















 This thesis is submitted for the Degree of  




Accounting Department  
Essex Business School 











      This study is dedicated to the following people who have helped me in various ways: 
 
To my parents, may their souls rest in peace. Thank you for encouraging me in all that I do, 
especially in my learning and acquisition of knowledge.  
 
To my brothers and sisters, may they be blessed by God always. Thank you for your 
unconditional love, support, motivation and prayers. 
 
To my father- and mother-in-law, thank you both for lending your support throughout my 
PhD and motivating me to try my best. May God bless you. 
 
To my wife, for her endless patience and love not only during my PhD studies but in all that I 
do. Thank you for caring for our wonderful children when I couldn’t be there for you all. 
 
To my children Suod and Jana, whose laughter and smiles have driven me on to complete my 
studies and be the best that I can be. 
 
To my hero star Shaima “sister-in-law”, who in fighting her cancer by outstanding spirit, 
surrounded by endless love from her kids and husband, has given me a good lesson in how to 













First of all, I must express my sincere thanks to my Lord, the Most Glorious, who has 
bestowed the ability and power in me to achieve all that I have in my life. 
Heartfelt thanks are due to Professor Thankom Arun and Dr Diogenis Baboukardos for 
supervising my thesis, providing insightful guidance and holding countless meetings and 
discussions. Your support and encouragement are matched by your endless patience and for 
that I am ever so grateful. It has been an honour and a pleasure to be a PhD student of 
Professor Thankom Arun. Your supervision of my work and provision of helpful feedback is 
an indication of your dedication to your students. Thanks also to Dr Diogenis Baboukardos 
for making a concerted effort to raise my spirits when times are difficult and helping me to 
rise to the challenge by seeking enjoyment in all that I do.  
My brothers and sisters have supported and motivated me throughout my life and for 
that I will be eternally grateful. Special thanks are due to my brother Messai Alrashidi, who 
became an admirable role model when our father passed away. You have taken a real interest 
in my future and advised me when I have had important decisions to make. I am especially 
grateful to my sister Fatima, who has been like a second mother to me since our mother 
passed away. You have always believed in me and what I am capable of and it is clear that 
you have always wanted what is best for me.  
Thanks are also due to the College of Business Studies, and the Public Authority for 
Applied Education and Training, for sponsoring this PhD and effectively giving me the 
opportunity to realise my dream. I’d also like to thank Souod Alazmi, Usman Zafar, Hamzah 








This thesis investigates access to finance in listed Indian firms. The Indian market offers an 
interesting context for my investigation. For instance, although India has one of the leading 
global economies, it is characterised by weak corporate governance and little investor 
protection. Therefore, the results found in previous studies on developed economies may not 
apply to India or other similar empirical settings. I aim to answer three questions. First, how 
audit quality impacts access to finance for Indian listed firms. Second, what is the influence 
of independent directors on access to finance in listed firms in India. Third, to what extent 
does gender diversity on boards affect access to finance in Indian listed firms. I use secondary 
data from Prowessdx database to examine these relationships. Limited attention theory is 
applied to interpret the results on firms’ access to finance by exploring the capital providers’ 
perceptions of these firms.   
 
The findings show that providers of finance consider fees from both audits and non-audits to 
be a signal of a high-quality audit, which enhances the credibility of the financial statements 
and in turn has a desirable impact on firms’ access to finance. Financial providers also 
consider the percentage of independent directors on the board to be a red flag; this can 
negatively affect a firm’s access to finance. However, the remuneration of the independent 
directors has a beneficial impact on a firm’s access to finance. Additionally, the finding 
provide weak evidence of financial providers considering the presence of female directors on 
boards and their participation on board committees to be a ‘green flag’, positively affecting 
firms’ access to finance. The results showed consistency when additional tests were run. The 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction   
Access to finance is a cornerstone for starting a business, surviving, remaining 
competitive in the market (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998) and 
continuing to grow (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006; Malhotra et al., 2007). Although access to 
finance is vital for firms’ progress, few studies in the literature analyse the behaviour of 
capital providers or their needs with the goal of helping more firms to gain access to finance. 
Cascino et al. (2014) confirm this lack of investigations into the needs of capital providers. At 
the same time, there are inadequate studies examining the capital constraints that firms face, 
which prevent their access to finance (Coluzzi et al., 2012; Ferrando & Mulier, 2015). A 
company’s access to finance concerns the ease with which it is able to obtain credit and is 
closely related to capital constraints. If a company is unable to access financing, it is more 
likely to be capital constrained and will find it difficult to obtain loans, issue new shares, or 
realise proceeds from the sale of illiquid assets (Lamont et al., 2001: 529). Therefore, the 
initial idea of this thesis was to analyse capital providers’ perspectives on firms. Then, I 
recognised the substantial need for academic studies on access to finance in the context of 
developing markets. Beck et al. (2006) and Fowowe (2017) state that remarkably little 
empirical research has been conducted on emerging markets, despite the known difficulties 
companies face when attempting to access finance in these countries. The aim of this thesis is 
to contribute to the literature on access to finance by exploring the capital providers’ 
perspective on how firms might gain better access to finance in the emerging market of India. 
1.2 Context  
Emerging economies differ considerably from developed economies in terms of their 
history, culture, business environment, politics and infrastructure, and can have entirely 
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distinct features due to insufficient protection of the privileges of shareholders (La Porta et 
al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
2010; Claessens et al., 2013) and weakness in capital markets (Claessens et al., 2013). In 
addition, the unusual dominance of families and the government can occur in emerging 
economies, due to their ownership of most of the companies in those economies (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Lins, 2003; Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). These substantial differences suggest 
that the results of a study conducted in developed countries may not apply to emerging 
countries. It is therefore important to conduct studies to understand the nature of these 
contexts.  
The institutional context of India is the most appropriate context for this study for 
several reasons. First, India is the second-most populous country in the world with 1.3 billion 
people (CIA, 2020), representing 18% of the global population. India is expected to become 
the most populous country within a decade (United Nation, 2019). It has a unique context as a 
multicultural country that is characterised by several religions, languages, ethnic groups, etc. 
This diversity allows India to present many of the characteristics of other developing 
countries.  
India became the fifth-largest economy in 2019 (Mayers, 2020) and is expected to 
become the third-largest by 2030 (Bloomberg, 2020). Also, India is a member of the Group 
of Twenty, which boasts two-thirds of the global population, 75% of all trade and 85% of 
global GDP (gross domestic product). India has a well-functioning stock market, the Bombay 
Stock Exchange. Established in 1875, it is one of the oldest stock markets globally and the 
oldest stock market in Asia (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). Many international investors and 
multinational companies operate in the Indian economy (Sharma & Singh, 2018). Thus, India 
is one of the most important and economically leading countries in the world. 
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Like other developing countries, the Indian market is dominated by large family 
businesses (Houqe et al., 2017), which are characterised by lower levels of professionalism 
and high levels of nepotism. The country appears to have inadequate investor protection 
mechanisms and limited corporate governance practices (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). As a 
result, there have been large-scale scandals, such as the Satyam scandal in 2009, which 
involved almost one billion US dollars and raised concerns about the roles of audit quality 
and corporate governance in monitoring management actions, e.g. in producing credible 
financial statements (Gakhar, 2014), all of which have become major concerns for capital 
providers. Based on the details mentioned above, I believe that India fits our investigation 
perfectly and presents similar issues to other developing countries (e.g. market imperfections 
tend to be a stronger characteristic in emerging countries, Yang et al., 2020). 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study explores how capital providers evaluate three firm elements, namely audit 
quality, board independence and gender diversity on corporate boards, in order to protect 
their investments in Indian listed firms. This evaluation by capital providers might affect 
firms’ access to finance. These three elements are converted into research questions. First, 
what is the effect of audit quality on firms’ access to finance in listed Indian firms? Second, 
what is the influence of board independence on firms’ access to finance in listed Indian 
firms? Third, what is the impact of gender diversity on boards of directors and firms’ access 
to finance in listed Indian firms? Based on these questions, this thesis examines the 
relationship between Indian-listed firms’ access to finance and their audit quality to shed light 
on how audit quality impacts access to finance, it explores the association between board 
independence and access to finance to examine how board independence influences the 
firms’ access to finance and it investigates the association between gender diversity on a 
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board of directors and access to finance in India in order to explore how the gender diversity 
of a board impacts financial access. Figure 1 illustrates the research questions of this thesis.  









1.3.1 First research question 
The first research question, What is the effect of audit quality on firms’ access to 
finance in listed Indian firms?  This thesis examines the relationship between Indian-listed 
firms’ access to finance and their audit quality to shed light on how audit quality impacts 
access to finance. Capital providers look for reliable financial information when evaluating a 
firm’s financial situation and use auditors’ judgment about a firm’s financial reporting 
quality. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) argue that audits provide a way to monitor firms’ 
financial reporting processes. Audits also ensure that management actions are supervised, 
reducing the chance of management manipulation (Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2012). Therefore, 
capital providers might see high audit and non-audit fees as a sign of high audit quality. The 
audit fees paid could be considered a sign of commitment to the audit process (Leventis et al., 
2011; Esplin et al., 2017). Indeed, Gandía and Huguet (2020) argue that, if firms attempt to 

























cost of debt. Non-audit fees may improve the accounting practices of companies (Choi et al., 
2009). However, capital providers may not observe the difference between firms audited by 
the Big 4 audit firms and those audited by small firms in terms of audit quality. For example, 
Jeong and Rho (2004) find no significant relationship between earnings management and size 
of auditor in Korea; these findings are corroborated by additional studies in Canada and 
France (Othman & Zeghal, 2006) and in Greece (Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2012). 
It is important to note that the professional accounting organisations that supervise and 
arrange auditing in India have been criticised for a lack of action in terms of audit errors 
(Chakrabarti, 2005). The big four accounting firms (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte, and KPMG) receive significantly higher fees in India than in other 
countries, even though there is no difference in the quality of the audits they provide (Joshy 
et al., 2015). In a recent policy document, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA, 2020) 
suggests that the shareholders are theoretically charged with appointing auditors. In reality, 
auditors are appointed and dismissed by the directors.  
Therefore, various attempts are being made by the Indian government to improve the 
quality of audits and competition among audit firms by expanding the number of auditors 
operating in the country, driving down the fees charged by auditors, and limiting their ability 
to sell non-audit services to audit clients. Most industry bodies have signalled their 
discomfort with the additional non-audit services that auditors routinely offer their clients 
(ET, 2020). Recognising the public opinion on this matter, PWC India, Grant Thornton and 
Deloitte have voluntarily ceased offering non-audit services to Indian companies to enhance 
confidence in the quality of their auditing processes and emphasise their independence. 
As previously argued, it is possible that paying more in fees for auditing services may 
suggest that the quality of the audit service provided is superior, thereby limiting the scope 
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for management to engage in earnings management, particularly in India context it is 
assumed that all firms offer similar quality audits irrespective of whether or not they are a Big 
Four firm. Also, in the same context the absence of adequate investor protection, providers of 
capital will look for indications of audit quality for reassurance that any investment will not 
be subject to manipulation by the company’s management. Therefore, I assume that the 
payment of sizeable audit fees is interpreted by capital providers as a reassurance, thereby 
encouraging them to agree to allow more access to finance by reducing capital constraints to 
firms because they have faith in the accuracy of the financial statements presents. 
Consequently, I expect that a significant positive relationship will be observed the fees that 
Indian firms pay for auditing services and the access that these same companies have to 
finance. As such, Hypothesis One is as follows: 
H1: A positive relationship exists between audit fees and access to finance for listed Indian 
firms. 
Also, it is possible that paying more in fees for non-auditing services may suggest that 
companies utilise an effective accounting system as a result of a knowledge spill-over. This 
could have the effect of making their financial statements more credible, particularly in 
Indian context is assumed that all firms offer similar quality audits irrespective of whether or 
not they are a Big Four firm. Consequently, I believe that the payment of sizeable non-audit 
fees will be interpreted by capital providers as reassurance that encourages them to offer 
more access to finance by decrease capital constraints to the firms because they believe that 
the financial statements are reliable and the firm is receiving effective monitoring. For this 
reason, it is anticipated that a positive relationship will be observed between the non-audit 
fees that Indian firms pay and the access that these companies have to finance. As such, 
Hypothesis Two is as follows: 
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H2: A positive relationship exists between non-audit fees and access to finance for listed 
Indian firms. 
1.3.2 Second research question 
The second research question, what is the influence of board independence on firms’ 
access to finance in listed Indian firms? This thesis explores the association between board 
independence and access to finance to examine how board independence influences the 
firms’ access to finance. Independent directors are one of the most important elements of the 
corporate governance of any company. For example, independent directors are significant in 
providing good corporate governance (Weisbach, 1988; Fich & Shivdasani, 2012). They also 
reduce information asymmetry (Joh & Jung, 2012; Lin et al., 2015) and improve the level of 
corporate disclosure (Armstrong et al., 2014). Independent directors on a board enhance the 
monitoring of the firm’s management (Armstrong et al., 2014; Goh & Gupta, 2016), reducing 
the potential for management manipulation, which can lead to better financing terms (Bhojraj 
& Sengupta, 2003; Francis et al., 2012). Therefore, the presence of independent directors 
would likely increase capital providers’ trust in terms of the reduction of management 
manipulation. 
However, the context plays an important role in determining the board independence 
(Pascual-Fuster & Crespí-Cladera, 2020). Independent directors in India are often handpicked 
by a company’s promoters, defined as a bulk group that owns significant shares in the 
company. Therefore, they often prefer to remain friendly with the management rather than act 
as watchdogs (Khan & Kotishwar, 2011). Independent directors are not really independent as 
they are chosen by the promoters or owners of businesses. Indeed, the directors' 
independence exists only on paper in the Indian setting, a major concern for good governance 
(OECD, 2019). The blurring of directors' responsibility seen in the case of Ratan Tata and 
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Cyrus Mistry is unique in corporate history
1
. The Companies Act of 1956 does not provide an 
explicit definition of the term ‘independent director’ and so the government is making efforts 
to enhance the role of independent directors on company boards through legislation such as 
Clause 49, Revised Clause 49, and the Companies Act of 2013. These regulations are meant 
to enhance management monitoring and more specifically spell out the duties of the board of 
directors, which could deliver a clearer picture of the financial position of firms. For 
example, Section 149 of the Companies Act 2013 defines the term ‘independent director’ and 
provides details regarding directors’ selection, role, duties and responsibilities. 
From the evidence presented, it is apparent that the notion of independent directors 
serving on the boards on Indian companies is a relatively new idea. What is more, the fact 
that many of these independent directors are selected by managers could undermine their 
independence and adversely affect the duties they perform. Thus, I assume that capital 
providers will perceive a high percentage of independent directors as a negative quality 
because this casts doubt on their ability to monitor effectively. Therefore, capital providers 
might reduce the availability of finance by increasing capital constraints for these firms. As 
such, it is anticipated that there will be a negative relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors serving on the boards of listed Indian companies and the ability of 
those firms to access finance. As such, Hypothesis One is as follows: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of independent members on a 
firm’s board and access to finance for listed firms in India. 
The remunerations of independent directors is important element to evaluate the board 
independency. The capital providers may see the remuneration of independent directors in 
                                                 
1
 Cyrus Mistry became chairman of the Tata group after Ratan Tata’s retirement in 2012. However, Cyrus was 
ejected before the end of his term, which raised concerns about both corporate governance practices and the 
board of directors being controlled by promoters (MC & Rentala, 2018).  
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one of two ways. It could show a reward for friendliness with the firm management, 
indicating low monitoring of the management and a lack of independence in those 
independent directors. Goh and Gupta (2016) state that there is an inverse relationship 
between the independence of independent directors and their remuneration. Conversely, 
capital providers could interpret the high remuneration of independent directors as a reward 
for outstanding work. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that it is vital to 
compensate independent directors appropriately for the extra tasks and duties they perform. 
The remuneration of independent directors in Indian listed firms consists of two 
elements, sitting fees and net profit; these two factors are subject to a cap of $1,500 per 
meeting and 1% of the firm’s annual profit (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). Capital providers 
may not perceive this remuneration as a negative sign in terms of independent directors’ 
responsibilities. From a capital provider’s viewpoint, remuneration may actually signal a 
firm’s profitability, particularly because independent director remuneration consists of a 
percentage of the firm’s annual profits. Lenders prefer profitable firms (Jiang et al., 2018) 
due to the low chance of default risk (Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008; Lorca et al., 2011). The same 
idea applies to sitting fees, which are considered a sign of an active board. Xie et al. (2003) 
and Ntim and Osei (2011) find that firm performance is significantly enhanced by how active 
the board is.  
As previously argued, the independent directors serving on the boards of listed Indian 
companies are remunerated on the basis of sitting fees as well as an agreed percentage of the 
company’s net profit. It is possible that capital providers may interpret the remuneration 
offered to independent directors as a sign of how profitable the underlying company is owing 
to the sum being related to the annual profits. In addition, it might indicate the activity of the 
board due to sitting fees is a part of the remuneration. As such, it is logical to assume that 
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those providing capital will be more inclined to offer more finance by reducing capital 
constraints if a company makes sizeable remunerations to its independent directors. On this 
basis, it is anticipated that the remuneration paid to the independent directors of companies 
listed in India will be positively related to the firm’s ability to obtain finance on agreeable 
terms. As such, Hypothesis Two is as follows: 
 H2: There is a positive relationship between the remuneration of independent directors and 
access to finance for listed firms in India. 
1.3.3 Third research question 
The third research question of this thesis; what is the impact of gender diversity on 
boards of directors and firms’ access to finance in listed Indian firms? This thesis investigates 
the association between gender diversity on a board of directors and access to finance in India 
in order to explore how the gender diversity of a board impacts financial access. The presence 
of women on boards of directors creates group heterogeneity. Empirical sociology research 
has strongly suggested that a group comprised of individuals of different backgrounds, 
cultures, sexes and races is likely to determine a wide range of solutions to challenges, 
resulting in better decision making (Hillman et al., 2007). Research also indicates that women 
have better listening and communication skills than their male counterparts. It is, therefore, 
logical to assume that women are well-suited to performing tasks that involve communicating 
with various groups of people (Schubert, 2006). It has also been found that women make 
more thorough preparations for board meetings than men (Huse & Solberg, 2006). Cardillo et 
al. (2020) find that female directors provide better monitoring than men. Female directors are 
also significant in terms of the delivery of good corporate governance (Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2008; Gordini & Rancati, 2017), especially in firms with weak corporate governance 
(Ionascu et al., 2018). As a result, women directors could help to reduce fraud (Capezio & 
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Mavisakalyan, 2016). It has been observed that the presence of women on firms’ boards has 
improved the oversight and monitoring of management actions (Carter et al., 2003), 
encouraged firms to follow the best ethical practices (Williams, 2003), and improved 
voluntary disclosure (Gul et al., 2009; Alves et al., 2015; Arun et al., 2015). The relatively 
high attendance rate of female directors also implies their willingness to monitor activities 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). There is a growing consensus that female directors are more 
effective at monitoring management teams and appraising their efforts (Bennedsen & 
Meisner Nielsen, 2010; Alves et al., 2015).  
Thus, several regulators and governments around the world have encouraged firms to 
appoint female members to their boards, and the Indian government has actively promoted 
women’s empowerment and gender equality by introducing many corporate governance 
reforms and regulations that aim to enhance gender equality (Gandhi, 2016). One example is 
the Companies Act of 2013, which mandates that at least one member of a firm’s board of 
directors must be female. However, only a small number of women smash the ‘glass ceiling’ 
and climb the corporate ladder (Ghosh, 2017); most board directorships and management 
positions continue to be held by men (Srivastava et al., 2018). Female directors may not 
perform their duties as expected if they are selected by the promoters or owner, and most new 
female directors are associated with promoters (Duggal, 2016). There is also a strong cultural 
resistance to the progress of women in India as Indian men control most of the decision-
making in all aspects of life (Chauhan & Dey, 2017); women in India are significantly less 
empowered than women in developed countries (Jadiyappa et al., 2019). 
The committees within a board of directors constitute a significant aspect of the 
governance process and are supposed to be created properly. They are important because the 
board regularly assigns tasks to the committees within it in order to more effectively manage 
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specialised or complex matters, and to use members’ time more efficiently. The main task of 
a committee is to provide recommendations to the board. The presence of women on these 
committees, particularly monitoring committees, reduces managerial manipulation (Zalata et 
al., 2019) and increases the integrity of company reports (Srinidhi et al., 2011).  
As previously argued, as a general rule, corporate governance among Indian companies 
is notoriously weak and it is possible that if more women were appointed to the board, this 
could enhance the monitoring of management. For this reason, it is logical to assume that the 
providers of capital will look more favourably upon those companies that appoint female 
directors and this will manifest itself in these companies being better able to obtain finance 
by decreasing capital constraints. Consequently, it is anticipated that the relationship between 
the number of female directors and the ability of companies listed in India to obtain finance 
will be significant and positive. As such, Hypothesis One is as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of female directors on a firm’s board 
and access to finance for listed firms in India.  
Also, female directors of companies listed in India are less likely than their male 
counterparts to participate in board committees yet when women do participate in these 
committees, the resulting company reports have greater integrity. It is possible that those 
providing capital interpret the involvement of women on committees because it means that 
the financial statements are more credible. On this basis, it is anticipated that companies with 
female directors participating in committees will benefit from better access to finance by 
reducing capital constraints. Therefore, it is anticipated that the relationship between the 
participation of female directors in committees and the ability of companies listed in India to 
obtain funding is significant and positive. As such, Hypothesis Two is as follows: 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between female directors’ participation in firms’ board 
committees and access to finance for listed firms in India. 
1.4 Theoretical Framework   
This thesis is informed by limited attention theory. Basically, capital constraints prevent 
firms from accessing finance; without these constraints, firms have easy access. Indeed, 
Cheng et al. (2014) and García-Sánchez et al. (2019) argue that a reduction in a firm’s capital 
constraints increases the firm’s access to finance. Moreover, a firm’s level of access to 
finance reflects how capital providers perceive it. For example, Ding et al. (2017) state that 
capital providers’ perceptions of firms can be measured though the firms’ degree of access to 
finance. Therefore, I’ve used the reverse relationship between firms’ access to finance and 
their capital constraints to explore capital providers’ perceptions of these firms (Alrashidi et 
al., 2021).  
In this sense, Information about firms plays a vital role in determining capital 
providers’ perceptions of them. For instance, capital providers use such information to 
evaluate potential risk (García-Sánchez  et al., 2019), and some kinds of information improve 
capital providers’ confidence, thereby enhancing a firm’s access to finance. Indeed, Dhaliwal 
et al. (2012) and Bayar et al. (2018) state that certain information grabs the attention of 
capital providers, encouraging them to offer access to finance. Consequently, information 
about a firm acts as a signal to capital providers and affects their judgments, thereby 
impacting a firm’s access to finance by reducing or increasing its capital constraints. 
‘Attention’ refers to the “noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focusing of time and 
effort by organisational decision-makers on both issues and answers” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). 
The basic technique for paying attention involves noticing information, understanding its 
influence on perceptions, and then recognising the effect of those perceptions on decisions 
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(Ramos et al., 2020). Limited attention theory assumes that capital providers have a narrow 
attention span and limited processing power. Therefore, this thesis will analyse capital 
providers’ attention/reactions toward three important firm elements in the Indian context, 
based on limited attention theory, in order to reflect the monitoring of a firm’s management 
and the credibility of its financial statements. Due to regular corporate scandals, the 
monitoring of management actions has become essential in terms of creating better access to 
finance for companies. Firstly, information regarding the audit quality of Indian listed firms 
may draw the positive attention of capital providers because high audit quality plays an 
essential role in the production of credible financial statements, which are preferred by capital 
providers. Secondly, information about board independence, and particularly the existence of 
independent directors on a firm’s board, may draw negative attention from capital providers 
because of doubts regarding the effectiveness of the role played by independent directors on 
the boards of Indian listed firms. Thirdly, capital providers may have a positive reaction to 
increased gender diversity on the boards of Indian listed firms. This is because of the 
perception that gender-diverse boards are better at monitoring the actions of managers. These 
three elements may affect financial access for Indian listed firms because of their effects on 
the opinions of capital providers.    
1.5 Methodology 
This thesis explores capital providers’ attention which reflects on firms’ access to 
finance, proxied by Indian firms’ capital constraints; a company’s access to finance concerns 
the ease with which it is able to obtain finance and is closely related to capital constraints.  
By access to finance, I mean capital constraints. The term ‘access to finance’ refers to a 
company’s ability to obtain finance (Cheng et al., 2014). The term ‘capital constraints’ refers 
to the restrictions on a firm’s capital that are ‘due to credit constraints or inability to borrow, 
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inability to issue equity, dependence on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets’ (Lamont et al., 
2001: 529). Therefore, firms face poor access to finance due to capital constraints. Indeed, 
reducing capital constraints places a firm in a better position to gain finance (Cheng et al., 
2014; García-Sánchez et al., 2019; Malik et al., 2021). In other words, when firms have good 
access to finance, this is represented by reductions in their capital constraints. In the same 
vein, an increase in a company’s access to finance (i.e. reduction in its capital constraints) 
indicates that capital providers have a positive attitude toward the company; otherwise, they 
would reduce the company’s access to finance. The degree of a firm’s access to finance thus 
reflects capital providers’ perception of the firm (Ding et al., 2017). Therefore, I measure a 
firm’s access to finance as a proxy for its capital constraints to explore the perceptions of 
capital providers (Alrashidi et al., 2021). Two well-known proxies have been used to measure 
capital constraints in the literature. The first is the KZ-index, created by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), which serves as a proxy for the extent of financial constraints to which a given 
company is subject. The second measurement is the WW-index, created by Whited and Wu 
(2006), which determines the financial constraint status of each company. The more capital 
constrained a firm is, the higher is the value of each index (Cheng et al., 2014). Data were 
obtained from secondary sources found in the Prowessdx
2
 database of the Centre for the 
Monitoring of the Indian Economy (CMIE), which has data on stock prices, accounting 
numbers and corporate governance reports for companies that have stocks listed in the 
Mumbai & National Stock of India (Aswani, Chidambaran, & Hasan, 2021; Elango & 
Pattnaik, 2007; Mal & Gupta, 2020; Pinto & Rastogi, 2019). This provided the necessary 
financial data for individual companies as well as supplementary background information on 
their operations.  
                                                 
2
 the Prowessdx database is available in the following link https://prowessdx.cmie.com/ 
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In sum, the purpose of this thesis is threefold. First, it examines the relationship 
between audit and non-audit fees and a firm’s access to finance in India. Second, it examines 
the relationship between the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board, their 
remuneration, and the company’s access to finance in India. Finally, it explores the 
relationship between female directors on a firm’s board, their participation in board 
committees, and the company’s access to finance in India. 
1.6 Key Findings 
First, I empirically tested the hypothesis that audit and non-audit fees increase firms’ 
ability to access finance by reducing their capital constraints. The results revealed that both 
audit and non-audit fees have significant negative associations with capital constraints. The 
results indicate that, despite the scepticism toward the audit process in India, capital providers 
might view audits (audit and non-audit fees) as a vital sign of the reliability and credibility of 
companies’ financial statements, positively affecting access to finance.  
Next, I tested the relationship between independent directors on firms’ boards and 
access to finance. A negative relationship between the percentage of independent members 
on a firm’s board and access to finance by increasing their capital constraints, for listed firms 
in India, was hypothesised, as was a positive relationship between the remuneration of 
independent directors and those firms’ access to finance by reducing their capital constraints. 
The results show that a higher proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board is related 
to the firm having a reduced ability to access finance, because the independence of directors 
is questionable due to the particular Indian institutional setting (Kumar & Singh, 2012). 
Therefore, capital providers might evaluate the existence of independent directors on firms’ 
boards as a sign of ineffectiveness and low independence. However, greater remuneration of 
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the independent directors increases firms’ ability to access finance because it indicates that 
the company has higher sitting fees and net profits (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). 
 Finally, I tested whether the presence of female board directors and their participation 
on board committees positively affects firms’ ability to access finance in India by reducing 
capital constraints. The findings provide weak evidence about the providers of financing 
consider female directors on boards and their participation in board committees to be a ‘green 
flag’ because their presence indicates that the board directors will fulfil their duties from the 
capital providers’ perspective, which positively affects the firms’ access to finance. 
Therefore, I failed to approve that more gender diversity on firms’ boards produces a positive 
reaction from the capital providers.   
1.7 Contributions 
 The results of this study make some contributions to the literature on both access to 
finance and the limited attention theory. First, this thesis contributes to the literature on 
access to finance by providing insights on factors that influence financing decisions. Also, 
this thesis responds to calls for an understanding of the needs of capital providers (Cascino et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, most of the literature exploring access to finance focuses on 
developed countries; little attention has been paid to developing countries. As mentioned 
earlier, developing countries differ greatly from developed countries in many ways, and these 
contexts need to be studied in order to improve our understanding of access to finance. 
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, no study has explored the factors that influence 
access to finance in the Indian context; the present study aims to fill this gap by introducing 
evidence that highlights capital providers’ attitudes in the unique institutional setting of India. 
First contribution, there is little exploration in the literature of the impact of audit 
quality on firms’ access to finance in emerging markets. Unlike previous studies that have 
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focused on various aspects of audits and finance in developed economies (Larcker & 
Richardson, 2004; Srinidhi & Gul, 2007; Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Nam & Ronen, 2012), this 
investigation focuses on India and is motivated by concerns regarding the quality of audit 
services offered even by the big four accounting firms (Joshy et al., 2015), as well as by 
actions taken by professional accounting organisations to address audit errors and 
deficiencies (Chakrabarti, 2005).  
The second contribution of this thesis is its examination of the effect of independent 
directors on a company’s board, as well as the effect of their remuneration, on the company’s 
ability to access finance in India (Chapter 5). This part of the thesis examines in depth how 
capital providers react to and perceive the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s 
board and the remuneration that those independent directors receive. There is remarkably 
little understanding of this relationship (Lorca et al., 2011) although previous research 
conducted in developed markets has focused on the effect that independent directors have on 
finance (Sengupta & Bhojraj, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004a; Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008). 
However, the impact of independent directors may be different in the Indian context (Lorca et 
al., 2011). Thus, this study aims to fill this gap by presenting evidence from India to show the 
attitude of capital providers toward the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board 
and the remuneration that those independent directors receive.  
The third contribution of this thesis relates to the findings showing weak evidence 
regards the presence of female directors on companies’ boards affects their ability to access 
finance in India. More specifically, the study investigates how capital providers perceive the 
number of female directors on boards and their participation in board committees, and how 
those perceptions determine their responses in terms of capital constraints (Chapter 6). There 
is little understanding of this relationship (Arun et al., 2015) and the extant research has 
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largely examined the effects that directors have on financing in developed contexts (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Arun et al., 2015; Li & Zhang, 2019). However, the impact of female 
directors might differ according to the country context because corporate governance falls 
short in emerging markets (Liedong & Rajwani, 2018); thus, the current study helps close this 
gap by highlighting the attitude of capital providers towards the number of female directors 
on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees. 
This study also makes a theoretical contribution. Most of the existing studies regarding 
access to finance employ the agency theory (Sengupta & Bhojraj, 2003; Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2011; Barroso et al., 2018). Another theory often used in the literature is the pecking 
order theory (Hernandez-Nicolas et al., 2015; Benkraiem et al., 2018). Also,  is the signalling 
theory ( Koonce et al., 2016; Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017). Yet, the findings of the studies are 
inconclusive and provide contradictory results. For instance, numerous corporate governance 
researchers believe that the agency theory is not adequate in terms of providing a thorough 
grasp of the main corporate governance issues in emerging markets because of the prevalence 
of ineffective capital markets and concentrated ownership structures (Siddiqui, 2010; Htay & 
Salman, 2013; Al-Hiyari, 2017). These diverse findings provide a great opportunity to use a 
new theoretical framework to provide new insights. Therefore, this study aims to broaden the 
understanding of access to finance by applying limited attention theory and attempting to 
provide an alternative description of the relationships between audit fees, non-audit fees and 
the financial constraints of a company (Chapter 4), the percentage of independent directors on 
a firm’s board, their remuneration and the firm’s financial constraints (Chapter 5), and female 
directors on a firm’s board, their participation in board committees and the firm’s financial 
constraints (Chapter 6). To my knowledge, no other study has applied limited attention theory 
in this context. Previous research incorporating this theory has focused on investors’ attention 
(Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2004; Barber & Odean, 2008) or debtors’ 
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perceptions of advertising expenses (Ding et al., 2017). Therefore, this thesis extends the 
application of limited attention theory in order to interpret capital providers’ feelings on 
audits, independent directors on firms’ boards, and gender diversity in firms’ boards in India.   
  
1.8 Structure of the Thesis   
This thesis contains eight chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 is an introduction section which highlights the key points of the thesis, and 
offers a brief discussion of the research context, theoretical framework, research questions, 
research methodology, key findings, contributions and structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief discussion of access to finance, beginning by explaining the 
definition of access to finance and then discussing the advantages and disadvantages of better 
access to finance. In addition, it discusses the context of the investigation, India, in order to 
provide background information on the economic, social and political context, the developing 
financial system, and corporate governance in the country. This chapter also reviews and 
discusses the audit quality in India, the role of board independence in India, and gender 
diversity in India. The second part of the chapter discusses the previous theories that have 
been used to interpret capital providers’ attention/reaction, and its relation to access to 
finance. The theory employed in this investigation, limited attention theory, is then 
introduced.  
Chapter 3 is the methodology chapter that discusses the philosophical position applied 




Chapter 4 discusses the first research question, which involves examining the 
association between audit and non-audit fees and access to finance for Indian listed firms. 
The literature is explored and the hypotheses are developed. The three steps of the research 
design are also discussed: sample selection, measuring variables and model specification. The 
results are then presented and the findings discussed before the chapter is concluded.   
Chapter 5 explores the second research question regarding independent directors on 
boards and access to finance for Indian listed firms. This chapter discuss the previous 
literature on this topic and two hypotheses are developed. The selection of the sample, 
variable measurements and model are then explained, followed by the findings, discussion 
thereof and conclusion.  
Chapter 6 presents the final research question, exposing the association of boards’ 
gender diversity with firms’ access to finance for Indian listed firms. Prior findings on this 
topic are discussed and two hypotheses are developed. The research methodology, namely 
sample selection process, variable measurements and model, is explained followed by the 
results and a discussion. Finally, the chapter is concluded.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by highlighting the key findings, contributions, 









The purpose of this chapter is to provide background about India and discuss the 
theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis. Thus, this chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first section discusses the ‘access to finance’ literature, starting with a definition 
of access to finance, and then offering some factors that might affect a firm’s access to 
finance. This is followed by a presentation of the literature on the advantages for firms having 
better access to finance (e.g. expansion, growth). After that, I will present some literature in 
regards to the disadvantages of firms having difficulties accessing finance (e.g. preventing 
firms from making the most of profitable opportunities and forcing firms to exit the market). 
Finally, I refer to the literature on the effects of firms’ access to finance at the international 
and macroeconomic level.   
The second section of this chapter discusses and reviews the background of India’s 
institutional setting and justifies why it is important to study this context. This section 
consists of four parts. The first part demonstrates and explains the motivation for conducting 
such a study in an emerging market. The second part describes the Indian context and 
particularly the political, historical, population and economic background of the country. 
Then, the development of financial systems in India is reviewed. In the final part of this 
section, the development of corporate governance regulations and codes in India is presented.  
The third section in this chapter deals with the theoretical framework. The main 
purpose of this section is to review and evaluate the main theories applied in the literature on 
access to finance. It starts with a discussion of the agency theory and its main assumptions. 
After that, the reasons why the agency theory is not the most suitable for this study are 
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explained. The second part of the section is a review of the pecking order theory. In this part, 
I review its main assumptions and suitability. Then, the limited attention theory is discussed 
and reviewed, and I explain why I chose this theory for this study. Finally, a conclusion to the 
chapter is provided.  
2.2 Access to Finance 
2.2.1 What is access to finance? 
Consensus has yet to be reached on a precise definition of access to finance, but it is 
usually assumed that the term refers to the ability of a company to obtain quality financial 
services at a reasonable cost (Claessens, 2006). A definition such as this is open to 
interpretation because perceptions of what constitutes quality and a reasonable cost will vary 
from one person to another (Bae et al., 2012). The interpretations of what constitutes access 
to finance and usage of finance can easily be confused (Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). 
However, I will define access to finance as fewer capital constraints, i.e., fewer of those 
market frictions that may prevent a firm from funding all its desired investments (Cheng et 
al., 2014). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that, if credit markets and capital markets operate 
perfectly, then a company’s investment behaviour will have no bearing on its financing 
decisions. However, if the market does not operate perfectly, the company’s investment 
decisions will be governed by the financial constraints that it faces. The extent to which a 
company is experiencing financing constraints can be inferred from whether internal funds 
affect the sensitivity of investment. This is based on the assumption that there is a higher cost 
associated with external funds than with internal funds, owing to the effect of information 
asymmetries (Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). If investment is particularly sensitive to internal 
funds, then the company is prone to financing constraints.  
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2.2.2 Advantages of access to finance   
If a company has ready access to finance, then it has the wherewithal to continue 
expanding. The finance industry plays a central role in stimulating economic growth by 
ensuring that the finite amount of credit is made available to the companies that are most 
deserving. It has been well established in the empirical literature that financial development 
has a significant positive effect on firm growth and especially among the companies that are 
considered to be most deserving of funding (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). If companies are able to access funding as required then this will help to mitigate 
liquidity constraints and enhance resource allocation (Wurgler, 1999; Love, 2003).  
In other words, when companies pursue potentially profitable investment opportunities, 
they hope to realise benefits in the form of a competitive advantage or better performance. 
However, these investments require financial investment that is only available if the capital 
constraints to which a firm is subject do not prevent funding being made available. It is a 
company’s profit maximisation that determines the investment function. The investment 
function assumes that investment will be forthcoming if the interest rate, tax rate and 
marginal productivity of capital are all conducive (Summers et al., 1981). However, it has 
also been suggested that a firm’s cash flow is significantly related to whether or not 
investment can be made (Blundell et al., 1992; Whited, 1992).  
If capital-constrained firms are prevented from pursuing profitable ventures, this will 
not only stymie their performance, but could even threaten their very survival. It is only 
because of financing frictions that these positive-net-present-value investments are not 
pursued. Therefore, other things being equal, if capital constraints could be relaxed, firms 
would be able to take advantage of the profitable investments available to them, thereby 
enhancing their performance. Demonstrating this, Faulkender and Petersen (2012) use the 
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American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 as a natural experiment to examine the effect of 
a shock to the cost of internal finance. Their research indicates that the AJCA triggered a 
surge in corporate investment, albeit only among those firms that had previously been credit 
constrained.  
Another strand of the empirical literature considers the effect capital constraints have 
on firms’ decisions to enter or exit markets. For instance, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) study the 
personal tax returns of entrepreneurs to confirm that positive wealth shocks resulting from an 
inheritance are significantly positively related to the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. 
The same authors reveal that companies founded by people who have inherited a particularly 
large sum of money are more likely to survive, thereby inferring that these firms are less 
likely to be capital constrained (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994b).  
Levine (2005) distinguishes between new-entrant firms and incumbents, confirming 
that newly established, small and high-risk companies are disproportionately affected by 
capital constraints Klapper et al. (2006) indicate that better access to finance results in more 
start-up companies being established. Consequently, economies are able to benefit from 
higher rates of growth if they have an efficient financial system that helps to mitigate 
constraints. Furthermore, it has been claimed in the empirical literature that the reason why 
small companies experience lower rates of growth, pay lower dividends and are relatively 
highly geared stems from the constraints they experience (Cooley et al., 2001; Cabral & 
Mata, 2003).  
Indeed, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) assert that it is the constraining effect of their 
internal capital that explains why small US companies experience relatively poor asset 
growth. Moreover, they state that there is a significant positive relationship between the rate 
of growth and the ability to raise external funds. Similar results are obtained for a sample of 
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Indian companies by Becchetti and Trovato (2002). Also, Desai et al. (2008) reveal that this 
relationship holds even in the midst of a currency crisis. Furthermore, Beck et al. (2005) 
obtain survey data for companies operating around the world and conclude that small firms 
are disproportionately adversely affected by financial constraints, owing to the fact that they 
are subject to particularly tight restrictions.  
In addition, it has been consistently reported in the empirical literature that financially 
constrained companies are significantly less likely to invest in a broad spectrum of strategic 
activities (Hubbard, 1998; Campello et al., 2010) such as investment in inventory (Carpenter 
et al., 1998), hoarding labour during market downturns (Sharpe, 1994), research and 
development (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Hall & Lerner, 2010) and market share pricing 
(Chevalier, 1995). By imposing limits on investment of this nature, financial constraints are 
effectively responsible for suppressing companies’ ability to expand over time.  
The empirical literature also provides insights at the international and macroeconomic 
level. For instance, Banerjee and Duflo (2014) examine firms that were customers of an 
Indian bank to evaluate the effect of eligibility for a directed credit programme on their 
growth. Once the directed credit programme became operational, these firms started to grow 
at a faster rate, indicating that they had previously been credit constrained. Importantly, 
access to finance helps all companies to expand by exploiting opportunities that present 
themselves (Beck et al., 2006). Moreover, efforts to tackle financial exclusion encourage 
innovation and result in more efficient asset portfolios (Ayyagari et al., 2011). Therefore, 
there is ample evidence in the empirical literature to suggest that relaxing ‘capital constraints’ 
and thereby granting better access to finance would not only benefit firm-level performance 





2.3.1 Why emerging markets? 
Emerging markets are distinct from developed economies in many ways, such as their 
culture, regulatory environments and economic infrastructure. Consequently, several 
researchers have recognised the need for further investigations in emerging markets (Mellahi 
et al., 2016; Liedong & Rajwani, 2018). However, the vast majority of the empirical literature 
is concerned with developments in the US, UK and other advanced economies (Claessens & 
Tzioumis, 2006). This provides a rationale for conducting the current study in an emerging 
market as it deals with a topic of importance, worthy of investigation.  
Unfortunately, the difficulties that companies operating in emerging markets 
experience when attempting to access funding, and the cost of that finance if it is available, 
represent significant obstacles to economic growth and development (Aryeetey, 1998; Beck 
et al., 2006). One possible reason for these difficulties could be the credibility of the firms’ 
financial statements, which are supposed to reflect the firms’ financial performance and 
status. Indeed, even large private companies and listed companies based in emerging markets 
often produce financial statements that are relatively unreliable in comparison to those 
compiled in advanced economies (Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). Therefore, in developing 
countries, in order to gain an accurate perception of the issues faced by companies when 
seeking funding, it is necessary to conduct firm-level surveys to gain further insight into the 
financing constraints experienced in a particular location.  
In different contexts, there might be different reactions to audits. More interestingly, 
even within a single country there are often regional cultural and environmental differences. 
For example, Kharuddin et al. (2019) assert that the UK market for auditing is likely to differ 
considerably between cities. This is because each region of the country has its own culture. 
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Moreover, it is noted by Humphrey et al. (2009) that, at the height of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, international regulators required improvements in accounting capability and 
capacity in emerging economies, a sign of the differences that exist between cultures. In 
addition, it has been revealed that the way auditors behave with regards to earnings 
management differs markedly across the countries in which they operate, and this is likely to 
reflect the unique institutional setting and economic environment of each territory (Arnedo et 
al., 2008).  
Another difference in the business environment between developed and developing 
economies relates to the board of directors. In advanced economies, the board of directors is 
the main internal governance mechanism (Fama & Jensen, 1983), and is supposed to monitor 
the management, which affects the credibility of information produced in the financial 
statements. Thus, appointing independent directors to the board is supposed to improve 
corporate governance (Su & Lee, 2013; Wei et al., 2018). However, the standard of corporate 
governance in emerging markets often lags behind that in more advanced economies because 
the board of directors is less likely to monitor the management of the company in the absence 
of appropriate institutional support (Young et al., 2008). Moreover, Liedong and Rajwani 
(2018) consider whether corporate governance failings in emerging markets may be able to 
explain the problems experienced with debt financing.  
Also, considering the importance of the composition of the board of directors to 
corporate governance, the presence of females on the board is supposed to have a significant 
effect. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that the inclusion of females on the 
board could impact corporate governance in many significant ways. Society in emerging 
markets is becoming increasingly gender-inclusive, and regulators are making a concerted 
effort to ensure that women are able to work in industries that have traditionally been male-
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dominated. Within individual companies, there is a general increasing trend in the proportion 
of the workforce comprised of women. Be that as it may, top-level management positions and 
the board of directors continue to be overwhelmingly dominated by men. For instance, 
women account for just 22.8% of directors in the UK, 19.2% in the US, 18.2% in Spain, 9.5% 
in India and 3.1% in Japan (Catalyst, 2015). Given that the composition of the board is 
known to have a bearing on corporate governance, it is logical to assume that the appointment 
of female directors could have a significant effect, especially in India. It is known that 
corporate governance institutions are not as strong in emerging markets as they are in 
advanced economies, and this effectively enables companies to raise equity to help fund 
investments that generate small returns. In countries that have excellent corporate governance 
standards, firms are more inclined to fund investments using retained earnings or internal 
cash flow. As such, it is apparent that the standard of corporate governance in a country can 
explain the choice of funding for investment purposes, as well as the rate of return generated 
from those investments.  
Thus, it is important to highlight the effects of audit quality, board independence and 
gender diversity on the board’s role in enhancing access to finance in emerging markets. 
Thus, the current study considers these elements in the setting of the emerging market of 
India. In the next few sections, I will explain my motivation for choosing India as the context 
for this investigation  
2.3.2 Background  
India is one of the most important countries in the world. It is located in South Asia, 
surrounded by the Arabian Sea and Bengal Bay, between Pakistan and Burma, and has a total 
land area of around 3,287 square kilometres. Its geographic location is of strategic 
importance, contributing to its emerging power (CIA, 2020). Indeed, India has great 
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significance among other countries due to its location which helps it approach other countries 
and maintain trading with Europe, Africa and West Asia. Thus, India is considered to be in a 
central location and offers a link from East to West and North to South.  
Politically, prior to 15 August 1947, India was under British rule, but on this date it 
gained its independence, becoming a federal parliamentary republic. India’s constitution was 
written prior to its independence, in 1935, with the final draft being produced on 4 November 
1949. The constitution was formally adopted on 26 November and came into effect on 26 
January 1950. Both the Council of States and the House of the People may propose 
amendments to the constitution. In order for an amendment to be passed, more than half of 
the total membership of both houses must participate in the discussion a minimum of two-
thirds of the voting members of both houses must vote in favour it, and then it must receive 
assent from the country’s president. If the constitutional amendment procedures are to be 
amended, any such proposal will need to be ratified by a minimum of half of the country’s 
state legislatures prior to receiving presidential assent; since 1950, the constitution has been 
amended on numerous occasions, the most recent being in 2019 (CIA, 2020).  
India operates a common-law legal system based on the English approach. Legislative 
acts are subject to judicial review and there are distinct personal law codes that are applicable 
to Hindus, Muslims and Christians. India’s legislative branches are bicameral, the first being 
the Sansad or Parliament, which comprises the Rajya Sabha/Council of States. The Council 
of States has a total of 245 seats and 233 of the members are elected indirectly on the basis of 
proportional representation by territorial and state assemblies, with a further 12 members 
selected directly by the president. All 245 members serve terms of six years. Meanwhile, the 
Lok Sabha or House of the People has a total of 545 seats and all but two of its members are 
elected directly on a majority basis to represent constituencies. The other two members are 
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selected directly by the president and all 545 members serve terms of five years. The highest 
court in India is the Supreme Court, which comprises 28 judges, one of whom is the chief 
justice. The president appoints all judges and they serve until retirement at the age of 65 
years. India’s other courts include High Courts, Labour Courts and District Courts. In an 
attempt to eradicate corruption among the judiciary and alleviate a build-up of cases, in 2011 
the Cabinet agreed on a National Mission for Justice Delivery and Legal Reform.  
From the demographic perspective, India is the second-most populous country, with 1.3 
billion people (many of whom are young) (CIA, 2020). Women represent approximately 48 
percent of the population (The World Bank, 2019). India is considered a multicultural 
country, consisting of a number of ethnic groups, such as Indo-Aryan, Dravidian and others. 
There are many languages spoken in India (e.g. Hindi, Bengali, Marathi etc). The largest 
religious group is Hindu, representing about 80%, followed by Muslim with around 15% of 
the population. There is a large educated population, many of whom are fluent in English. 
India’s economy has emerged as one of the largest and fastest-growing in the world, 
resulting in its accession to the Group of Twenty (G20), which is regarded as the leading 
international forum for economic cooperation on a global basis. Collectively, the members of 
the G20 boast two-thirds of the global population, 75% of all trade and 85% of global GDP, 
but also the majority of all people living in poverty. The leaders of the G20 nations meet on 
an annual basis at the G20 Summit (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020). Initially 
formed in 1999, the summit G20 is essentially a forum for discussion and consultation 
between the central bank governors and finance ministers of the respective member countries 
(G20, 2021). 
The Indian economy is truly diverse, spanning subsistence farming, modern agricultural 
practices, small-scale manual manufacturing and various modern industries and service-
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sector firms. Almost half of the population works in agriculture but the most notable engine 
of growth is the service sector, which generates two-thirds of GDP despite employing less 
than a third of the workforce. Just a few decades ago, India was gripped by poverty but now 
the domestic economy has been overhauled, with thriving research and development 
producing innovations, a large number of people skilled in computer software services, a 
successful film industry and widespread entrepreneurialism. India’s large English-speaking 
population has helped it to emerge as a key player in computer software, information 
technology and business outsourcing. Whilst there are clear signs of India becoming an open-
market economy, it is also apparent that it has yet to shake off the autarkic policies of the 
past. During the early 1990s, India initiated a series of economic reforms that helped to 
deregulate industry, privatise public-sector companies and relax restrictions on international 
trade and investment. This has had a positive impact on economic growth, which has 
averaged almost 7% per annum in the twenty years to 2017. What is more, the country has 
one of the world’s oldest stock markets, founded in 1875 (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). 
It is very worth noting that the Indian economy has undergone major market-oriented 
reforms, and restructuring has created a reliable investment environment during the early 
1990s. This has helped to set India’s economy in a new direction and to produce a country 
that is increasingly self-confident, with a global mindset and a population that has become 
materialistic over time. This has led to the country gaining increasing significance due to the 
entry of huge international investors and multinational companies (Sharma & Singh, 2018).  
Having said that, whilst the country can look forward to a promising future, it continues 
to face difficulties, including corruption, environmental degradation, widespread poverty and 
the fact that one third of all the malnourished people in the world live in India (CIA, 2020). 
Moreover, India suffers from major challenges in its regulations and laws regarding capital 
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provider protection. For instance, Narayanaswamy et al. (2012) mention its inadequate 
investor protection and limited corporate governance practices. Furthermore, India suffers 
from weak civil justice and regulatory enforcement, which could limit the capital provider’s 
ability to approve financing decisions based on audit reports alone. Indeed, the country 
ranked 77
th
 out of 113 jurisdictions in terms of regulatory implementation in 2016, and 93
rd
 
out of 113 in terms of civil justice (World Justice Project, 2016). Chakrabarti et al. (2008) 
state that, although on paper the structure of the Indian legal system is considered to have 
some of the best investor protection in the world, execution is a major issue due to the slow 
functioning of the courts and many cases of corruption. In addition, the Indian economy 
suffers from strong intervention by business groups/promoters. Although business groups are 
a common feature of emerging economies, the strength of their control in India is unique 
(Houqe et al., 2017). Business groups own over 60% of the total market capitalisation 
according to Chakrabarti et al. (2008). Given the above, India is an interesting context worth 
exploring. 
2.3.3 Development of financial system in India 
The Indian banking sector is considered the core of the Indian financial system. It plays 
a vital role in financing huge projects, along with serving other financial functions in India 
(Nataraj & Ashwani, 2018; Gaur & Mohapatra, 2020). Moreover, the Indian bank sector’s 
development has affected the growth of the Indian economy positively (Tripathy & Pradhan, 
2014). In other words, India boasts a sizeable economy and it has a well-developed financial 
system with services offered mainly by banks. The financial system is bank-based, which is 
the result of the belief that banking offers the most effective means of delivering economic 
development and serving the needs of companies operating in various sectors of the economy 
(Shahbaz et al., 2018). As of 2018, aggregate bank assets were approaching $2 trillion, which 
equates to approximately 80% of the GDP. Moreover, at that time, the sector recorded loan 
34 
 
growth of 11% and deposit growth of 13% (Ghosh, 2021). There has been considerable 
expansion in the Indian banking sector over time, and by early 2020, there was a total of 22 
private-sector banks, 20 public-sector banks (PSBs), 44 regional banks, 94,384 co-operative 
banks operating in rural areas, 1,542 co-operative banks operating in urban areas and 44 
foreign lenders (Dhameja & Arora, 2020).  
The formation of the General Bank of India in 1786 marked the creation of the 
country’s formal banking sector. It was not until India gained independence from Great 
Britain that controls were imposed on interest rates and reserve requirements were raised 
from unusually low levels (Demetriades & Luintel, 1996). With the country having gained 
independence, policymakers set about nationalising the banking sector and imposing stricter 
regulations, with the intention of ensuring that credit was better distributed and economic 
development was promoted. The Banking Regulation Act was implemented in 1949, through 
which policymakers embarked on efforts to restructure commercial banks and formally 
recognised the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as the country’s central bank (Dossani & 
Kenney, 2001). The Act also hiked liquidity requirements, implemented lending rate controls 
and created development banks for agriculture and industry (Demetriades & Luintel, 1996). 
Indeed, the Indian government attempted to adopt the best regulations from advanced 
economies to enhance the efficiency of the banking sector (Nataraj & Ashwani, 2018).  
During 1969, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi oversaw the nationalisation of the fourteen 
largest Indian banks, giving the government control over 90% of bank assets (Dossani & 
Kenney, 2001). Government ownership of banks has been shown to have a positive impact on 
the provision of financial services (Arun & Turner, 2002). Following nationalisation, India’s 
banking sector became the fastest-growing in the world (Banerjee et al., 2004). 
Nationalisation helped to tackle the problem of financial exclusion, with in excess of 58,000 
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branches opened between 1969 and 2003, and US$187.8 billion amassed in deposits 
(Banerjee et al., 2004). Gradualist reforms implemented in 1991 continued to benefit the 
financial sector well into the 21
st
 century (Reddy, 2005). The diversity of the banks operating 
in India makes the sector particularly interesting (Sathye, 2003), especially given that the 
country is the largest in South Asia, with an extensive financial system. The types of banks 
currently operating in India include old private, new private, public sector and foreign.   
Companies operating in India were severely limited in their choice of capital structure 
prior to the 1980s. Access to the equity market was governed by the Controller of Capital 
Issues and this served to severely limit companies’ funding options. Many companies relied 
on development finance institutions as a source of business loans (Bhaduri, 2002). It was only 
following the initiation of a programme of economic reforms in July 1991 that the situation 
started to improve in a meaningful way (Chakraborty, 2018). The Controller of Capital Issues 
was abolished in May 1992 and this afforded companies greater access to the equity market. 
The National Stock Exchange was established in 1994, providing stock trading across the 
whole country that was conducted electronically, with modern clearing and settlement 
facilities. This development prompted the Bombay Stock Exchange to also offer electronic 
trading from 1995 onwards (Chakraborty, 2018).  
At the same time, efforts were made to reform the banking sector and this provided 
companies with a wider range of options when seeking debt. The first stage of the reform 
process saw the deregulation of interest rates and this was followed shortly afterwards by the 
liberalisation of the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) and the cash reserve ratio (CRR). 
Chakraborty (2018) states that, prior to 1991, the SLR had been set at 40% and the CRR at 
25% but by 2010 they had been reduced to 24% and 5% respectively. It was also in 1991 that 
foreign banks were invited to enter the Indian market. This resulted in the number of foreign 
36 
 
banks operating in India increasing from 21 in 1991 to 33 by 2004. Meanwhile, the number 
of private banks increased from 23 in 1991 to 30 in 2004. Furthermore, the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision’s uniform prudential norm was adopted in March 1996. As of 1991, 
only a very small minority of banks operated with a capital adequacy ratio up to 8%. By 
1998, however, only one of India’s 28 public banks had not achieved this standard 
(Ahluwalia, 2000). Furthermore, as part of the reforms, concerted efforts were made to tackle 
the problem of non-performing assets and by 2008 these had been reduced to 1.3% 
(Chakraborty, 2018). 
The country began implementing a programme of financial liberalisation, privatisation 
and globalisation in 1991 that continues to this day (Dhameja & Arora, 2020). The 
programme of reform was needed to better utilise the resources of the banking sector so that 
more credit could be made available to the domestic economy. In addition, it resulted in a 
banking sector that is more secure, transparent and accessible to the average customer. As an 
example of the steps being taken, ten PSBs were consolidated into four institutions in April 
2020 by order of the national government to ensure that PSBs were better able to serve the 
needs of the economy (Geetha & Priya, 2020). In addition, it was envisaged that these larger 
PSBs would be better able to compete in an era of globalisation. Combining the capital of the 
ten PSBs helps to ensure that additional loans can be made available in the domestic 
economy whilst simultaneously increasing the capital base. Another notable development 
was the Reserve Bank of India’s decision during July 2014 to introduce the 5:25 flexible 
finance scheme whereby banks are able to offer loans of up to 25 years in accordance with 
the cash flows of the projects being funded, and they can refinance these loans on a five-year 
basis (Dhameja & Arora, 2020). Over the course of 2019, the Reserve Bank cut the repo rate 
on six occasions by a total of 135 basis points to stand at 5.15%, whilst the reverse repo rate 
stood at 4.90% (Geetha & Priya, 2020). 
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At a time when many companies were financially constrained, they benefited greatly 
from the development of the capital market and the banking sector (Shahbaz et al., 2018). As 
a result of the reforms initiated since 1991, the Indian banking sector has become 
increasingly dynamic. Reflecting the new business setting, banks operating in India currently 
experience numerous types of risk, including market risk, operational risk, regulatory risk and 
credit risk (Mishra, 2020). When faced with large numbers of loan applications, loan officers 
at the banks may only have limited time and resources to devote to assessing the 
creditworthiness of applicants (Miller, 1956). Given that individuals have a limited ability to 
process information, when they are faced with overwhelming demands to do so, it is 
understandable that they will become less productive (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). This is 
the same problem facing banks and other lenders when attempting to determine the 
creditworthiness of numerous loan applicants. Consequently, when faced with a large number 
of loan applications, there is a distinct possibility that banks will inadvertently overlook 
certain details (e.g., the number of years that the company has been trading). However, the 
current study sets out to clarify whether there are certain features of companies that help them 
to stand out when applying for funding, such as the number of independent directors, the 
remuneration directors receive, the sums paid by the company in audit and non-audit fees, 
female representation on the board of directors and the participation of female directors on 
board committees. 
2.3.4 Indian corporate governance 
Corporate governance in India is supposedly based on international best practice, 
combining elements of the German and Anglo-American models. Companies operating in 
India can be categorised as either public, private or public-sector undertakings (e.g. banks, 
financial institutions, government companies and statutory companies). Each category of 
companies has its own form of share ownership. For instance, private companies are typically 
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family-owned. However, listed companies’ regulations are the responsibility of the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) (Deloitte, 
2020). Clause 49 of the stock exchange listing agreement authorises the SEBI to assume 
responsibility for the corporate governance of listed firms. The regulatory requirements of the 
SEBI are relatively onerous and the exchange is the largest in the world in terms of the 
number of trades. Clause 49 also specifies what is required with regards to the composition of 
the board of directors, specifying a maximum tenure of ten years for directors and limiting an 
individual to serving on no more than seven boards of listed firms as an independent director 
or three firms on a full-time basis. In addition, Clause 49 requires all listed firms to operate a 
team responsible for risk management. In the event that the roles of chairman and chief 
executive officer are performed by the same person, at least half of the directors comprising 
the board have to be independent and protection is in place to protect whistle-blowers. The 
compensation offered to all directors is agreed by the board but must be approved through a 
shareholder vote. At least one member of the audit committee is required to be financially 
numerate and this individual will usually be a member of the Institute of Company 
Secretaries of India (ICSI) or the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).  
Clause 49 also compels listed firms to provide details of their risk management 
activities, accounting departments and treatments, and related party transactions. They are 
also required to produce an annual report specifying trends, risks, opportunities, directors’ 
compensation, offering proceeds, the adequacy of internal controls, corporate governance 
reports, adoption of requirements, a compliance record for the previous three-year period, an 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls, certifications of the financial statements 
by the chief finance officer and chief executive officer, and certifications of corporate 
governance and compliance by the company secretary or auditors.  
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Prior to the implementation of Clause 49 of the listing agreement (2014), very little 
attention was paid to corporate governance in India. Between 1947 and 1991, the providers of 
equity capital and debt faced considerable judicial delays if they sought to exercise oversight 
over the managers of a company. However, when India suffered a fiscal crisis in 1991, it was 
apparent that corporate governance practices would need to be reformed in order for the 
country to attract much-needed investment. This process was initiated with the 
implementation of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) Code (Black & Khanna, 2007). 
Moreover, introducing Clause 49 of the SEBI guidelines on corporate governance helped to 
transform the approach taken towards corporate governance in India by enhancing the 
disclosures made to shareholders and other stakeholders, thereby helping to greatly reduce 
problems relating to information asymmetry (OECD, 2014). India has also introduced major 
corporate governance reforms in the recent past, such as the Companies Act 2013. It sets out 
the regulatory requirements regarding the incorporation of companies in India, as well as the 
responsibilities of firms and directors. It also specifies how companies should be dissolved. 
Implemented on 29 August 2013 (Deloitte, 2020), the Companies Act superseded the 
previous Companies Act of 1956. In the same vein, India maintains an ongoing amendment 
process for its regulations to enhance the corporate governance standards (e.g. the 
recommendations of the Kotak Committee) (Popescu, 2019).     
India’s economy is already one of the largest among the emerging market nations but 
the Satyam crisis laid bare the failings in corporate governance in the country. In 2009, this 
scandal, known as the ‘Enron of India’, revealed accounting fraud of almost one billion US 
dollars, which caused suspicion about management manipulation and raised questions 
regarding the firm’s board of directors and its roles, such as the monitoring of management
3
. 
                                                 
3
 The questions raised over accounting practices in India will not have been helped by news of an accounting 
fraud at Satyam, which involved not only earnings being inflated but also asset values. Therefore, further 
investigation of auditing practices in India is likely to be worthwhile. 
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In the same vein, some suspicions have arisen about the directors’ duties in the board war 
between Ratan Tata and Cyrus Mistry, which has shown up the weak corporate governance 
practices and strong control of firm’s boards of directors by promoters (MC & Rentala, 
2018).  
2.3.4.1 Family influence on firms’ corporate governance 
If corporate governance is effective, it will offer the ability to resolve disputes that may 
arise between controlling and minority shareholders as well as between the owners of the 
firm and the other stakeholders. Investors benefit from corporate governance that offers 
protection against managers serving their own interests as a result of activities such as fraud, 
theft or insider-dealing (Dalton & Daily, 1999). Be that as it may, if a firm has a concentrated 
ownership structure, a blockholder may attempt to direct the actions of management, thereby 
depriving other stakeholders of their ability to access information. There is the potential for a 
blockholder to exert excessive influence over managers to serve their own interests whilst 
simultaneously harming other shareholders (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003). Additionally, if the 
ownership structure of a firm is concentrated, there is the potential for blockholders to benefit 
themselves at the expense of minority shareholders and, consequently, they are inclined to 
delay the release of relevant information. As such, those with a controlling stake are less 
inclined to freely disclose all relevant information in a timely manner, and they may not have 
sufficient incentive to operate transparently (Berglöf & Pajuste, 2005). In effect, such 
blockholders exploit their power to extract rent from other stakeholders. Moreover, it is 
possible that those with a controlling stake will manipulate performance reports to obscure 
the impact that their expropriation is having on the firm. In practical terms, this is likely to 
involve them exerting influence over the company’s directors and blocking monitoring 
systems, thereby adversely affecting the quality of corporate disclosures. Crucially, if there is 
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a greater risk of expropriation, controlling shareholders have a greater incentive to encourage 
opacity and deter monitoring (Bozec & Bozec, 2007). 
Founding families often retain large shareholdings in many of the largest listed firms in 
emerging markets, such as India. This often results in concentrated ownership among a single 
family and their associates (Phani et al., 2004). Due to the prevalence of family-owned firms 
in India, promoters play an important role in terms of incorporating and organising these 
companies (Kumar & Singh, 2013). Despite these firms being listed on stock exchanges and 
having public shareholders, promoters continue to exercise considerable influence (Varottil, 
2010). Indeed, there is a high concentration of promoters in Indian firms (Chakrabarti et al., 
2008). Back in 2001, controlling shareholders had median holdings of 42.94% across the 
NIFTY 50 index, but by 2011 this had risen to 56.24% (Balasubramanian & Anand, 2013).  
The prevalence of concentrated family stakes and promoter dominance is significantly 
greater among Indian firms than in the majority of other emerging markets and, therefore, the 
corporate governance challenges in India are quite distinct (Jackling & Johl, 2009). 
According to Houqe et al. (2017), large family companies in India typically lack 
professionalism and have a high prevalence of nepotism. This has been attributed to a number 
of corporate scandals, including one involving Satyam during 2009, which laid bare the audit 
and corporate governance failings that effectively allowed managers to operate as they 
wished. Indeed, Gakhar (2014) reported that 52% of auditors had found signs of earnings 
management among Indian firms. In the same study, it was found that auditors believe that 
the auditors, the chief financial officer, senior management and promoters were all culpable 
for the failings at Satyam (Gakhar, 2014). In addition, it is often the case that directors in 
such companies are closely aligned with the controlling family, who typically have a say 
when appointing board members. It is often the case that promoters will select independent 
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directors to serve on the boards of Indian firms and, consequently, they are less likely to hold 
management to account (Khan & Kotishwar, 2011). If promoters or business owners are 
involved in the appointment of independent directors, it is unlikely that these board members 
will truly be independent. Indeed, it has been claimed that the appointment of independent 
directors in India is merely a box-ticking exercise, and this threatens to undermine corporate 
governance (OECD, 2019). Worryingly, the majority of female directors at Indian firms are 
chosen by owners or promoters, and there is a close association between newly appointed 
female directors and promoters (Duggal, 2016).  
As such, it is distinctly possible that the influence of promoters and family ownership in 
India could undermine efforts to ensure effective auditing and corporate governance 
mechanisms, resulting in greater information asymmetry as well as giving managers free rein 
to manipulate the financial statements. Consequently, shareholders in Indian companies 
should be alert to doubts concerning the quality of audit assessments and the application of 
corporate governance codes. For this reason, it is necessary to take into consideration family 
ownership when interpreting the results of the current study. However, that was not possible 
owing to a lack of relevant data. 
2.3.5 Audit in India 
Accounting bodies have expanded their operations in India, thereby helping to 
supervise the auditing process. However, despite this, many people remain sceptical 
regarding the quality and effectiveness of accounting and auditing processes in the country. It 
is a requirement of the Company Act 1956 that firms be audited by a member of the The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). The ICAI is charged with determining 
India’s auditing standards, making it the country's preeminent professional accounting body. 
As such, members of the ICAI are required to ensure that companies comply with accounting 
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standards when compiling their financial statements (Sinha et al., 2013). Any failure by 
members to report non-compliance will lead to disciplinary action being taken in accordance 
with the Chartered Accountants 1949 Act (Houqe et al., 2017). However, in practice, the 
ICAI has proved ineffectual at taking action when non-compliance is observed (Chakrabarti, 
2005) and this has contributed to suspicions regarding the credibility of the audit process. 
What is more, there is considerable evidence to suggest that Indian firms routinely engage in 
accrual-based earnings management practices (Gakhar, 2014). The falsifying of Satyam’s 
accounts which came to light in 2009 did not help, revealing an accounting scandal in which 
almost US$1 billion could not be accounted for. This has raised questions regarding auditors’ 
judgment of financial statement credibility and likely affects capital providers’ attitudes 
towards external auditors’ efforts.  
It was initially anticipated that IFRS would be formally adopted in India from 1
st
 April 
2011, but owing to a number of outstanding taxation and legal issues, the decision was taken 
to defer implementation (Bedia & Shrivastava, 2016). It was later decided that rather than 
adopting IFRS on a specified date, India would instead seek to converge its standards with 
IFRS over time. Consequently, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) devised 
the Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS) to help facilitate convergence with IFRS (Rao, 
Bedia, & Shrivastava, 2020). This is an important development because adopting IFRS will 
enable Indian firms to benefit from a single accounting language, which will also drive down 
auditing fees (Puri & Singh, 2020) and make the process of auditing and accounting less 
time-consuming (Zala, 2020). Moreover, funds can be raised at a significantly lower cost, and 




However, there is a detrimental effect on the quality of the audit process since the ICAI 
applies IFRS in the absence of appropriate guidance for auditors. For instance, Indian 
companies need to apply fair value accounting for IFRS in the absence of suitable guidance; 
at present, auditors apply cost concept accounting (Singh & Kumar Srivastava, 2019). For 
this reason, it is unlikely that the auditing authorities will be able to operate in full 
compliance with the Companies Act 2013. Moreover, this makes it particularly difficult for 
auditors in India to train their staff, recruit new employees, agree suitable procedures, and 
provide reassurances that they will be sufficiently knowledgeable to conduct audits in 
accordance with IFRS. 
2.3.6 The role of the independent director in India 
The bulk of the firms in India are promoter constructed; these promoters own the 
majority of a firm’s shares and mostly sit on the firm’s board of directors (Sarkar & Sarkar, 
2009; Gill & Kaur, 2015). The controlling privileges of promoters afford them an influence 
over the selection of the independent members of the board (Kumar & Singh, 2012). This 
domination by business groups could influence the management and the duties of the board 
of directors. For instance, in family-controlled companies, the independent directors may not 
be fully committed to their monitoring duties, either due to the affecting power of the 
promoters or because of their relationship with them (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). Moreover, as the 
independent directors are frequently selected by the firms’ promoters, they prefer to stay 
friendly with the firm’s board instead of acting as watchdogs (Khan & Kotishwar, 2011). In 
reality, the independent directors are not fully independent due to the influence of the 
promoters over their appointment. It has been remarked that the independent directors are 
only independent on paper (OECD, 2019). This might increase the manipulations of firms’ 
management teams. Indeed, a large body of research suggests that Indian companies are 
actively involved in accrual-based earnings management (Gakhar, 2014). Therefore, there are 
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doubts about the actual role and duties of independent directors in the Indian context (OECD, 
2019). 
2.3.7 The role of female directors in India 
Female directors on firms’ boards may also not fulfil their duties as expected if they are 
appointed by the promoters/owner. New women directors are often connected with promoters 
(Duggal, 2016); indeed, it is likely that a firm’s board might appoint an unprofessional or 
unenthusiastic female family member as a director (Balasubramanian & Mohanty, 2015). 
Another major reason for choosing India as the study context is that Indian women are 
significantly less empowered than women in developed nations (Jadiyappa et al., 2019). In 
Indian companies, it has been stated that it could take 130 years to achieve the level of 
appointments of females to boards seen in Norway (Sikand et al., 2012). India has been 
ranked very low on the Global Gender Gap Index (113 among 135 nations) and even worse 
on the Economic Participation and Opportunity sub-index, according to which it is classified 
as 131 out of 135 nations (World Economic Forum, 2011).  
As a result, the Indian government is committed to combating gender bias issues on 
many fronts (Mehrotra & Chand, 2012) and its dedicated efforts to support women’s 
empowerment and gender equality are notable (Gandhi, 2016). For instance, the literacy rate 
gap between women and men has dropped from 21% to 16% due to the implementation of 
government regulations supporting women’s rights (Arora & Kumar, 2016). However, only a 
very small proportion of women have reached the top level of management or begun to climb 
the corporate ladder thus far (Arora & Kumar, 2016; Ghosh, 2017); for instance, as of 2010, 
only 5.3% of executive directors in BSE-100 companies were female, whereas the equivalent 
figure for FTSE-100 companies was 12.2% and that for Fortune 500 companies 14.5% 
(Banerji et al., 2010). This is because Indian society has a strong cultural resistance to 
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women’s rights, with Indian men controlling the decision-making in most aspects of life 
(Chauhan & Dey, 2017) and Indian traditions supporting gender inequality in its perceptions 
of women (Raju, 2014). 
Briefly, then, India delivers a unique context for this investigation due to its emerging, 
but quickly growing and large economy. However, the Indian case is also characterised by 
the unique control of large family business groups, major cases of board directors’ failure to 
ensure proper governance, an inadequate litigious system in which the legal penalty against 
firms’ manipulation is relatively low and major scandals. It is therefore important to observe 
the effects of audits, independent directors on firms’ boards and gender diversity on firms’ 
boards. 
2.4 Theory  
A combination of economic, political and social factors shapes capital providers’ 
perceptions of borrowing firms and, therefore, these factors must be considered when 
selecting theories as the basis for a framework to elucidate such perceptions in a particular 
country. It is quite possible that certain theories explaining these perceptions may be better 
suited to some business environments than others. This is due to the different cultures, 
economies and politics of each individual jurisdiction. However, many theories have been 
used to explain these phenomena. One of the most used in the literature on access to finance 
is agency theory (Sengupta & Bhojraj, 2003; Barroso et al., 2018). Another is the pecking 
order theory (Hernandez-Nicolas et al., 2015; Benkraiem et al., 2018). Also,  is the signalling 
theory ( Koonce et al., 2016; Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017).Therefore, I will discuss these 
theories briefly, before discussing in more depth my chosen theory, the limited attention 
theory.   
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2.4.1 Agency theory  
Agency theory is concerned with the issues that can arise when the ownership of a firm 
is separate from its oversight. More specifically, agency theory suggests that managers have 
an incentive to exploit their unique insight regarding the firm to serve their own interests, at 
the expense of the owners (shareholders) (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency 
problems arise when there is a discrepancy between the objectives of the principal and agent, 
and when the principal cannot easily verify how the agent is acting (Eisenhardt, 1989). As 
such, there is a clear need to monitor the activities of managers and numerous governance 
mechanisms have been proposed in the empirical literature to mitigate agency problems. 
These governance mechanisms are intended to reduce the scale of agency costs, serve 
shareholder interests and better align the interests of agents and principals (Davis et al., 
1997). 
For many firms, debt comprises a large proportion of their financing (Maresch et al., 
2016). Given the reliance on debt, a large body of empirical literature has investigated the 
determinants of credit contracting. It is a firm’s creditworthiness that primarily determines its 
ability to access credit and the contract terms that will be imposed (Sengupta & Bhojraj, 
2003; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Namely, if a company poses a greater risk of default, 
creditors will respond by charging a higher rate of interest and/or imposing more stringent 
contractual terms, thereby reducing access to finance (Rajan & Winton, 1995). 
The probability of default is closely related to a firm’s agency costs. According to Ge et 
al. (2012), there are two distinct ways in which the agency conflict presents itself. First, there 
is a conflict of interests between the managers and lenders if the managers serve their own 
interests at the expense of the lenders. If such a conflict of interest becomes evident to the 
lender, they are likely to anticipate a greater probability of default (Lin et al., 2014). Second, 
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agency conflict could manifest itself in conflicts of interests between owners and debtors. 
Once debt funding has been secured, it is in the interests of the shareholders for the firm to 
pursue projects that are high risk but have the potential for substantial returns (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). This is logical because, if the project succeeds, the majority of the profits 
will be distributed to the shareholders but, if the scheme fails, it is the lender who will be left 
out of pocket (John & Senbet, 1998). The actions of the shareholders effectively undermine 
the position of the creditor because the company is now at greater risk of default.  
The empirical literature indicates that corporate governance mechanisms have a bearing 
on the likelihood of agency conflict arising. It is therefore possible that corporate governance 
mechanisms may also influence the price a firm is charged for credit or the non-price terms of 
loan contracts. It is logical to assume that, if corporate governance mechanisms result in a 
firm becoming more transparent, this should help to minimise the potential for agency 
conflict between managers and lenders. This relationship between corporate transparency and 
the cost of funding has been examined by Sengupta (1998) and Cumming and Knill (2012). 
In addition, it has been found that there is a negative relationship between the independence 
of company directors and the cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2004a). This implies that the 
composition of the board of directors is associated with the reliability of corporate reports 
and, in turn, the scope for agency conflict to arise. Furthermore, it has been observed in the 
empirical literature that firms will experience less onerous financing constraints if their 
financial reports are considered to be credible (Hope et al., 2011). For instance, agency theory 
supports the appointment of independent directors to the board in order that they can 
effectively hold executives to account. The rationale behind this assumption is that their 
independence means they will prioritise maintaining their own good reputation (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983).  
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Having said that, some empirical studies have concluded that corporate governance 
mechanisms do not help to mitigate agency problems between managers and creditors. They 
assert that corporate governance mechanisms are initiated to serve the interests of 
shareholders and, therefore, they are not necessarily conducive to serving the interests of 
creditors. Indeed, it has been found that corporate governance mechanisms that serve 
shareholder interests have a detrimental effect on credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Chava et al., 2009; Qi et al., 2011; Jiraporn et al., 2013). Given that corporate 
governance mechanisms can be designed in ways that serve shareholders or creditors, if 
inside directors wield excessive power, there is a distinct possibility that the monitoring of 
the board’s actions will prove ineffective. 
Also the agency theory states that improved monitoring efforts can address the 
problems associated with the contrasting incentives of managers and debtholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Supporters of agency theory also believe that a major device for mitigating 
agency conflicts can be to hire independent external auditors (Barroso et al., 2018). In 
general, it is argued that the employment of external auditors might improve the fairness and 
quality of the financial statements produced by the management, due to their capabilities for 
detecting misleading reporting. Indeed, auditing services play a vital role in providing 
confidence in financial statements and help to minimise agency costs by providing an 
independent check on the performance and information produced by the agents (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Johnson & Lys, 1990). Therefore, to reduce any agency issues, companies 
need to appoint external auditors to audit their financial books, as their opinion can enhance 
the credibility of financial reporting (Gul et al., 2013; Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). 
If the capital provider believes in the credibility of the financial reporting produced by a 
company, that might reduce the issues between them. For instance, issues between capital 
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providers and owners arise because of investment opportunities and shareholders’ financing 
decisions (Damodaran, 1997). The shareholders attempt to make investments in risky 
projects, where they expect to get a higher return. The risky investments increase the cost of 
finance and reduce the value of the outstanding debt, which might affect the capital providers. 
If the investment is successful and makes a profit, the owners will receive the profits, while 
the capital providers will get only a specific amount of interest according to their fixed 
interest percentage. However, if the investment fails, then the capital providers will be 
required to undertake some of these losses. 
Having said that, the agency theory can be applied to explain the phenomena that occur 
in developed economies because these economies are characterised by effective corporate 
governance mechanisms, strong justice systems and greater transparency. However, in India, 
the context for this investigation, the corporate governance is far behind that in the developed 
markets, and is accompanied by a high level of corruption and a weak justice system 
(Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). These differences raise concerns about the effectiveness of 
applying agency theory to this investigation. In support of this, Al-Hiyari (2017) and Htay 
and Salman (2013) state that, due to developing market characteristics, the agency theory 
would be insufficient for interpreting the relationships in these markets. 
2.4.2 Pecking order theory 
According to pecking order theory, firms operate with an order of preference regarding 
their choice of financing sources, owing to the costs associated with adverse selection 
(Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984). What underpins pecking order theory is the problem 
of asymmetric information between managers and the providers of financing. As such, a 
company would elect to use retained earnings rather than debt; short-term debt rather than 
long-term debt; and debt rather than equity.  
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The managers have a better appreciation of the firm’s prospects than external finance 
providers. Consequently, it may be necessary to miss out on profitable business opportunities 
if the company is required to seek external funding. However, if the firm has sufficient 
retained earnings, it will be possible to commit to new projects when profitable opportunities 
arise. In the event that the firm can access credit and it is offered risk free, then this 
opportunity can be accepted. If the firm can access credit and it is risky then it is logical to 
opt for this rather than issuing equity because it is less sensitive to the costs associated with 
adverse selection (Myers, 1984). Consequently, due to information asymmetries, pecking 
order theory explains why firms prefer retained earnings rather than debt, and debt rather than 
equity. Each provider of financing is privy to different levels of information about the firm, 
and their ability to monitor how the company behaves also varies. Consequently, it does 
matter to a firm who provides its financing (MacKie-Mason, 1990).  
Harford et al. (2008) claim that governance and debt perform essentially the same 
function and can be treated as substitutes. However, it has also been claimed that more 
independent boards are associated with firms operating with higher levels of debt. Berger et 
al. (1997) find that firms operate with lower gearing if the chief executive is not subject to 
pressure from the owners or active monitoring. Corporate goverance has been widely 
researched (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998), and numerous 
empirical studies have concluded that good corporate governance practices are associated 
with better information disclosure and fewer issues relating to information asymmetry 
(Vafeas, 2000; Klein, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Kanagaretnam 
et al., 2007; Petra, 2007; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). 
Therefore, it is expected that a good corporate governance mechanism will help to 
tackle the problem of information asymmetry that exists between the management of a firm 
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and creditors. In turn, this should help to improve a firm’s access to finance. This is because 
obtaining financing involves managers justifying to creditors why the money is required, and 
this exposes them to monitoring by the creditors, as part of their decision over whether to 
grant access to more financing (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
As such, it is conceivable that the pecking order theory could be used to determine 
which corporate governance elements provide better access to finance by reducing capital 
constraints. The same theory could be applied to capital providers’ evaluations of firms that 
have high audit quality. However, in this investigation, I deal with a context suffering from 
high information asymmetry. For instance, firms produce less reliable financial statements in 
emerging markets compared to advance markets (Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). In this case, 
use the pecking order theory would be ineffective at explaining capital providers’ attitudes 
simply through firms’ financing choices (e.g. retained earnings, debt or equity). This is 
because the capital providers in the Indian context might accept that, given the level of 
information asymmetry, firms’ financing choices are an unreliable signal of their access to 
finance. Thus, the pecking order theory might not be suitable for the purposes of this 
research. However, capital providers’ attitudes/attention as a measure of firms’ financing 
obstacles could offer a good explanation of firms’ access to finance. Thus, I will apply the 
limited attention theory to explain the reactions of capital providers to certain firm elements, 
namely audit quality, the independence of the board and gender diversity on the board. 
2.4.3 Signalling theory 
Signalling theory is used to describe how two parties behave when they do not have the 
same information. It is usually the case that the party sending the information will need to 
decide if they are to send it and how it will be communicated. The party receiving the 
information must decide how the signal will be interpreted. The basic assumption 
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underpinning signalling theory is that the party who signals has access to information that is 
not in the public domain or that the receiving party is unaware of (Spence, 1973).  
According to Connelly et al. (2011), signalling theory involves four main constructs: 
the party who signals, the party receiving the signal, the signal itself and the feedback. Those 
signalling are insiders who are privy to information that others are unaware of. Insiders might 
include directors, managers (Lester et al., 2006) or entrepreneurs (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003) 
who would like to issue equity. The parties receiving this information are external to the firm 
and require additional information about it. These actors include venture capitalists (Busenitz 
et al., 2005; Mueller et al., 2012), investors in IPOs (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Lester et al., 
2006) and others who may consider investing in the company. Thanks to the signal, the 
receivers obtain information about the standing of the venture that they would not otherwise 
be privy to. In turn, the recipient of the signal provides feedback to the sender to explain how 
effective the signal was. Signallers can use this feedback to adjust the signals they send in the 
future and, if necessary, re-signal previously disclosed information. Therefore, signalling can 
be regarded as the means by which signals are conveyed, received, understood and replied to, 
ultimately resulting in further signals and understandings. 
Signals differ in terms of their strength, honesty and reliability (Connelly et al., 2011), 
as well as their relevancy and the richness of the information they contain (Busenitz et al., 
2005). Moreover, the value that the recipient assigns to signals is primarily governed by the 
degree to which the recipient is actively seeking signals (Connelly et al., 2011). If a capital 
provider applies strict criteria when on the lookout for signals (Mason & Stark, 2004), it is 
possible that they will overlook any signals that do not precisely match those criteria. 
Furthermore, it is not sufficient to merely receive a signal; rather, the recipient must translate 
and interpret what the signal means. To do so reliably, they may require certain knowledge or 
an appreciation of the dominant social context (Connelly et al., 2011). Signals offer the 
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ability to compensate for any limitations regarding access to capital; therefore, they help to 
improve the likelihood of receiving funding. For this reason, there will be differences in the 
signals that are transmitted to capital providers based on the cognitive, spatial and social 
proximity limitations that entrepreneurs face compared to them (Mueller et al., 2012). 
Signalling theory has been adopted in the literature to explain various elements of the 
venture finance process. For instance, the theoretical basis for investment decisions has been 
explained with reference to signalling theory (Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017). Similarly, the 
theory has been used to explain how the release of information by managers influences the 
actions of investors (Koonce et al., 2016). Relatively few studies have considered the 
importance of feedback, though some have recognised that feedback helps to make 
subsequent signals more effective  (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017). 
Indeed, feedback significantly contributes to the decision-making process in the relationship 
between entrepreneurs and providers of capital, with the result that entrepreneurs’ prospects 
improve over time (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). By re-signalling, entrepreneurs can enhance 
their legitimacy in the eyes of capital providers and demonstrate that what they are offering 
satisfies the latter’s criteria. 
Therefore, signalling theory could be used to explain the effect of information about 
audit quality, the independence of directors, and gender diversity among directors on capital 
providers’ perceptions, thereby affecting Indian listed firms’ access to finance. However, this 
thesis applies limited attention theory to interpret these phenomena, which shares elements 
with signalling theory but is better suited to explain the rationale behind how capital 
providers perceive and react to firms’ information. The following subsection provides a brief 
discussion of limited attention theory. 
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2.4.4 Limited attention theory 
Diverging from the conventional method of applying agency theory to understand audit 
quality (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017; Barroso et al., 2018), the independence of the 
independent directors (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Francis et al., 2012; Goh & Gupta, 
2016) and gender diversity on firms’ boards (Carter et al., 2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Li 
& Zhang, 2019)
4
, another theory often used in the access to finance literature is the pecking 
order theory (Hernandez-Nicolas et al., 2015; Benkraiem et al., 2018), this study applies the 
limited attention theory to interpret the impact of information relating to audit quality, the 
independence of independent directors and gender diversity on firms’ boards on capital 
providers’ perceptions, thereby affect firms access to finance by measuring their capital 
constraints. Although, signalling theory is usually used to interpret signal information 
(Connelly et al., 2011; Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017; Yasar et al., 2020). The limited attention 
theory is more suitable for explaining this phenomenon because it offers more detailed 
explanations and justifications for how capital providers act after receiving signals from 
firms. It suggests how such signals impact their actions step by step. For instance, Ramos et 
al. (2020) explain the basic technique for paying attention, which includes noticing 
information, understanding its influence on perceptions, and then recognising those 
perceptions’ effects on decisions. Limited attention theory assumes that capital providers 
have a narrow attention span and limited processing power (Ding et al., 2017). Therefore, not 
all information about firms grabs their attention. Certain information, however, will attract 
their attention—whether positive or negative—thereby affecting their decisions to provide 
firms access to finance or leave them suffering from capital constraints. 
                                                 
4
 The agency theory is not sufficient for applying to developing markets due to these markets being associated 




‘Attention’ refers to the “noticing, encoding, interpreting and focusing of time and 
effort by organisational decision-makers on both issues and answers” (Ocasio, 1997: 189). 
The basic technique of paying attention involves noticing information, its impact on 
perceptions, and perceptions’ influence on decisions (Ramos et al., 2020). According to this 
theory, there is an assumption that capital providers' attention and processing capabilities are 
limited. Therefore, in this model, owing to capital providers’ limited attention, information 
relating to audit quality, the independence of independent directors and gender diversity on 
firms’ boards is assumed to indicate the monitoring role of the firms’ boards and the 
credibility of their financial statements. Due to the cases of corporate fraud in India, the 
practice of monitoring management activity as they compile financial reports has been 
undermined and this presents difficulties for the providers of capital. Irrespective of the size 
of the company, the financial statements of emerging market firms are unlikely to be as 
reliable as those of companies based in advanced economies, thereby deterring creditors from 
advancing money (Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). For this reason, it is deemed that limited 
attention theory will be suitable for interpreting the relationship between audit fees and non-
audit fees, the proportion of independent directors on a board and their remuneration, and 
female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees, as capital 
providers’ ‘attention grabbers’, and companies’ access to finance.  
Due to the considerable number of loan applications capital providers receive, their 
ability to devote attention to the allocation of funds is limited (Miller, 1956). Given that 
people have limited capacity to process information, when they are overwhelmed with 
information, their output will decline (Washburn & Bromiley, 2012). The same is true of 
capital providers when they are attempting to select which companies are most deserving of 
capital among the many applications for funding they have received. In another example, it is 
commonplace for investors to choose stocks on the basis that they offer a certain quality that 
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is deemed desirable (Barber & Odean, 2008). It is for this reason that investors pay greater 
attention to companies that are highly prominent in some way. Therefore, applying the same 
premise to the providers of capital, it is conceivable that, when presented with countless loan 
applications, there are certain features of the applicants that lenders may overlook, such as the 
length of time the firm has been functioning in the market. However, this study posits that 
audit fees and non-audit fees, the proportion of independent directors on the board and their 
remuneration, and female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board 
committees all act as capital providers’ attention grabbers.  
Based on these assumptions, companies that have their financial statements audited are 
more likely to attract capital providers’ attention because it suggests that the accuracy of their 
financial figures has been verified by an independent third party. For example, it is 
conceivable that capital providers may consider audit and non-audit fees to be significant 
indicator of credibility of a company’s financial statements. If the fees are significant, this 
could be interpreted as the auditor having performed a comprehensive assessment of the firm 
(Chen et al., 2016). Meanwhile, Choi et al. (2009) assert that high non-audit fees are 
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of a firm engaging in earnings management. 
Thus, these audit elements could increase financial reporting reliability, and reduce the 
likelihood of earnings management by a firm. It is logical that capital providers will favour 
these positive qualities, and thus that firms with these qualities will be less likely to 
experience capital constraints. This is especially relevant in the Indian setting, where it is 
known that investor protection is weak and the ICAI offers ineffective supervision. For this 
reason, companies that are not audited and do not pay non-audit fees might find it more 
difficult to obtain loans. In line with this, DeYoung et al. (2008) state that companies that do 
not have high audit quality might not obtain loans.  
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Applying limited attention theory, it seems likely that the proportion of independent 
directors on a firm’s board and their remuneration will influence capital providers’ cognitive 
processes by verifying the accuracy of the information the firm provides. Thus, firms with a 
high percentage of independent directors on their boards and which provide information on 
their members’ remuneration are more likely to attract capital providers' attention when the 
firms apply for finance. For instance, capital providers might evaluate independent directors 
on a board and their remuneration as one of the main indicators of the monitoring of the 
firm’s management. However, due to India's unique institutional setting, capital providers 
may observe a higher number of independent directors on a board as a sign of reduced board 
independence that may affect the directors' duties in monitoring the management. In India, 
the management hires the independent directors (Arora & Sharma, 2016), and the 
management continues to control the firm (Bhatt & Bhattacharya, 2015). Therefore, it is quite 
conceivable that more independent directors on a firm’s board will negatively grab capital 
providers’ attention, thus increasing the capital constraints and reducing access to finance. 
However, capital providers might perceive the remuneration of independent directors as a 
green flag that indicates a company’s profitability. For instance, the remuneration of 
independent directors in listed firms in India consists of two parts: the sitting fees and a 
proportion of net profit (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). The capital providers may pay 
positive attention to the remuneration of independent directors, facilitating a reduction of 
capital constraints and better access to finance in India. 
Next, according to the limited attention theory, female directors on firms’ boards, and 
their participation in board committees, are also likely to send capital providers a signal about 
the accuracy of the information the firm provides. Firms that appoint more female directors to 
their boards, and encourage their participation in board committees, send signals that they are 
performing the expected board duties, and thus are more likely to attract capital providers' 
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positive attention when applying for financing. Capital providers might evaluate these 
female-director-related factors as an important element of the monitoring of the firms’ 
management. Although India’s unique institutional setting provides less empowerment for 
women compared to developed countries (Jadiyappa et al., 2019), capital providers perceive 
increased numbers of female directors on firms’ boards as a sign of good board performance, 
and enhanced monitoring of the firms’ management. For instance, they might believe that 
women should be appointed to boards because they are skilled in monitoring and evaluating 
how managers act (Nielsen & Huse, 2010), as well as having confidence in the efficiency and 
transparency with which they present information to managers and shareholders (Alves et al., 
2015). Along the same lines, Adams and Ferreira (2009) state that female board members 
provide more intense monitoring of a situation because they are less likely to be caught up in 
an ‘old boys club’ mentality. Women are more likely than men to attend meetings and to take 
up positions on monitoring committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). It is apparent that the 
appointment of women to firms’ boards can improve the effectiveness of monitoring 
activities, indicating that the gender of a firm’s directors is associated with their monitoring 
role, reflecting the credibility of companies’ financial reports and, in turn, influencing their 
access to finance. Hope et al. (2011) state that companies will have fewer financing 
constraints imposed on them if their financial statements are considered to be credible; 
therefore, it is quite conceivable that more female directors on firms’ boards will grab capital 
providers’ positive attention, encouraging them to reduce capital constraints and provide 
more access to finance in India. 
The limited attention theory will thus be used to explain capital providers’ attitudes to 
the three aforementioned important elements of audit quality, independent directors on firms’ 
boards and gender diversity on firms’ boards, for Indian listed firms. Their attitudes could be 
negative or positive in terms of their effects on firms’ capital constraints. A firm facing a high 
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level of capital constraints means that the capital providers have negative perceptions towards 
these elements, and vice versa. In other words, the capital providers’ attitudes/attentions are 
connected to the level of capital constraints firms face. Therefore, looking at firms’ capital 
sources and how easily they access finance is another way to determine the extent to which 
the firms grab capital providers’ attention.    
However, capital providers’ attitudes in emerging markets such as India might be 
different to those in developed markets, due to the differences in culture and the business 
environment. Therefore, the attention they pay to these elements (audit quality, independent 
directors on firms’ boards and gender diversity on firms’ boards) might also be different. 
Moreover, firms’ levels of financial constraints will also be different. For example, the justice 
system in India is weak compared to in developed countries, which can give capital providers 
concern about protecting their investments against potential fraud by Indian firms. In the 
same vein, these concerns extend to the possibility that firms might use the audit quality, 
independent directors on their board and gender diversity on their board to the management 
team’s benefit instead of to serve stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, these elements could 
give capital providers the opposing perceptions to those seen in advanced economies, and 
thereby the opposite effect on capital constraints and access to finance for Indian listed firms 
than is seen for listed firms in developed markets.   
2.5 Conclusion  
In summary, this chapter discusses the definition and advantages and disadvantages of 
access to finance. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief amount of information in 
regards to firms’ access to finance, which is the theme of this thesis. It has been shown that it 
would be beneficial to explore in greater depth the potential for audit quality, independent 
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directors on boards and gender diversity on boards to influence the ability of firms to access 
funding. This is reflected on in greater detail in Chapters 4 to 6.  
Moreover, this chapter has discussed and reviewed the background and institutional 
setting of the Indian context as well as the theoretical framework. This chapter has shown that 
the institutional setting of India is unique and worth investigating. India is one of the most 
important countries, not only among the developing countries but also around the world. 
India is the second-most populous country, one of the five largest economies, and a member 
of the G20 countries, as well as being one of the fastest-developing and -growing economies. 
For these reasons, India is chosen as the setting to explore.  
This chapter has also discussed and evaluated the theories that are applied in the 
existing literature on access to finance. It started by discussing the agency theory and pecking 
order theory. After reviewing these two theories and their weaknesses, this study has argued 
that the limited attention theory may provide new understanding about the phenomena 




Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction  
This section introduces the methodology employed to examine the research questions 
of this study. In the first section of this chapter, I will explain the adopted research 
philosophy and justify the selected methodology, by defining the ontology and epistemology, 
and highlighting the advantages of positivism for this research. In the second section, I will 
determine the research approach. In the third section, I will explain how I measure a firm’s 
access to finance. Finally, I will conclude this chapter.  
3.2 Research Philosophy 
The research philosophy refers to the manner in which knowledge develops and the 
specific features of that knowledge (Saunders et al., 2011). Due consideration must be given 
to the philosophy when undertaking any research study because of the effect it has on our 
understanding of what we do. Dainty et al. (2007) stress the need to agree on a philosophical 
stance when conducting a research study. The philosophical stance will provide backing for a 
variety of research paradigms concerning ontology and epistemology. Indeed, Saunders et al. 
(2011) assert that researchers must consider two different approaches: ontology and 
epistemology. By selecting a philosophy, the researcher will be able to approach their study 
from a better standpoint (Saunders et al., 2011). There are key differences between ontology 
and epistemology that affect how the researcher approaches the study process.  
3.2.1 Ontology and epistemology 
The primary focus of ontology is the nature of existence, reality or being. It is a 
philosophical belief system that takes into account the nature of existence and reality 
(Saunders et al., 2011; Bryman, 2016). This prompts questions about the fundamental beliefs 
that underpin research and how things operate in the real world. The current research is 
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concerned with the attitudes of creditors when relying on financial reports, and the way firms 
are monitored in terms of corporate governance, to assess the creditworthiness of listed 
Indian firms, paying particular attention to the influence exerted by audit quality, 
independence of the board and gender diversity of the board.  
Epistemology is, in effect, the theory of knowledge. Consideration should be given to 
epistemology when choosing a strategy for a research project and when agreeing the 
knowledge that must be contemplated in relation to the phenomena being researched. Crotty 
(1998) refers to epistemology being “concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for 
deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how I can ensure that they are both 
adequate and legitimate”.  
3.2.2 Positivism 
Levy (2006) considers the main features of positivism to include the nature of the world 
(whether there is access to it); reality; grounds of knowledge between reality and research; 
the ability to access firm, objective knowledge; and a research focus on generalisation and 
abstraction. Importantly, positivism is associated with external and independent existence 
from a social environment. It is from this that knowledge can be gleaned via observations that 
help to explain a given phenomenon. Useful knowledge is acquired using quantitative 
methods such as statistical analysis, surveys and practical experiments (Gill & Johnson, 
2010). As such, positivist research typically utilises structured methodologies that can be 
replicated. Crucially, the output is observations that can be quantified, thereby enabling 
statistical analysis to be conducted (Creswell & Poth, 2016).  
Obtaining secondary data from the Prowessdx database allows me to be more objective 
in dealing with my data. Therefore, the positivism philosophy will let me gain a single reality 
and objective knowledge about the impact of audit quality, board independence and board 
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gender diversity on firms’ access to finance in India, since these factors already exist in the 
objective world.  
3.3 Research Approach 
Illustrating the research approach helps to enhance the validity of social inquiries 
(Lewis, 2015). According to Gill and Johnson (2010), there are two reasons why it is 
necessary to clarify the research approach: (1) specifying the type of data that needs to be 
collected and how this will be achieved helps to answer the research question; (2) to specify 
the research strategy. Regarding the latter point, an inductive methodology, for example, 
would be better suited to a study seeking to understand a phenomenon rather than merely 
describe it. If a research study requires the application of a theory, there is a choice of two 
different research strategies that can be applied: (1) It is possible that theory dictates the 
research (the deductive approach); (2) alternatively, it may be that the research develops a 
theory (the inductive approach) (Bryman, 2016).  
3.3.1 Deductive approach 
Research theory can be approached in one of two ways: deductive or inductive 
(Saunders et al., 2011; Bryman, 2016). When research is deductive, it sets out with a theory 
and tests hypotheses based on that theory. For example, in this case, one might look to 
establish the nature of the relationship between access to finance and audit quality, 
independent directors on boards and gender diversity on boards. Data follows theory when 
applying a deductive approach, but the opposite is true when applying an inductive approach. 
Deductive research focuses on scientific ideologies, sets out to explain causal relationships 
between variables, moves from theory to data, and relies on quantitative data (Saunders et al., 
2011). In addition, the researcher is effectively independent from the research.  
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When deciding whether a research study should adopt a deductive or inductive 
approach, there are many criteria that can be contemplated (Saunders et al., 2011). If there is 
a large body of empirical literature from which a theoretical framework and hypotheses can 
be derived, it is likely that the study would be well suited to the deductive approach. 
Conversely, in the absence of a large body of empirical literature and if the research seeks to 
establish the nature of a problem, an inductive approach might be better, whereby data are 
obtained and analysed to contemplate the theoretical themes that come to light as a result.  
A deductive approach might be suitable for the current research, which is concerned 
with establishing the nature of some relationships, as mentioned above. There is already a 
large body of empirical literature on the subject, from which hypotheses can be developed 
and theory can be outlined.  
3.3.2 Quantitative research 
It has been firmly established that there are three core types of research: quantitative, 
qualitative and the mixed approach (Lewis, 2015). Quantitative research is sometimes 
referred to as ‘scientific research’ but is also known as positivist or post-positivist research 
that yields empirical science (Lewis, 2015). Quantitative methods are used to resolve 
hypotheses based on the relationships between variables. Similarly, quantitative methods can 
be employed to test theories. Furthermore, quantitative methods are often used to predict 
outcomes and they make use of the objectivity, generalisability and replicability of findings 
(Lincoln & Tierney, 2004). To preserve objectivity, researchers using quantitative methods 
must make a conscious effort to act in an unbiased manner that is free from preconceptions 
(Clark & Johnston, 2009).   
Typical research instruments used to amass quantitative data include surveys and tests. 
In addition, quantitative studies often test hypotheses using probability theory (Denzin & 
66 
 
Lincoln, 1994). Quantitative methods are often referred to as being deductive because the 
testing of statistical hypotheses yields general inferences about the features of a population 
(Bryman, 2016). Furthermore, quantitative methods typically suppose that there is a single 
‘truth’ that is fixed, irrespective of human perceptions (Lincoln & Tierney, 2004).  
Rather than being preoccupied with how frequently events occur, qualitative research 
seeks to provide information about social events and establish why they occur (Yates, 2004). 
However, the nature of the current study lends itself to quantitative methodologies since the 
research questions are concerned with such matters as ‘how much’ and ‘how many’. 
Moreover, the purpose is to verify and not to acquire an appreciation of some phenomenon 
from respondents. As such, quantitative methods are best suited to answering the stated 
research questions that are concerned with establishing the nature of the relationship between 
access to finance and audit quality. 
I use quantitative analysis to answer my research questions on the impact of audit 
quality, board independence and gender diversity on the board, on access to finance for 
Indian listed firms. This is appropriate because my purpose is to achieve objective results 
about these associations, and I am trying to answer the question of ‘how much’ the audit 
quality, board independence and gender diversity impact the firms’ access to finance. In 
addition, in the quantitative approach I can perform tests many times to get the same results.  
3.4 Using the Balance Sheet to Measure Access to Finance 
A firm’s access to finance can be determined from balance sheet figures (Agarwal et 
al., 2014; García-Teruel et al., 2014; Guariglia & Liu, 2014; Johan & Wu, 2014; Kling et al., 
2014; Ryan et al., 2014; Cenni et al., 2015; Crespí & Martín-Oliver, 2015; Bose et al., 2019; 
Ding et al., 2017; Hasan et al., 2017). Significant insights can be gained through the 
comparison of firms’ balance sheets (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). I therefore refer to listed 
67 
 
Indian firms’ balance sheets to measure access to finance based on capital constraints. I start 
with the KZ-index (Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), which is based on five accounting ratios, to 
measure the level of firms’ capital constraints. I also use the WW-index (Whited & Wu, 
2006), based on six accounting ratios. Both of these indices will be discussed in detail in the 
variable definition sections of each empirical chapter. The Prowessdx database provided all 
the necessary data to construct the capital constraint indices and determine firms’ access to 
finance in India.   Figure 2 illustrates my planned research methodology for this thesis. 


















  In summary, this chapter has provided a brief discussion of the methodology used to 
conduct this research. I have shown the role of ontology and epistemology in determining the 
method used, and the benefits of using positivism to conduct this study. Also, I have defined 
and explained the deductive approach, which I have followed. After that, I highlighted the 
method applied in my investigation, which is the quantitative method. Then, I explained the 
importance of the methodology used to investigate access to finance for listed Indian firms. in 
this research,  I believe that everything is constructed and is objective truth. In this sense, 
ontology and epistemology should follow this belief. Consequently, the research philosophy 
in this thesis should be positivism, because of the direct access to reality and objective 
knowledge (Levy, 2006). Finally, the quantitative approach is applied to conduct this 
research, because it provides answers about “how much and how many”, is a logical 









Chapter Four: Audit and Non-audit Fees and Access to Finance 
In this chapter, I will examine the association between audit and non-audit fees, and 
access to finance, for Indian listed firms. In the first section, I will describe the literature on 
audit quality and access to finance. Then I will develop two hypotheses for this chapter, the 
first regarding the relationship between audit fees and access to finance by reducing their 
capital constraints, and the second that between non-audit fees and access to finance by 
reducing their capital constraints. After that, the detailed research design will be explained, 
including the sample selection, measurement of variables and model specification. The next 
section will present the empirical results, including descriptive statistics, regression analysis 
and additional analysis, and then a discussion in which I will analyse the results and then 
interpret them according to the limited attention theory.   
4.1 Literature Review  
The main purpose of audit firms is to provide opinions regarding the credibility and 
reliability of financial information produced by firms. Stakeholders demand reliable financial 
information for different purposes, and use auditors’ judgments about how reliable this 
information is. Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) state that auditing is considered a monitoring 
function that makes a meaningful contribution to the financial reporting process. The 
empirical literature has shown the merits of being audited by a high-quality firm (Lin & 
Hwang, 2010; Arens et al., 2012). Indeed, it is known that companies rely on audits to 
mitigate the likelihood of encountering agency problems (Fan & Wong, 2005). The 
incentives of managers are opportunistic but appointing external auditors should help to 
ensure that their actions are supervised, helping to ensure that the accounts offer a true 
reflection of the firm’s standing, whilst also containing agency costs (Tsipouridou & Spathis, 
2012). Firms that have appointed high-quality auditors are unlikely to engage in earnings 
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management because such auditors conduct certification tasks to verify the credibility of 
financial statements (Alzoubi, 2018). If doubts are raised about financial statements’ 
reliability, readers will devote greater attention to auditors’ reports.  
In addition, high-quality financial reporting is beneficial for both internal and external 
evaluations of business performance (Bushman & Smith, 2001). For instance, with internal 
decision-making, access to high-quality financial reports enables the management to select 
profitable ventures and operate more efficiently (McNichols & Stubben, 2008; Chen et al., 
2011). For external purposes, when seeking to raise capital, it enables third parties to gain a 
better appreciation of the opportunities available to the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Diamond 
& Verrecchia, 1991). A company’s financial reports are the main source of independently 
verified information about managers that is accessible to investors and creditors (Sloan, 
2001). 
If an auditor does not provide a good audit quality, this could prevent the company’s 
financial reports from being evaluated effectively (Claessens et al., 2002). Therefore, the 
auditors’ quality is directly associated with the credibility of the company’s financial 
information. Sometimes, companies will deliberately appoint a low-quality auditor to 
maintain a certain level of opacity, so as to keep engaging in a desirable extent of earnings 
management, rather than hiring a high-quality auditor to indicate good corporate governance 
practices (Lin & Liu, 2009).  
Previous research has confirmed that availability of financial sources has a significant 
positive effect on firm growth, especially among the companies considered most deserving of 
funding (Beck et al., 2006). If a firm is financially constrained, it is unlikely to have the 
wherewithal to invest across many strategic interests (Campello et al., 2010), in research and 
development (Hall & Lerner, 2010). If a company is capital constrained, it will experience 
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restrictions on its capital that effectively constrain its efforts to expand (Lamont et al., 2001). 
A reduction in capital constraints, and increase in the company’s finance options, will 
positively affect the ability of that company to expand and to stay in business when otherwise 
it might not. 
Audits can affect capital constraints. As mentioned above, a good audit plays a vital 
role in decreasing earnings management because of auditors' important role in checking the 
credibility of the financial statements (Alzoubi, 2018). This emphasises the imperative for 
auditors to supervise a company’s management and investment decisions closely. In addition, 
good auditing leads firms to provide reliable and accurate disclosures to avoid harmful audit 
reports and unsatisfactory attention from capital providers. An audit is likely to decrease the 
doubt of capital providers regarding reporting quality and management skills, which will lead 
to better financing terms (Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017).  
It has been found that the audit fees charged by an auditor are considered an indicator 
of the effort made in the audit process (Leventis et al., 2011). Non-audit fees, meanwhile, 
might indicate enhanced accounting practices of companies (Choi et al., 2009). The size of 
the auditor is usually regarded as a proxy for how good their audit services are (DeAngelo, 
1981; DeFond, 1992; Francis & Wilson, 1988). However, capital providers might see no 
observable difference between companies audited by large and small audit firms, in terms of 
whether or not they engage in earnings management. For instance, investigations in countries 
such as Belgium, France, Greece and Korea have found no statistically significant difference 
between the levels of earnings management in companies audited by Big4 versus small audit 
firms (Jeong & Rho, 2004; Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2004; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; 
Tsipouridou & Spathis, 2012). This may be because large auditors have less of an incentive 
to behave conservatively in order to avoid legal prosecution and protect their reputations in 
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countries with weak regulatory systems. India, the context for this study, provides weak 
investor protection. Thus, auditor size will not be considered as a measurement of auditor 
services from the capital provider’s perspective in India. In particular, the current Indian 
laws/regulations prohibit publicly listed firms from using the same audit firms for rendering 
certain non-audit services, e.g., advisory services; outsourced financial service; investment 
services; management services; design of any financial information system and internal audit 
and book-keeping services (MCA, 2020). However, audit firms in India could offer non audit 
services to a listed company if it not one of these services mentioned earlier.  
It is helpful to investigate the actions of auditors in relation to access to finance, to 
show the need for an auditor to actively monitor the investment and management decisions 
made by a firm. Thus, in the next sub-section, the previous theoretical and empirical literature 
is examined to explain the development of the specific hypotheses of interest. Two elements 
of audits are investigated: audit fees and non-audit fees.  
4.1.1 Hypotheses’ development 
The relationship between audit fees and access to finance 
Many researchers have concluded that auditors' fees are indicative of the quality of the 
audit that is undertaken (Leventis et al., 2013). The audit fees charged by an auditor indicate 
the effort that will be expended during the auditing process (Leventis et al., 2011) because 
many stakeholders consider audit fees to be a core element of the agency cost and monitoring 
assessments (Cobbin, 2002). Indeed, Alzoubi (2018) concludes that a negative relationship 
exists between audit fees and earnings management. This lends weight to the argument that 
those who pay substantial audit fees receive high-quality audits, helping to avoid the 
possibility of earnings management or other forms of financial manipulation. It is logical, 
therefore, to assume that better-quality audits make it easier for third parties to verify a 
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company’s financial standing, making it more likely that the providers of capital will trust the 
data presented to them and approve requests for financing. Carcello et al. (2011) offer 
empirical evidence that audit fees are higher when audit quality is higher. Similarly, evidence 
from the US provided by Srinidhi and Gul (2007) suggests that higher audit fees are 
associated with better-quality auditing practices and a reduced likelihood of earnings 
management. The same relationship is reported by Gerayli et al. (2011), who study a sample 
of Iranian companies.   
The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that audited financial statements help to 
reassure the providers of capital because the audit effectively validates the credibility of the 
information being presented. Suppose the risk of information is priced by capital providers, 
perhaps in the way capital providers link price information risks to the efficiency of auditing. 
A high audit fee acts as a solid monitoring mechanism and sends a positive signal to capital 
providers: the expectation is that the providers of capital will reward the firm for helping to 
minimise information asymmetry. According to Chen et al. (2011), the auditing process 
effectively serves as a monitoring device to verify how well a particular firm is actually 
performing. Essentially, audits offer a means to improve the quality of information by 
minimising information asymmetry. In particular, in India’s unique institutional setting, 
where the size of the auditing firm might not be a sign of good quality (Joshy et al., 2015), 
capital providers may use audit fees as an indicator of the credibility of financial statements.     
Conversely, other researchers argue that the price of an audit will rise if auditors 
anticipate that a firm’s audit risk has become elevated (Lin & Liu, 2013; Mitra et al., 2017), 
since a lower risk might require them to exert less effort (Bell et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; 
Niemi, 2005). In addition, some researchers (e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Li & Lin, 2005) state 
that, if an auditor charges a relatively high fee, this can be interpreted as a particularly strong 
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economic bond between firm and auditor, thereby casting doubt over the independence of the 
auditor. Reduced independence might in turn increase the chances of earnings management 
(Abbott et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2006; Lin & Hwang, 2010). 
Based on earlier arguments, the more audit fees might be an indicator for more audit 
quality conducted, thereby reduce the earning management especially in context 
characterized by no difference in audit quality between big4 and non-big4 firms. Moreover,  
the absent of investor protection, which make the capital provider seek to audit quality signs 
such as audit fees as positive sign to protect their investment from management manipulation. 
Therefore, I expect that the capital providers to respond to relatively high audit fees by 
approving more finance by reducing capital constraints because these fees send a signal that 
the underlying financial statements are accurate and reliable. Consequently, I hypothesis that 
there to be a significant positive relationship between the audit fees paid by listed Indian 
companies and their ability to access finance. The first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: A positive relationship exists between audit fees and access to finance for listed Indian 
firms. 
The relationship between non-audit fees and access to finance 
Auditors also offer companies a range of non-audit services. This is controversial 
because the sale of additional services potentially threatens an auditor's independence, which 
could be reflected in the perceived quality of the firm’s financial statements. This issue stems 
from the assumption that an auditor and the firm it is auditing could establish an economic 
bond which might reduce the quality of the financial statements (DeAngelo, 1981; Ashbaugh 
& Warfield, 2003; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005). On the other hand, many research studies have 
concluded that the sale of additional non-audit services has no bearing on the auditor’s 
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independence (Dhaliwal et al., 2008) because auditors care about their reputations (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1983) and wish to avoid litigation cases (Shu, 2000). 
Several researchers have even found that the provision of non-audit services enhances 
the credibility of firms’ financial reporting among stakeholders (Robinson, 2006; Cahan et 
al., 2008; Choi et al., 2009; Nam & Ronen, 2012; Koh et al., 2013). For example, Robinson 
(2006) asserts that non-audit services enhance information about companies’ financial status. 
Kinney et al. (2004) state that there is a negative association between tax service fees and 
restatement. Also, Choi et al. (2009) find a significant negative association between non-audit 
fees as a tax service and reported earnings management, suggesting that earnings quality 
improves through a reduction in aggressive accounting and a move to more conservative 
accounting practices. It is also argued that by providing non-audit services auditors become 
increasingly aware of a company's financial system, enhancing the quality of the company’s 
accounting system because of a knowledge spill-over (Simunic, 1984; Antle et al., 2006). 
If the payment of non-audit fees increases the integrity of financial statements, then 
these fees could logically also affect the firm’s ability to obtain finance because capital 
providers rely heavily on a company’s financial reports when assessing its creditworthiness. 
In India, the accounting organisation has little real action it can take against audit errors 
(Chakrabarti, 2005). Thus, a firm’s non-audit fees will provide a sign of the effectiveness of 
its accounting system. Indeed, some studies, such as Dhaliwal et al. (2008) and Choi and Lee 
(2015), have shown a negative association between non-audit fees and the cost of debt. It is 
thus anticipated that there will be a significant positive relationship between the payment of 
non-audit fees and the ability of a company to access finance.  
Based on previous arguments, the more non-audit fees could be a sign for effective 
accounting system used by firms due to the a knowledge spill-over, thereby increase the 
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credibility of financial statements produce by these firms especially in context characterized 
by accounting organisation take little real action it can take against audit errors and no 
difference in audit quality between big4 and non-big4 firms. Therefore, I expect there to be a 
significant positive relationship between the non-audit fees paid by listed Indian companies 
and their ability to access finance by decreasing capital constraints. I hypothesis that the 
capital providers will be more inclined to extend funding to firms paying sizeable non-audit 
fees by lower the capital constraints they face, because of a perception that their financial 
statements are more credible and they are benefiting from effective mentoring. Based on this 
assumption, I will test the following hypothesis: 
H2: A positive relationship exists between non-audit fees and access to finance for listed 
Indian firms. 
4.2 Research Design  
4.2.1  Sample selection and data sources  
I obtained data from the Prowessdx database of the CMIE, which has data for companies 
with stocks listed on the two stock exchanges mentioned above. The database provides 
necessary financial data for individual companies and supplementary background information 
on their operations. It has been extensively employed in the empirical literature (Aswani, 
Chidambaran, & Hasan, 2021; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Mal & Gupta, 2020; Pinto & 
Rastogi, 2019). The initial sample comprises 2,557 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, belonging to 18 industrial categories, 
for the period from 2002 to 2017. After taking a closer look, 483 firms in the financial 
industry were excluded because they have different operations, regulations and governance 
arrangements (Iatridis, 2018). In addition, companies were eliminated that did not disclose 
any information about any of the variables (Mallin et al., 2015); consequently, 1,103 firms 
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with missing data were excluded. Therefore, the sample comprises 971 companies listed on 
the Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange for the testing of H1, 
labelled Panel A. For the purposes of testing H2, 649 companies are used, labelled Panel B, 
after 322 firms were excluded due to missing data of non-audit fees. Table 1 illustrates the 
sample selection process. 
Table 1 Sample selection process for audit and non-audit fees 
 Firms Observations 
Initial number of listed firms in the NSE and BSE, data from 
the Prowessdx database, for the period from 2002-2017. 2,557 18,815 
   
Less financial firms. -483 -3,347 
Less firms with missing values  -1,103 -10,353 
Final sample, Panel A, for H1 971 5,115 
   
Less missing observations for NAF -322 -1,961 
Final sample, Panel B, for H2 649 3,154 
NSE is the National Stock Exchange; BSE is the Bombay Stock Exchange; Prowessdx is the database provided 
by CMIE. 
 
4.2.2  Measurement of variables and model specification 
Access to finance refers to the ability of a company to obtain finance. The inability to 
access finance might be “due to credit constraints or inability to borrow, inability to issue 
equity, dependence on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets” (Lamont et al., 2001: 529). Hence, 
if a company experiences a reduction in its capital constraints, its ability to access finance 
will improve (Cheng et al., 2014). Therefore, in my analysis, the dependent variable is the 
KZ-index, a measurement of capital constraints (Lamont et al., 2001; Bakke & Whited, 2010; 
Cheng et al., 2014). This approach applied to categorise companies according to their 
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financial constraints was devised by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who related classifications 
to accounting variables using an ordered logit specification. Following the methods applied in 
the empirical literature, a KZ-index for each individual firm-year is produced using 
regression coefficients. The index effectively amalgamates the following accounting ratios: 
market-to-book ratio; cash-holdings-to-capital ratio; cash-flow-to-total-capital ratio; debt-to-
total-capital ratio; and dividends-to-total-capital ratio. I follow Baker et al. (2003) by 
applying the same coefficients
5
. The value of the index increases with financial constraints 
(Cheng et al., 2014).  
The first independent variable is the log of audit fees (ln AF), following the approach 
employed by Alzoubi (2016). I would expect audit fees to rise if the audit process is 
sufficiently comprehensive to consume many working hours or require the appointment of 
highly qualified personnel. Francis (2004) states that audit fees are an indication of the effort 
spent by auditors and, therefore, they imply much about the integrity of the resulting financial 
statement. 
The second independent variable is non-audit fees, as provided by Prowessdx, including 
taxation and company law services fees. Similar to that in Chen et al. (2017a), the selected 
measure is the natural log of non-audit fees (ln NAF). The payment of sizeable non-audit fees 
could imply that the auditor is familiar with the firm’s accounting system, suggesting that the 
accounting practices being applied are of the highest quality (Antle et al., 2006; Choi et al., 
2009). 
The control variables are selected on the basis of their use in the empirical literature. 
The size of the company provides insight into the scope of its activities as well as the 
complexity of its operations. The larger a firm is, the more complex its operations are 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix B for a more detailed construction of the main and alternative capital constraint indices (KZ, 
WW, KZE and KZ4).  
79 
 
expected to be (Andreas et al., 2012). In the empirical literature, it has been widely reported 
that the size of a company has a significant bearing on its financing mix (Frank & Goyal, 
2009). The variable Firm size is calculated as the log of its total assets at the year-end (Mallin 
et al., 2015). The current study employs both industry and year effects (Goh & Gupta, 2016). 
The industry in which a company operates determines the National Industry Classification 
code that is assigned to it (Industry). Full details of the variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. 
4.2.3  Model specification 
To test the main hypothesis, the dependent variable is the current year’s KZ-index 
(KZ), whilst the independent variables are the previous year’s audit and non-audit fees. Firm 
size lagged by one year serves as a control variable. The method applied by Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008) is broadly replicated, whereby the independent variables are lagged by a year 
to forecast the subsequent year’s dependent variables.  
An ordinary least squares approach is adopted to estimate Models 1 and 2, whose 
specifications are given below. To control heteroscedasticity and address any potential cross-
sectional dependence issues, the approach adopted by Petersen (2009) is followed, whereby 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level (García Lara et al., 2017). Besides firm-level 
clustering, both models employ clustering at the year level (Baboukardos, 2018). 
Furthermore, winsorising the variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles helps avoid the effect of 
extreme values (Chang et al., 2007).  
To test the main hypothesis regarding the lagged effects of an audit on a firm’s access 
to finance, the following models are used: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛 𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡               (1)  
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𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑛 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡              (2)  
where the dependent variable is the KZ-index for the current year, ln AF and ln NAF are the 
independent variables for the previous year and the control variables are lagged by one year. 
4.3  Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.3.1  Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. This provides statistical insight into 
the measures used to capture the degree to which the companies experience capital 
constraints. In Panel A, the KZ-index has a mean of -0.42 with a standard deviation of 1.34, 
indicating the variation across the sample of companies in regards to capital constraints.   
Meanwhile, the mean value of ln AF is 3.61, and the mean Firm size is 5.154. In Panel B, 
meanwhile, the KZ-index has a mean of -0.47 with a standard deviation of 1.33, again 
indicating variation across the sample. ln NAF has a mean of 2.56, and the mean Firm size is 
5.310. This implies that listed firms in India face different status regarding capital constraints 
due to the high level of difference across the sample of firms’ capital constraints. In addition, 
the mean and median of ln AF is higher than ln NAF of the Indian-listed firms, which might 
be a sign that the independence of auditors is not threatened by using less ln NAF than ln AF 
and not exaggerating paying more ln NAF. Regarding correlations, the firms’ capital 
constraints correlate to ln AF and ln NAF by 0.04 and 0.02, respectively; however, it 
correlates more to firms’ size by 0.18 in Panel A and 0.17 in Panel B. In addition, ln AF is 
highly correlated to the firms’ size in Panel A and ln NAF in Panel B. Table 3 presents the 






Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the final samples for the audit and non-audit fee panels 
Panel A, for H1 
 N Mean Median S.D 
KZ  5115 -0.429 -0.224 1.347 
In AF  5115 3.617 3.605 1.453 
Firm size  5115 5.154 5.033 1.677 
     
Panel B, for H2 
 N Mean Median S.D 
KZ  3154 -0.479 -0.287 1.334 
In NAF  3154 2.564 2.460 1.331 
Firm size  3154 5.310 5.193 1.632 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF is the 
log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous 
year. 
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix for audit fees and non-audit fees  
Panel A, for H1   
 KZ index InAF Firm size 
KZ  1   
In AF  0.042 1  
Firm size  0.186 0.757 1 
    
Panel B, for H2    
 KZ index NAF Firm size 
KZ  1   
In NAF  -0.020 1  
Firm size  0.171 0.631 1 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF is the 
log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous 
year. 
 
4.3.2  Regression analysis 
In this section, the association between access to finance, measured by the KZ-index, 
and audit and non-audit fees in the previous year is demonstrated. I control for company size, 
and industry and year fixed effects. Table 4 shows the results of applying Model 1 and testing 
the causal relationship between ln AF and KZ. The coefficient of ln AF is negative and 
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highly significant (-0.204, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that firms with higher audit fees face 
fewer capital constraints, and thus have greater access to finance. 
The results support the argument that audit fees can influence capital providers’ 
attitudes, exerting a positive impact on a company’s ability to access finance. Audit fees 
could indicate low earnings management, supporting the argument (Alzoubi, 2018). This 
implies that the payment of sizeable audit fees is associated with good-quality auditing, 
preventing management from attempting to manage earnings whilst simultaneously 
enhancing the credibility of the financial reports published. It is quite conceivable that paying 
elevated audit fees could cause the providers of credit to look favourably upon a company. 
Meanwhile, it does not support the Leventis (2018) argument that auditors inflate their fees in 
response to perceptions that a company’s audit risk has increase. Therefore, the results 
suggest that higher audit fees encourage capital providers to extend loans, which supports H1. 
Table 4 Results of regressing lagged audit and non-audit fees on a firm’s access to 
finance 
Variables H1 H2 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
In AF -0.204***  
 (0.051)  
In NAF  -0.167*** 
  (0.041) 
Firm size 0.239*** 0.185*** 
 (0.054) (0.049) 
Constant -2.193*** -1.778** 
 (0.684) (0.762) 
   
Observations 5,115 3,154 
Adj. R-sq. 0.157 0.168 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF is the 
log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous 
year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered (by 




Table 4 also shows the results of applying Model 2 and testing the causal relationship 
between ln NAF and KZ. The coefficient of ln NAF is negative and highly significant (-
0.167, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that firms with higher non-audit fees also encounter fewer 
capital constraints, and thus have better access to finance.  
These results support the argument that non-audit fees can influence the attitudes of 
capital providers, thereby positively affecting access to finance. Capital providers could view 
high non-audit fees as a sign of low earnings management and more aggressive accounting 
practices being suppressed by auditors through non-audit services (Antle et al., 2006; Choi et 
al., 2009). Conversely, the results do not support the argument for a significant positive 
relationship between non-audit fees and earnings management (Lin & Hwang, 2010). Based 
on these results, capital providers would be expected to react to an increase in non-audit fees 
by more granting loans. The results support H2. 
4.3.3  Additional analysis 
Next, in Equations 1 and 2, the KZ-index is replaced by the WW-index to ensure 
robustness. Initially devised by Whited and Wu (2006), the WW-index offers an alternative 
means of gauging capital constraints
6
 (Chen et al., 2017b). In the first column of Table 5, the 
coefficient of ln AF is -0.039 and significant with a p-value of less than 0.01. This supports 
the argument that companies paying sizeable audit fees are less likely to be capital 
constrained. Meanwhile, in the second column of Table 5, the coefficient of ln NAF is -0.035 
and significant with a p-value of less than 0.01. 
 
                                                 
6
 For further robustness, I also use two modified KZ-indices. The first is an equally weighted KZ-index (KZE) 
that assigns equal weight to each of the five accounting ratios. This is necessary to ensure that the weights are 
not the significant factor (Chang et al., 2007). In the second modified KZ-index (KZ4), Tobin’s Q is dropped 
whilst the same coefficients are kept for the remaining four ratios (Baker et al., 2003). See Appendices C1 and 
C2 for the regression results. 
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Table 5 Additional analysis: lagged audit and non-audit fees regressed against a 
different capital constraints index 
Variables H1 H2 
(WW) (WW) 
   
In AF -0.039***  
 (0.003)  
In NAF  -0.035*** 
  (0.004) 
Constant -0.194 -0.213 
 (0.122) (0.143) 
   
Observations 5,109 3,150 
Adj. R-sq. 0.203 0.208 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
WW is the WW-index for the current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF is 
the log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the 
previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way clustered (by 
firm and year) standard errors (in parentheses). 
 
In addition, the method employed by Ball et al. (2012) is adopted, using heightened 
audit fees (excess audit fees, or EX_AF), which is taken to be the residual from regressing ln 
AF on the following company-level determinants: the current ratio (CA/CL), the total 
accruals to total assets (Accrual), the log of total assets (Firm size), total liabilities divided by 
total assets (Liabilities), the return on assets (ROA) and a dummy variable indicating whether 
the company is loss-making (Loss). A regression of Equation 1 is run but with the lagged 
EX_AF instead of the lagged ln AF. I apply the same technique using the log of non-audit 
fees (ln NAF) to create a variable for the excess non-audit fees (EX_NAF) and then use it to 
run a regression of Equation 2. Table 6 shows that the results are consistent with the previous 





Table 6 Results of regressing lagged excess audit and non-audit fees on a firm’s access 
to finance 
Variables H1 H2 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
EXAF -2.015***  
 (0.362)  
EXNAF  -5.004*** 
  (0.808) 
Firm size 1.444*** 2.880*** 
 (0.246) (0.431) 
Constant -11.087*** -24.053*** 
 (1.664) (3.311) 
   
Observations 3,876 3,876 
Adj. R-sq. 0.228 0.356 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; EX_AF is the residual from a regression of log audit fees (ln AF) on 
the firm-level determinants lagged by one year; EX_NAF is the residual from a regression of the log of non-
audit fees (ln NAF) on the firm-level determinants lagged by one year Firm size is the log of total assets of 
the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way clustered (by 
firm and year) standard errors (in parentheses). 
 
Two separate methods are employed to address possible endogeneity issues in the 
model. The first method is two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, which has been 
demonstrated to resolve endogeneity matters. This approach utilises instrumental variables 
expected to satisfy the exclusion restriction because they are associated with audit and non-
audit fees but not with the KZ-index
7
. It can be seen in Table 7 that the coefficients of ln AF 




                                                 
7
 I follow Usman et al. (2018a, 2018b) in using as instrumental variables the main independent variable lagged 
by one year and the industry average of the main independent variable. 
86 
 
Table 7 Additional analysis: (2SLS) Regressions results for lagged audit and non-audit 
fees against a firm’s access to finance 
Variables 
H1  H2 
First stage Second stage 
 
First stage Second stage 
      
In AF  -0.255***    
  (0.063)    
Lag In AF  0.894***     
 (0.011)     
ln AF.M 0.001***     
 (0.000)     
In NAF     -0.207*** 
     (0.057) 
Lag In NAF    0.772***  
    (0.019)  
ln NAF.M    0.003**  
    (0.001)  
Firm size 0.076*** 0.262***  0.126*** 0.231*** 
 (0.010) (0.060)  (0.019) (0.057) 
Constant -0.413** -3.124***  -0.200 -4.402*** 
 (0.170) (0.833)  (0.737) (1.130) 
      
Observations 3,876 3,876  2,241 2,386 
Adj. R-sq. 0.930 0.181  0.775 0.191 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; L. ln AF is the 
one-year-lagged value of ln AF; ln AF.M is the industry average of the audit fees from the last year; ; ln NAF 
is the log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; L. ln NAF is the one-year-lagged value of ln NAF; ln 
NAF_M is the industry average of the non-audit fees for the last year; Firm size is the log of the total assets 
of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
Secondly, it is possible that the independent variable is not responsible for the KZ-
index being high or low. Instead, this could be due to the characteristics of the firms. Thus, 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method is used to overcome this issue. I apply this 
method to a set of control companies, matched to the original treatment companies, where 
each control company has a low value for the independent variable but no other apparent 
differences in its characteristics (e.g. its financial condition) from the matched treatment firm 
that has a high value for the independent variable. Thus, firms in each pair are closely similar 
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to each other except for one variable (the main independent variable). Column 1 and 2 of 
Table 8 shows that the coefficients on both ln AF and ln NAF are consistent with the 
previous results, being significantly negative.  
Table 8 Additional analysis: Propensity score matching results for lagged audit and 
non-audit fees regressed on a firm’s access to finance 
Panel A. Estimation of propensity score functions 
Variables In AF_D  In NAF_D 
Firm size 0.840***  0.232*** 
 (0.025)  (0.014) 
Current_ratio 0.000***  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
LEV 0.000**  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
ROA 0.000**  0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant -10.482***  -2.635*** 
 (0.365)  (0.232) 
    
Observations 4,931  3,875 
Pseudo R-sq. 0.41  0.082 
Year Fixed Effects YES  YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES  YES 
 
Panel B. Specifications based on alternative matching methods 
Variables 












In AF -0.204*** -0.223***    
 (0.051) (0.058)    
In NAF    -0.167*** -0.199*** 
    (0.041) (0.044) 
Firm size 0.239*** 0.241***  0.185*** 0.214*** 
 (0.054) (0.058)  (0.049) (0.053) 
Constant -2.193*** -2.980***  -1.778** -2.799*** 
 (0.684) (0.834)  (0.762) (0.958) 
      
Observations 5,115 3,866  3,154 2,439 
Adj. R-sq. 0.157 0.179  0.168 0.196 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES  YES YES 
Panel A, Probit Model: ln AF_D is a binary variable which equals one if the firm has larger audit fees than 
the sample median for the previous year; ln NAF_D is a binary variable which equals one if the firm has 
larger non-audit fees than the sample median for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the 
firm for the previous year. LEV is the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by equity for the 
previous year; CA/CL is the current assets over current liabilities for the previous year; ROA is the return on 
assets for the previous year. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
Panel B, Valuation Model: KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for 
the previous year; ln NAF is the log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total 
assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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In summary, the findings suggest that capital providers react positively to news of 
Indian companies having high audit fees. Access to finance improves following the payment 
of high audit fees, implying that paying auditors relatively high fees results in high-quality 
audits being conducted. In emerging markets, it is especially likely that companies might try 
to maintain a certain level of opaqueness (Lin & Liu, 2009), but in an Indian context, high 
audit fees would increase faith in financial statements. In addition, the results suggest that 
capital providers react positively to news that Indian companies have high non-audit fees. As 
such, access to finance could improve following the payment of high non-audit fees, 
suggesting that paying auditors relatively high non-audit fees results in reduced earnings 
management at Indian companies. This supports identical findings in developed countries 
(Antle et al., 2006; Cahan et al., 2008). Capital providers could also consider high non-audit 
fees to be an indicator of better accounting practices in Indian firms, as has been shown in the 
case of Korea (Choi et al., 2009).  
Following the limited attention theory, both audit and non-audit fees attract capital 
providers' attention, making it more likely that companies paying these fees will get better 
access to finance. High audit and non-audit fees are not regarded as being a red flag. 
Conversely, capital providers recognise them as a good sign of the quality of the audit, along 
with low management manipulation and higher credibility of a firm’s financial reporting. 
Firms that cannot demonstrate good audit practices could be overlooked and may not be 
granted loans (DeYoung et al., 2008). Put another way, loan officers will interpret high audit 
and non-audit fees as a positive sign of the accuracy of the financial information they have 
been presented, which will affect their cognitive process (Stein, 2002). In the Indian setting, 
and in accordance with the limited attention perspective, it is anticipated that the payment of 
sizeable audit and non-audit fees by listed Indian companies will be positively interpreted by 
lenders that have limited attention capacity, thereby improving these firms’ access to finance. 
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Particularly, it is a country that affords limited investor protection and relatively poor 
supervision by accounting bodies and, as such, the payment of sizeable audit and non-audit 
fees will help garner the trust of capital providers. Therefore, companies have an incentive to 
pay high fees to auditors as a means of demonstrating that their financial statements are 
credible.  
In other words, under the limited attention lens, capital providers in India respond 
positively to a rise in audit quality implied by higher audit and non-audit fees, reducing firms’ 
capital constraints and giving them easier access to finance. Capital providers might see 
audits as useful tools for achieving reliable financial statements and applying appropriate 
corporate governance mechanisms in Indian listed firms. Indeed, firms use audits as an 
instrument to deliver good corporate governance because they achieve legitimacy from the 
quality of their audits and the reassurance that auditors provide (Sainty et al., 2002; Anderson 
et al., 2004a; Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003) assert that the 
monitoring function of audits means that they make a meaningful contribution to corporate 
governance and the financial reporting process. Thus, employing independent auditors is very 
important (DeFond et al., 2000; Allen et al., 2005). High-quality audits may reduce the cost 
of borrowing in the debt market by reducing the opaqueness of information and earnings 
management (Fan & Wong, 2005) and enabling third parties to gain a better appreciation of 
the opportunities available to the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). 
A company’s financial reports are the main source of independently verified information 





This investigation examines the influence on capital providers of two audit-related 
elements (audit and non-audit fees) of listed companies in India. The investigation yields 
significant insights by examining the attitudes of capital providers to auditing information. 
While this type of information (audit and non-audit fees) can be costly for firms, it can also 
influence capital providers’ decisions, leading to greater access to finance.  
The data were sourced from the Prowessdx database, producing an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 971 and 649 firms in Panels A and B, respectively. Both panels include firms listed 
on the National Stock Exchange and the Mumbai Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2017. 
These firms operate in eighteen different industries. The investigation indicates that capital 
constraints as measured by the KZ-index show a significant and negative relationship with 
audit and non-audit fees; thus, higher fees lead to more access to finance. The results are 
significant and support both hypotheses: a positive relationship between audit fees and access 
to finance for listed Indian firms, and a positive relationship between non-audit fees and 
access to finance.  
Capital providers operating in India are highly responsive to companies paying sizeable 
audit and non-audit fees. I perceive the payment of these fees as a green flag in the Indian 
context, which is characterised by weak protection for investors and many questions 
regarding the duties of the accounting organisation. This indicates that the attention of capital 
providers can be attracted by a signal that sizeable audit and non-audit fees have been paid. 
Under the limited attention perspective, the payment of these fees exerts a positive influence 
over the providers of capital who suffer from a limited attention capacity. This affords listed 
Indian firms preferential access to finance.  
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Based on the results presented in the current study, companies can better test whether 
the benefits afforded by paying high audit and non-audit fees outweigh the costs. Limited 
attention theory asserts that firms can pay these fees to influence the perceptions of capital 
providers and improve their access to finance. The results will be of use to researchers 
interested in learning about the effects audits have on companies in emerging markets. The 
regulatory authorities will also be interested in the findings because they will be keen to 
ensure that audits help to support the supervision of Indian firms. Crucially, it is possible to 
generalise the results to companies operating in other emerging markets because India's 















































Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable  Description  
KZ  KZ-index for the current year; A capital constraints proxy whose estimation is 
explained in Appendix B. 
 
WW  WW-index for the current year; A capital constraints proxy whose estimation is 
explained in Appendix B. 
 
ln AF  Log of audit fees on the previous year. 
ln NAF  Log of non-audit fees on the previous year. 
Firm size  Log of total assets on the previous year. 
Industry Multiple dummy variable based on 18 industries, according to the National 
Industry Classification (NIC) codes. 
   
Year Multiple dummy variable based on the 16 years under investigation, 2002-2017.  
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Appendix B.1 Indices’ construction 
KZ, following Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
KZit (five-variable) = -1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) -39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) - 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 3.139LEVi(t) + 
0.283Qi(t), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1)  is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 
assets;  Cit/A(it_1) is cash balances over lagged assets;  LEVi(t)  is leverage; and Q is the market 
value of equity (price times shares outstanding) plus assets minus the book value of equity all 
over assets. 
WW, based on Whited and Wu (2006), derived as: 
WW = (−0.091 ∗ CF) − (0.062 ∗ DIVPOS) + (0.021 ∗ TLTD) − (0.044 ∗ LNTA) + 
(0.102 ∗ ISG) − (0.035 ∗ SG), 
 
where CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets; 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digit industry sales growth; 
and SG is firm sales growth. 
KZE, based on Cheng et al. (2014), derived as: 
KZEit = {(1/5)*(-1.002CFit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(39.368DIVit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(1.315Cit/A(it_1))} 
+ {(1/5)*3.139LEVi(t)} + {(1/5)*0.283Qi(t)}, 
 
I adjust the weights so that each ratio of the KZit index accounts for 1/5 of the variation in the 
index, with unchanging sign of the variable, in the same way that Chang et al. (2007) adjust 
the weights of the KZ (4 variables) index, so that each variable accounts for (1/4) of the 
variation in the index, with unchanging sign of the variable (Cheng et al., 2014). 
KZ4, based on Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
      KZit (four-variable) = – 1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) – 39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) – 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 
3.139LEVi(t)), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1) is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 




















Appendix B. 2 Descriptive statistics for the data used for computing the KZ and WW Indices  
Panel A, for H1  
KZ index N Mean Median S.D 
Cash Flow  5115 1086 168.7 5333 
Total Assets 5115 5.295 5.187 1.692 
Cash Dividends  5115 16.39 1.286 91.50 
Cash 5115 79.01 2.013 541.6 
Q 5115 2.120 1.563 9.702 
Leverage 5115 0.294 0.297 0.177 
WW index     
Cash Flow  5109 1087 169.3 5336 
Cash Dividends Dummy 5109 1 1 0 
Leverage 5109 0.294 0.297 0.177 
Total Assets 5109 5.298 5.189 1.691 
Industry Sales Growth 5109 1.151 0.153 7.050 
Firms Sales Growth 5109 0.219 0.113 1.445 
Panel B, for H2 
KZ index N Mean Median S.D 
Cash Flow  3154 1184 205.9 5688 
Total Assets 3154 5.434 5.297 1.647 
Cash Dividends  3154 19.18 1.580 105.10 
Cash 3154 78.57 2.938 388.0 
Q 3154 1.968 1.563 1.350 
Leverage 3154 0.282 0.281 0.180 
WW index     
Cash Flow  3150 1185 206.2 5691 
Cash Dividends Dummy 3150 1 1 0 
Leverage 3150 0.282 0.282 0.180 
Total Assets 3150 5.437 5.298 1.646 
Industry Sales Growth 3150 0.964 0.116 6.035 
Firms Sales Growth 3150 0.175 0.098 0.789 
 
Appendix B.2 provides statistical insights into the data used for computing the KZ and 
WW indices. In Panel A, the KZ index shows that the cash flow has a mean of 1086 with a 
standard deviation of 5333, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of 
companies with regards to cash flow. Additionally, almost the same statistical results are 
shown in Panel B. Meanwhile, the firms’ total assets in Panel A have a mean of 5.294; a 
median of 5.187 is almost the same for both panels. The cash dividends in Panel A are highly 
different among firms, with a mean of 16.39 and standard deviation of 91.50; almost the same 
result was found for Panel B. The cash mean in Panel A is 79.01, and it has high variation 
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across the sample; the same results were found in Panel B. The Q in Panel A has a high 
standard deviation, but Panel B has a lower standard deviation; this indicates that the firms in 
Panel B have less difference regarding Q. In Panel A, the leverage has a mean of 0.294 and a 
median of 0.297, and similar results apply to Panel B.  
However, in Panel A, the WW index shows that the cash flow has a mean of 1087 with 
a standard deviation of 5336, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of 
companies regarding cash flow. It also shows almost the same statistical results in Panel B. 
The firms’ cash dividends dummy in Panel A has a mean of 1 with a median of 1, which is 
almost the same for both panels. The leverage in Panel A is the same among firms, with a 
mean of 0.294 and standard deviation of 0.177, with almost the same results found for Panel 
B. The total mean assets in Panel A is 5.297, and there is low variation across the sample; the 
same results are found in Panel B. The industry sales growth in Panel A has a mean of 1.151 
and a high standard deviation, which is similar to the results found in Panel B. In Panel A, the 
firms’ sales growth has a mean of 0.219 and a median of 0.113, which is similar to the results 






















































Appendix C1. Additional analysis: In AF and different capital constraints indices 
                                                              
 
VARIABLES KZE KZ4 
    
ln AF  -0.041*** -0.245***  
 (0.010) (0.055)  
Firm size  0.048*** 0.282***  
 (0.011) (0.054)  
Constant -0.392*** -2.717***  
 (0.128) (0.664)  
    
Observations 5,115 5,115  
R-squared 0.159 0.167  
Year FE YES YES  
Industry FE YES YES  
KZE is the equal-weighted KZ-index; KZ4 is the KZ-index using four ratios for the current year; ln AF is the 
log of audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered (by 


























Appendix C2. Additional analysis: In NAF and different capital constraints indices 
 
 
VARIABLES KZE KZ4 
   
ln NAF  -0.033*** -0.193*** 
 (0.008) (0.045) 
Firm size  0.036*** 0.214*** 
 (0.010) (0.051) 
Constant -0.327** -2.290*** 
 (0.138) (0.712) 
   
Observations 3,154 3,154 
R-squared 0.169 0.174 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
KZE is the equal-weighted KZ-index; KZ4 is the KZ-index with four ratios for current year; ln NAF is the log 
of non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered (by 




Chapter Five: Independent Directors on Boards and Access to 
Finance 
In this chapter, I will examine the association between independent directors on boards 
and access to finance for Indian listed firms. Having independent directors on a board is 
considered as the most important determination for having a low quality of corporate 
governance in India. For example, directors' independence exists only on paper in the Indian 
setting, which is a major concern for good governance (OECD, 2019). Therefore, in the 
second chapter I focus on independent directors on boards and one connected characteristic, 
e.g., their remuneration; this variable was chosen over other corporate governance variables 
due to data availability. In the first section, I will present the literature on independent 
directors on firms’ boards and access to finance, after which I will develop two hypotheses 
for this chapter. The first hypothesis deals with the relationship between independent 
directors and access to finance. The second hypothesis is about the relationship between 
independent directors’ remuneration and access to finance. Then, a detailed description of the 
research design will be given, including the sample selection process, variable measurement 
and model specification. The next section will present the empirical results, including 
descriptive statistics, regression analysis and additional analysis, and the discussion of our 
findings and their interpretation according to the limited attention theory. 
5.1 Literature Review  
It is routine practice for a company’s financial accounts to be examined by creditors 
when the latter wish to determine its viability. If a firm violates previously agreed standards, 
this enables debtholders to liquidate the company or renegotiate existing loan contracts 
(DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). Therefore, managers have an incentive to manipulate financial 
information, either to avoid breaching loan covenants or for personal gain if doing so will 
trigger the payment of bonuses (Dechow et al., 1996). Thus, creditors pay attention to the 
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apparent incentives of managers to manipulate the company’s performance, and it is 
understandable that creditors will be wary about the potential for accounts to be deliberately 
manipulated (Smith, 1993). 
Therefore, numerous efforts have been made in the empirical literature to clarify the 
nature of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms aimed at preventing 
information asymmetry and reducing manipulation, and debt finance (Sengupta, 1998; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008). For instance, the responsibility of the 
board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism is to supervise the firm’s financial 
reporting processes. In practical terms, this involves the directors communicating with the 
company’s accountants as well as external auditors to oversee the internal control 
mechanisms, production of financial statements and audit procedures (Klein, 2002). Based on 
this relationship, it is logical that creditors will evaluate the directors and the structure of the 
board when determining a firm’s ability to produce accurate and reliable financial statements 
(Daley & Vigeland, 1983; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994).  
The empirical literature has observed a significant relationship between various features 
of the board and the manipulation of financial accounts (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Carcello & Neal, 2000; Klein, 2002). Therefore, creditors are likely to be interested in 
learning about the specific features of boards that are related to the validity of financial 
statements. For instance, Smith and Warner (1979) find that a company’s debt is priced in a 
way that reflects how easily the validity of the lending agreement can be demonstrated, 
implying that debt is priced in a way that takes the structure of the board into consideration. 
In a sense, previous studies have exposed the advantages of having independent 
directors on a firm’s board. For example, independent directors are influential in delivering 
good corporate governance (Weisbach, 1988; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Holder-Webb & 
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Sharma, 2010; Fich & Shivdasani, 2012; Rashid, 2015). It has also been shown in the 
empirical literature that, when firms announce an increase in the number of independent or 
external directors, there is a positive effect on the share price (Sarpal, 2018) and a surge in 
abnormal returns (Wang & Lee, 2012). This is because independent directors have been 
found to reduce information asymmetry (Joh & Jung, 2012; Lin et al., 2015) and enhance the 
degree of corporate disclosure (Armstrong et al., 2014).  
The empirical literature has established that financial development has a significant 
positive effect on firm growth, especially among companies considered to be the most 
deserving of funding (Beck et al., 2006). Financially constrained companies (Campello et al., 
2010) are less likely to invest in a broad range of strategic activities, such as research and 
development (Hall & Lerner, 2010), acquiring additional inventory (Carpenter et al., 1998) or 
engaging in market share pricing (Chevalier, 1995). Access to finance is related to capital 
constraints (Cheng et al., 2014), which can in turn restrict firms’ expansion (Lamont et al., 
2001). Therefore, a reduction in capital constraints positively affects a company's ability to 
expand and stay in business.  
The inclusion of independent directors on a firm’s board may influence capital 
constraints. It is reasonable to presume that independent directors are in a good position to 
observe managers' movements and measure their capability to produce reliable financial 
statements. For example, Beasley (1996), Anderson et al. (2004a) and Holder-Webb and 
Sharma (2010) state that independent directors are able to provide effective monitoring of a 
company’s activities and thereby improve its ability to access finance. This highlights the 
need for independent directors to actively monitor the investment and management decisions 
of a firm. In addition, it shows that firms need to provide reliable and accurate disclosures to 
avoid unsatisfactory attention from capital providers. Independent directors on a firm’s board 
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should decrease the doubts of capital providers regarding management manipulation, which 
would lead to better financing terms (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003; Francis et al., 2012). It has 
been established that the inclusion of independent directors on a board improves the 
monitoring of the firm’s management (Armstrong et al., 2014; Goh & Gupta, 2016). The 
remuneration of independent directors also shows the important role they play (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2008). Therefore, it is useful to investigate the actions of independent directors in 
relation to access to finance, in order to demonstrate the importance of their active 
monitoring of the investment and management decisions made by a firm. Thus, in the next 
sub-section, the previous theoretical and empirical literature is examined to explain the 
development of my specific hypotheses of interest. I investigate how two elements of 
independent directors influence a company’s ability to access finance: the percentage of 
independent directors on a board and the independent directors’ remuneration. 
5.1.1 Hypotheses’ development 
The relationship between independent directors and access to finance 
It is in the interests of creditors that borrowers make all of their repayments when they 
fall due (Akudugu et al., 2009). Therefore, capital providers consider independent directors a 
vital aspect of board composition and might give more attention to whether boards include 
independent directors and how well those independent directors complete their important 
roles. For instance, independent directors are assumed to help with the monitoring of the 
firms’ management, improving transparency, reducing earnings management and increasing 
financial statement reliability (Beasley, 1996; Fields & Keys, 2003; Francis et al., 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2014; Goh & Gupta, 2016). This suggests that a high proportion of 
independent directors on a firm’s board results in a reduced likelihood that manipulation by 
the management will occur. In this sense, a higher proportion of independent directors on a 
firm’s board might indicate more credible financial reporting, with decreased earnings 
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management. This decreases the cost of verifying a firm’s financial information, increasing 
capital providers’ trust in these firms’ financial positions and thus increasing the firm’s 
ability to obtain finance. In summary, independent directors effectively reduce the risk to 
which creditors are exposed, consequently affecting a firm's ability to access finance (Holder-
Webb & Sharma, 2010; Bliss & Gul, 2012). 
However, Lorca et al. (2011) state that one should not assume that the same 
relationship between board independence and the cost of funding holds in all countries. They 
observe that no such relationship exists in Spain. Moreover, Arioglu (2015) finds no evidence 
that independent directors' presence yields benefits for companies seeking financing via the 
capital market of Turkey. Likewise, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) fail to identify a significant 
relationship between the employment of independent directors and the firms’ value in 
Malaysia. Meanwhile, some observe that board independence is a novel concept in most 
emerging markets (Arora & Sharma, 2016). Also, they stated that it is common practice in 
Indian companies for the management to be the ones who appoint the independent directors, 
casting doubt over whether such directors can truly be considered independent. For instance, 
Bhatt and Bhattacharya (2015) argue that the management will often nominate independent 
directors to maintain control over the firm.  
Based on previous arguments, that the independent directors on board are new concept 
in Indian context and often they chosen by the management, which might harm their 
independency and negatively affect their duties. The capital providers are likely to react to 
companies with a high percentage of independent directors on their boards by raising firms 
capital constraints which reduce their access to finance, because they question these 
directors’ ability to perform their monitoring duties. Therefore, a significant negative 
relationship between the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board and access to 
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finance is predicted in Indian listed firms. Under this presumption, I propose the first 
hypothesis of this chapter: 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of independent members on a 
firm’s board and access to finance for listed firms in India.  
The relationship between independent director remuneration and access to finance 
There is a serious demand for more understanding of independent directors’ 
remuneration (Mallin et al., 2015), as it might be understood by lenders in one of two ways. 
There might be doubts that exaggerated remuneration packages are employed to reduce the 
objectivity of independent directors and deflect them from the important things that should 
concern them. For instance, Goh and Gupta (2016) find a negative relationship between the 
independence of independent directors and their remuneration. Moreover, Bebchuk et al. 
(2002) show that the high remuneration of independent directors reduces the effectiveness 
with which they play their role. Therefore, too-high remuneration packages might be used to 
reward inefficient monitoring, thereby increasing concerns about relationships between 
insider directors and supposedly independent directors. For instance, Yermack (2004) shows 
that independent directors’ wealth rises by only 11 cents per each $1,000 rise in firm value, 
among the Fortune 500 companies. The second way of understanding the remuneration of 
independent directors is that it might reflect their effort and time spent working on firms’ 
boards. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2008) report that, due to independent directors 
often being required to perform extra duties and legal tasks, it is essential to compensate them 
for the significant function they perform, which requires a greater time commitment of them. 
By way of explanation, a greater level of remuneration paid to independent directors might 
purely be an indication of the quality of service they provide. Furthermore, Horton et al. 
(2012) state that higher remuneration of independent directors is associated with better 
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monitoring, thereby impacting the firm’s performance. For example, independent directors 
are rewarded for enhancing strategic decisions, as they are providing resources to their 
company, thereby improving the firm’s status. 
However, the independent directors’ remuneration in Indian listed firms consists of two 
parts: the sitting fees and a portion of net profit, and these two components are subject to a 
cap of $1,500 per meeting and 1% of the firm’s annual profit (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). 
Consequently, capital providers may not observe this as a signal of independent directors’ 
duties. From a capital provider’s viewpoint, remuneration may actually be a signal of the 
firm’s profitability since it contains a percentage of the firm’s annual profits. Lenders also 
favour profitable firms (Jiang et al., 2018) owing to their reduced default risk (Ertugrul & 
Hegde, 2008; Lorca et al., 2011). The other part of the remuneration, the sitting fees, are a 
sign of an active board. Xie et al. (2003) and Ntim and Osei (2011) state that firm 
performance is significantly improved by an active board.  
Based on previous argument, which is the remunerations of independent directors on 
board of listed Indian firms come from sitting fees and portion of net annual profit. The 
capital providers might see the independent directors remunerations be a signal of the firm’s 
profitability since it contains a percentage of the firm’s annual profits and sign of an active 
board as it also comes from the independent directors sitting fees. Therefore, the capital 
providers are likely to react to companies with a more remunerations of independent directors 
on their boards by allowing more finance which reduce capital constraints. Consequently, a 
significant positive relationship between the remunerations of independent directors on a 
firm’s board and access to finance is predicted in Indian listed firms. Under this presumption, 
I propose the second hypothesis of this chapter:    
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 H2: There is a positive relationship between the remuneration of independent directors and 
access to finance for listed firms in India. 
5.2 Research Design  
5.2.1  Sample selection and data sources  
I obtained data from the Prowessdx database of the CMIE, which has data for companies 
with stocks listed on the two stock exchanges mentioned above. The database provides 
necessary financial data for individual companies and supplementary background information 
on their operations. It has been extensively employed in the empirical literature (Aswani, 
Chidambaran, & Hasan, 2021; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Mal & Gupta, 2020; Pinto & 
Rastogi, 2019). The initial sample comprises 6,185 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, belonging to 18 industrial categories, 
for the period from 2006 to 2017. After taking a closer look, 1,325 firms in the financial 
industry were excluded because they have different operations, regulations and governance 
arrangements (Iatridis, 2018). In addition, companies were eliminated that did not disclose 
any information about any of the variables (Mallin et al., 2015); consequently, 3,909 firms 
with missing data were excluded. Therefore, the sample comprises 1,054 companies listed on 
the Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange for the testing of H1, 
labelled Panel A. For the purposes of testing H2, 894 companies are used, labelled Panel B, 
after 160 firms were excluded due to missing data of non-audit fees. Table 9 illustrates the 











Table 9 Sample selection process for tests on independent directors on boards and their 
remuneration 
 Firms Observations 
Initial number of listed firms in NSE and BSE, data found in 
Prowessdx database, for the period from 2006-2017. 6,185 56,531 
   
Less financial firms. -1,325 -15,199 
Less firms with missing values  -3,909 -38,631 
Final sample Panel A, for H1 1,054 5,562 
   
Less missing observation for IND_R -160 -1,015 
Final sample Panel B, for H2 894 4,547 
NSE is the National Stock Exchange; BSE is the Bombay Stock Exchange; Prowessdx is the database provided 
by CMIE. 
 
5.2.2  Measurement of variables  
Access to finance refers to the ability of a company to obtain finance. Difficulties 
accessing finance might be related to an inability to issue equity and borrow, illiquidity of 
assets or credit constraints (Lamont et al., 2001); any reduction in capital constraints will 
increase firms’ access to finance (Cheng et al., 2014). Thus, if firms are able to access a 
finance source, it will be shown by a reduction in their capital constraints. Therefore, the 
dependent variable I use is the KZ-index, a measurement of capital constraints (Baker et al., 
2003; Bakke & Whited, 2010; Cheng et al., 2014). The KZ-index was developed by Kaplan 
and Zingales (1997) to serve as an indicator for the extent of financial constraints facing a 
given company. They related classifications to accounting variables using an ordered logit 
specification. In accordance with the approaches adopted in the empirical literature, 
regression coefficients are used to compose a KZ-index for each firm-year, based on a linear 
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combination of five accounting ratios: cash holdings to capital, dividends to total capital, debt 
to total capital, the market-to-book ratio and cash flow to total capital. The value of the index 




The first independent variable indicates the proportion of independent members on the 
board, which is measured as the number of independent directors divided by the total number 
of board members (IND), similarly to Goh and Gupta (2016) and Al-Shaer and Zaman 
(2019). The second independent variable indicates the remuneration received by an 
independent director: IND_R is defined as the log of remuneration received per independent 
director; the total remuneration received by the independent directors divided by the total 
number of independent directors then I take the log, similarly to Marchetti and Stefanelli 
(2009), Andreas et al. (2012) and Mallin et al. (2015). 
The control variables are based on findings from prior research. Firm size shows the 
complexity of a company’s operations, with larger companies being expected to have more 
complex operations with greater stakes involved (Andreas et al., 2012). Company size has 
been recognised in the literature as a vital key to the financing mix (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
Firm size is measured as a firm’s total assets at the end of the year (Mallin et al., 2015). Both 
industry and year effects are incorporated as well (Goh & Gupta, 2016). National Industry 
Classification codes are used to assign each company to an industry group (Industry). 
Appendix A provides the definitions of the variables. 
5.2.3  Model specification 
To test the hypotheses, the dependent variable used is the KZ-index for the current 
year. The independent variables are the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix B for a more detailed construction of the main and alternative capital constraint indices (KZ, 
KZE and KZ4).  
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and independent directors’ remuneration in the previous year. An additional control variable, 
firm size, is lagged by one year. The method adopted is similar to that of Caramanis and 
Lennox (2008), with independent variables being lagged by one year to predict the dependent 
variable in the following year.  
An ordinary least squares approach is adopted to estimate Equations 1 and 2 beloow. I 
follow the approach adopted by Petersen (2009), whereby standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level to control heteroscedasticity and to address any potential cross-sectional 
dependence issues. In addition to firm-level clustering, both equations employ clustering at 
the year level (Baboukardos, 2018). Furthermore, to avoid extreme values, the variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles (Chang et al., 2007). 
To test the main hypotheses regarding the lagged effects of independent directors and 
their remuneration on a firm’s access to finance, the following equations are used: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1)  
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2)  
where the dependent variable is the KZ-index (KZ) for the current year, and the independent 
variables, IND and IND_R, are lagged by one year, as are the control variables. 
5.3  Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.3.1  Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 10. This provides statistical insights 
into the measure used to capture the degree to which companies experience capital 
constraints. In Panel A, the KZ-index has a mean of -0.40 and a standard deviation of 1.35, 
indicating the degree of variation across the sample of companies in regards to capital 
constraints. Meanwhile, IND's mean is 0.45, with a standard deviation of 0.13, and the mean 
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of the log of company size is 5.42. In Panel B, the KZ-index has a mean of -0.38 and a 
standard deviation of 1.34. Meanwhile, IND_R has a mean of 7.98, and standard deviation of 
1.5, and the mean of the log of company size is 5.61. This implies that listed firms in India 
face different status regarding capital constraints due to the high level of difference across the 
sample of firms’ capital constraints. In addition, the mean and median of IND is around 0.45, 
which implies that half of Indian-listed firms’ boards have independent directors. In addition, 
the average remuneration for independent directors is around $7000, which might indicate 
that independent directors, on average, are not receiving high levels of remuneration. 
Regarding correlations, the firms’ capital constraints correlate to IND by 0.08 and IND_R by 
-0.08; however, this correlates more to the firm’s size by .16 in Panel A and .17 in Panel B. 
Additionally, it was found that IND has a low correlation to the firm’s size in Panel A 
compared to IND_R in Panel B. Table 11 presents the correlations among the variables. 
Table 10 Descriptive statistics for the final sample of independent directors on boards 
and their remuneration   
Panel A, H1 
 N Mean Median SD 
KZ 5562 -0.403 -0.190 1.359 
IND 5562 0.452 0.455 0.132 
Firm size  5562 5.424 5.295 1.721 
     
Panel B, H2 
 N Mean Median SD 
KZ 4547 -0.389 -0.180 1.347 
IND_R 4547 7.985 7.877 1.503 
Firm size  4547 5.611 5.487 1.709 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; IND is the percentage of independent directors on the board for the 
previous year; IND_R is the log of the total remuneration received by an independent member for the previous 











Table 11 Correlation matrix for independent directors on boards and their 
remuneration   
Panel A, H1      
 KZ IND Firm size 
KZ 1   
IND  0.081 1  
Firm size 0.165 0.036 1 
    
Panel B, H2    
 KZ IND_R Firm size 
KZ 1   
IND_R  -0.084 1  
Firm size 0.173 0.514 1 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; IND is the percentage of Independent directors on the board for the 
previous year; IND_R is the log of total remuneration received by an independent member for the previous 
year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.  
 
5.3.2  Regression analysis 
The regression results show the relationship between access to finance measured by the 
KZ-index, and the percentage of independent directors on the board, as well as their 
remuneration, in the previous year, controlling for company size, and industry and year fixed 
effects. Table 12 column 1 shows the application of Equation 1 and the testing of the effect of 
IND on the KZ-index. The coefficient of IND is positive and highly significant (0.749, 
p<0.01). Table 12 therefore shows that firms with a high percentage of independent directors 
have more capital constraints, which means they have less access to finance. Based on these 
results, capital providers would be expected to react to an increase in independent directors 
on a firm’s board by putting more obstacles in the way of their access to loans. The results 





Table 12 Results of regressing lagged percentage of independent directors on the board 
and their remuneration on a firm’s access to finance 
 
Variables Model Model 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
IND  0.749***  
 (0.236)  
IND_R  -0.220*** 
  (0.032) 
Firm size 0.095*** 0.195*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) 
Constant -0.951*** 0.610** 
 (0.225) (0.307) 
   
Observations 5,562 4,547 
R-squared 0.138 0.177 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for current year; IND is the percentage of independent directors on the board for the 
previous year; IND_R is the log of remuneration received by an independent member for the previous year; 
Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
In Table 12 column 2, I present the results of applying Equation 2, testing the effect of 
IND_R on the KZ-index, and showing whether independent directors’ remuneration affects a 
firm’s access to finance. The coefficient of IND_R is negative and highly significant (-0.220, 
p<0.01), implying that firms that pay their independent directors more encounter fewer 
capital constraints, thus improved access to finance. These results support the argument that 
independent directors’ remuneration can influence capital providers' attitudes, and thus access 
to finance. Based on these results, capital providers would be expected to react to an increase 




5.3.3 Additional tests 
For robustness purposes, the KZ-index is replaced by the WW-index to ensure 
robustness. Initially devised by Whited and Wu (2006), the WW-index offers an alternative 
means of gauging capital constraints
9
 (Chen et al., 2017b). However, I applied the WW index 
to the regression, it caused a nonsymmetric and highly singular variance matrix. Therefore, 
the WW index regression has been removed in this section. Alternatively, the KZ-index is 
modified and Equations 1 and 2 run again. The first modification is an equally weighted KZ-
index (KZE) that assigns equal weight to each of the five accounting ratios. This is necessary 
to ensure that the weights are not the significant factor (Chang et al., 2007). The second 
modification is a modified KZ-index (KZ4), which involves Tobin’s Q being dropped whilst 
keeping the same coefficients for the remaining four variables (Baker et al., 2003). Columns 
1 and 2 in Table 13 show that the coefficient of IND is positive and highly significant in each 
case (0.150, p<0.01; and 0.763, p<0.01, respectively), which suggests that firms with a higher 
proportion of independent directors encounter more capital constraints, as in the previous 
tests. Moreover, columns 3 and 4 of Table 13 also show results consistent with the earlier 
ones, with the coefficients of IND_R negative and highly significant (-0.044, p<0.01; and -
0.265, p<0.01, respectively), indicating that firms that pay higher remuneration to their 




                                                 
9
 For further robustness, I also use two modified KZ-indices. The first is an equally weighted KZ-index (KZE) 
that assigns equal weight to each of the five accounting ratios. This is necessary to ensure that the weights are 
not the significant factor (Chang et al., 2007). In the second modified KZ-index (KZ4), Tobin’s Q is dropped 
whilst the same coefficients are kept for the remaining four ratios (Baker et al., 2003). See Appendices C1 and 
C2 for the regression results. 
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Table 13 Additional analysis: lagged percentage of independent directors on the board 
and their remuneration, and different capital constraints indices 
Variables Model Model Model Model 
(KZE) (KZ4) (KZE) (KZ4) 
IND  0.150*** 0.763***   
 (0.047) (0.260)   
IND_R   -0.044*** -0.265*** 
   (0.006) (0.036) 
Firm size 0.019*** 0.110*** 0.039*** 0.231*** 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.007) (0.035) 
Constant -0.190*** -1.535*** 0.122** 0.328 
 (0.045) (0.245) (0.061) (0.338) 
     
Observations 5,562 5,562 4,547 4,547 
R-squared 0.138 0.141 0.177 0.188 
Year & Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
KZE is the equal-weighted KZ-index for the current year; KZ4 is the four-ratio KZ-index for the current 
year; IND is the percentage of independent directors on the board for the previous year; IND_R is the log 
of remuneration received by an independent member for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total 
assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
To address the endogeneity issues in the equations, two approaches are used. First, 
2SLS regression is used, a typical remedy for the endogeneity problem. The 2SLS regression 
method employs instrumental variables that likely satisfy the exclusion restriction (i.e., they 
are associated with the percentage of independent directors on the board and their 
remuneration, but not associated with the KZ-index)
10
. Column 2 of Table 14 shows that the 
coefficient of IND is significantly positive (0.811, p<0.1). However, in column 4 of Table 14, 
the coefficient of IND_R is significantly negative (-0.241, p<0.01). Which provide 
consistency for the pervious results. 
 
 
                                                 
10
 I follow Usman et al. (2018a, 2018b) in my use of instrumental variables. I use the main independent variable 
lagged by one year and the industry average of the main independent variable. 
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Table 14 Additional analysis: 2SLS results of regressing lagged percentage of 
independent directors on the board and their remuneration on a firm’s access to finance 
Variables First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
IND  0.811*   
  (0.440)   
L.IND 0.496***    
 (0.023)    
IND.M 0.406**    
 (0.186)    
IND_R    -0.241*** 
    (0.043) 
L.IND_R   0.850***  
   (0.013)  
IND _R_M   0.155  
   (0.151)  
Firm size -0.003** 0.083*** 0.066*** 0.197*** 
 (0.001) (0.030) (0.009) (0.036) 
Constant 0.228*** -0.835*** -0.010 0.808** 
 (0.061) (0.282) (1.266) (0.378) 
     
Observations 4,480 4,480 3,577 3,630 
R-squared 0.373 0.144 0.813 0.183 
Year & Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; IND is the percentage of independent directors on the board for the 
previous year; L.IND is one-year-lagged IND; IND.M is the industry average of the IND last year; Firm 
size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.; IND_R is the log of remuneration received 
by an independent member for the previous year; L.IND_R is one-year-lagged IND_R; IND_R_M is the 
industry average of the remuneration of independent directors for the last year; Firm size is the log of total 
assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
Second, the KZ-index could be high or low due to companies’ characteristics rather 
than the main independent variable. Thus, the PSM method is used to overcome this issue. 
Using this technique, I can control for firms with a low value for the main independent 
variable but no other obvious differences in characteristics (such as financial condition) from 
other companies with a high value for the main independent variable. Thus, firms in each pair 
are closely similar to each other except for one variable (the main independent variable)
11
. In 
Panel B, column 1 of Table 15 shows that the coefficient on IND is significantly positive 
(0.664, p<0.01). However, in the same panel, in column 2, the coefficient on IND_R is 
                                                 
11
 I follow Faccio et al. (2016) and base the matching on the probability of a company having a larger value for 
the main independent variable than the sample’s median based on firm characteristics. 
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significantly negative (-0.054, p<0.1). Both of these results are consistent with the previous 
results.  
Table 15 Additional analysis: Propensity score matching results of lagged percentage of 
independent directors on the board and their remuneration against a firm’s access to 
finance 
Panel A. Estimation of propensity score functions 
Variables IND_D IND_R_D 
Firm size 0.011 0.416*** 
 (-1.470) (0.018) 
CA/CL 0.099*** -0.253*** 
 (0.037) (0.046) 
LEV 0.072*** -0.166*** 
 (0.015) (0.024) 
ROA 0.090*** 0.124*** 
 (0.030) (0.037) 
Constant 0.811 -1.000*** 
 (0.143) (0.184) 
   
Observations 5,369 4,397 
Pseudo. R2 0.05 0.19 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 









IND 0.749*** 0.664***   
 (0.236) (0.229)   
IND_R   -0.220*** -0.054* 
   (0.032) (0.032) 
Firm size 0.095*** 0.059* 0.195*** 0.239*** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.033) (0.045) 
Constant -0.951*** -0.804*** 0.610** -1.031*** 
 (0.225) (0.276) (0.307) (0.321) 
     
Observations 5,562 2,916 4,547 1,904 
R-squared 0.138 0.142 0.177 0.177 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Panel A, Probit Model: IND_D is a binary variable which equals one if the firm has larger percentage of 
independent board members than the sample median for the previous year; IND_R_D is a binary variable 
which equals one if the firm has a larger remuneration of its independent board members than the sample 
median for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year. LEV is 
the leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by equity for the previous year; CA/CL is the 
current assets over current liabilities for the previous year; ROA is the return on assets for the previous 
year. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Panel B, Valuation Model: KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; IND is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board for the previous year; IND_R is the log of the remuneration received 
by an independent member for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the 
previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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The findings suggest that capital providers react negatively to news of Indian 
companies having a high percentage of independent directors on their boards. As such, access 
to finance could be reduced for these firms. It may be that capital providers have little 
confidence in the role independent directors perform and it may suggest that they question 
whether independent directors are truly independent in the company, due to the fact that they 
are often appointed by the company’s management. Because of this, independent directors 
are sometimes regarded as working on behalf of the management (Arora & Sharma, 2016). 
Also, in emerging markets, it is especially likely that companies will try to maintain a certain 
level of opaqueness (Lin & Liu, 2009). Another explanation is that, because board 
independence is a novel idea in many emerging markets (Arora & Sharma, 2016), creditors 
may not believe that independent directors have enough detailed knowledge about the firm to 
be able to make a positive contribution, due to the weaker corporate governance mechanisms 
relative to those in advanced economies (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Therefore, it would 
be a mistake to assume that independent directors are entirely informed about the companies 
they oversee (Ravina & Sapienza, 2010).  
In addition, the results suggest that capital providers react positively to news that Indian 
companies pay their independent director high remuneration. As such, access to finance could 
improve if independent directors were paid more. Capital providers might not consider 
independent directors’ remuneration as an element belonging to independent directors’ 
characteristics. Independent directors' remuneration in Indian listed firms contains two parts: 
the sitting fees and a percentage of annual profits (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). Therefore, 
the independent directors’ remuneration might be considered by capital providers as a sign of 
prospective profitability and enhanced activity of the board, affecting firms’ ability to 
produce profits and continue to exist in the market. For instance, Jiang et al. (2018) state that 
firms with high profitability (i.e. return on assets) are associated with low financial 
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constraints, and Xie et al. (2003) and Ntim and Osei (2011) state that firm performance is 
enhanced by an active board. Therefore, our findings not only support the argument by 
Adams and Ferreira (2008) that high remuneration of independent directors indicates the 
important function they perform, neither the negative impact, which might be a sign of lower 
independency of independent directors (Mallin et al., 2015). 
Under the limited attention theory, the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s 
board could negatively grab capital providers’ attention and lead to less access to finance. 
Capital providers may consider a high percentage of independent directors on a board as a red 
flag – an adverse sign of independent directors' independence – implying low monitoring of 
management, and increased management manipulation. Therefore, firms that cannot 
demonstrate the independence of their independent directors could be overlooked and may 
not be granted loans. For instance, low independence of the board reduces a firm’s credit 
rating by increasing the agency conflict between the management and all the stakeholders, 
including the bondholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). However, the remuneration of 
independent directors positively grabs capital providers’ attention and leads to more access to 
finance. Capital providers may consider high remuneration of independent directors as a 
green flag because it indicates the firm is profitable, since part of the remuneration comes 
from the firm’s annual profit, thereby encouraging the capital providers to facilitate access to 
finance. This is because a firm with strong performance (i.e. a high return on assets) will have 
a lower default risk (Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008; Lorca et al., 2011). Based on the limited 
attention perspective, which states that lenders are constrained by their limited attention 
capacity, it is distinctly possible that a high percentage of independent directors on the board 
of a listed firm in India will have a significantly negative influence on lenders, creating an 
obstacle to their access to finance. However, high remuneration of independent directors of 
listed firms in India seems to have a significantly positive influence on capital providers, 
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yielding easier access to finance. Particularly, for an institutional setting such as India, which 
suffers from low investor protection and weak supervision by accounting organisations, the 
percentage of independent directors and their remuneration are likely to play a vital role in 
capital providers’ decisions to provide finance.  
In other words, theoretically, the reaction of capital providers to a company board with 
a high proportion of independent directors should produce lower agency costs because the 
monitoring skills and lending experience of independent directors could add value to the 
company (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Therefore, firms with a higher percentage of independent 
members on their boards should face lower capital constraints and better access to finance. 
This supports the idea that the independent board members could influence the attitudes of 
creditors, thereby affecting the company’s access to finance (Holder-Webb & Sharma, 2010; 
Bliss & Gul, 2012). However, the opposite is true in the Indian context. Under the 
interpretation of limited attention theory, capital providers’ perceptions of independent 
directors on the boards of listed firms in India are negative due to the effect of the Indian 
context, where independent directors have many concerns regarding their independency 
(Arora & Sharma, 2016). For instance, the management will often nominate independent 
directors to maintain control over the firm (Bhatt and Bhattacharya, 2015). In this sense, the 
attention of capital providers will translate into more difficulties for firms in obtaining 
finance when they notice a higher percentage of independent directors on firms’ boards. 
Therefore, listed Indian firms will suffer from greater capital constraints if their boards have a 
high proportion of independent directors. However, their remuneration has a positive impact 
on access to finance. Because the source of directors’ remuneration comes from annual 
profits and sitting fees, higher fees might point to the profitability or the activity of Indian-
listed firms’ boards. In both cases, remuneration of independent directors is a positive sign 
for the capital providers. This contradictory impact of the percentage of independent board 
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members and their remuneration on firms’ access to finance might show that capital 
providers do have concerns regarding independent directors on the board, but that they 
evaluate the remuneration differently. 
5.3.4 Sub-sample 
Since Chapter 4 shows that that audit and non-audit fees matter, and have a significant 
negative impact on the firms’ capital constraints, it is very odd to not control for those in 
Chapter 5. Therefore, I have added a sub-section where I keep only the sub-sample of firms 
for which I have data for the tests conducted in both Chapters 4 and 5. With this data, I have 
repeated the analysis conducted in Chapter 5 by including the key variables of interest used in 
Chapter 4 (e.g., ln AF and ln NAF). Therefore, the following equations are used: 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼3 ln 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (3)  
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼3 ln 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (4)  
where the dependent variable is the KZ-index (KZ) for the current year, and the independent 
variables, IND and IND_R, are lagged by one year, as are the control variables. 
Table 16 shows the consistency of the results, along with a significant and positive 
relationship between the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board and capital 
constraints as measured by the KZ-index, implying that a higher percentage produces less 
access to finance. However, a significant negative relationship is found between the 
remuneration of the independent directors and capital constraints, meaning that higher 




Table 16 Results of regressing lagged percentage of independent directors on the board 
and their remuneration on a firm’s access to finance 
Variables Model Model 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
IND  0.843***  
 (0.280)  
IND_R  -0.179*** 
  (0.043) 
ln AF -0.111* -0.038 
 (0.063) (0.069) 
ln NAF -0.130*** -0.094** 
 (0.041) (0.043) 
Firm size 0.246*** 0.262*** 
 (0.057) (0.067) 
Constant -0.972*** 0.294 
 (0.284) (0.358) 
   
Observations 2,808 2,369 
R-squared 0.170 0.194 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for current year; IND is the percentage of independent directors on the board for the 
previous year; IND_R is the log of remuneration received by an independent member for the previous year; 
ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF is the log of the non-audit fees for the 
previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion   
In this investigation, I examine the response of capital providers to elements related to 
the independence of the board (i.e. the percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board 
and the remuneration of the independent directors) of listed firms in India. The investigation 
provides significant insights into these companies by examining capital providers' attitudes to 
receiving independent director information. I explore elements of the independence of the 
board that could affect companies’ access to finance. While a high percentage of independent 
directors on a firm’s board can influence capital providers' decisions and lead to less access to 
finance, higher remuneration of such directors leads to more access to finance. 
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Data were drawn from the Prowessdx database, consisting of an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 1,054 listed firms belonging to 18 industry categories on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange. However, the sample used for testing 
H2 consisted of only 894 Indian listed firms. The data for both panels cover the period from 
2006 to 2017. The investigation indicated a significant and positive relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board and capital constraints as measured by 
the KZ-index, implying that a higher percentage produces less access to finance. However, a 
significant negative relationship is found between the remuneration of the independent 
directors and capital constraints, meaning that higher remuneration yields more access to 
finance. The results are substantial and support both hypotheses.  
The percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board and their remuneration in 
India serve as attention grabbers for capital providers. Capital providers perceive a high 
percentage of independent directors as a red flag in the Indian context, which is characterised 
by weak protection for investors and many questions regarding the board directors' duties. 
However, capital providers perceive high remuneration of independent directors in the Indian 
context as a good sign, since it is connected to firms’ profitability. This suggests that 
companies can use the percentage of independent directors on their board and their 
remuneration to manage capital providers' attention. According to the limited attention 
perspective, a high percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board has a significant 
negative influence on capital providers, while those directors’ remuneration has a significant 
positive impact. This affects access to finance for listed firms in India. I believe that our 
investigation gives significant insights on the attitudes of capital providers towards 







































Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Description  
KZ KZ-index for the current year. 
IND The percentage of independent directors on the board for the previous year. 
IND_R The log of the total remuneration received by an independent director on board for the previous year. 
Firm size Log of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
Industry Classification of industry according to National Industry Classification (NIC) codes 




Appendix B.1 Indices’ construction 
KZ, following Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
KZit (five-variable) = -1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) -39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) - 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 3.139LEVi(t) + 
0.283Qi(t), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1) is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 
assets;  Cit/A(it_1) is cash balances over lagged assets;  LEVi(t)  is leverage; and Q is the market 
value of equity (price times shares outstanding) plus assets minus the book value of equity all 
over assets. 
 
KZE, based on Cheng et al. (2014), derived as: 
KZEit = {(1/5)*(-1.002CFit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(39.368DIVit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(1.315Cit/A(it_1))} 
+ {(1/5)*3.139LEVi(t)} + {(1/5)*0.283Qi(t)} 
 
I adjust the weights so that each ratio of the KZit index accounts for 1/5 of the variation in 
the index, with unchanging sign of the variable, just as Chang et al. (2007) adjust the weights 
of the four-variable KZ-index such that each variable accounts for 1/4 of the variation in the 
index, with unchanging sign of the variable (Cheng et al., 2014).  
 
KZ4, based on Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
      KZit (four-variable) = – 1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) – 39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) – 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 
3.139LEVi(t)), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1) is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 
assets; Cit/A(it_1) is cash balances over lagged assets; and  LEVi(t)  is leverage. 
 
 












Appendix B. 2 Descriptive statistics for the data used for computing the KZ and WW Indices  
Panel A, for H1  
KZ index N Mean Median S.D 
Cash Flow  5562 1291 215.7 5459 
Total Assets 5562 5.560 5.431 1.710 
Cash Dividends  5562 21.67 1.574 108.71 
Cash 5562 109.17 3.048 605.7 
Q 5562 1.963 1.579 1.264 
Leverage 5562 0.296 0.302 0.178 
WW index     
Cash Flow  5552 1292 215.9 5464 
Cash Dividends Dummy 5552 1 1 0 
Leverage 5552 0.297 0.302 0.178 
Total Assets 5552 5.562 5.432 1.708 
Industry Sales Growth 5552 1.028 0.120 5.765 
Firms Sales Growth 5552 0.212 0.099 1.417 
Panel B, for H2 
KZ index N Mean Median S.D 
Cash Flow  4547 1480 255.9 5961 
Total Assets 4547 5.733 5.609 1.710 
Cash Dividends  4547 24.73 2.010 117.26 
Cash 4547 127.38 4.179 661.8 
Q 4547 1.984 1.573 1.311 
Leverage 4547 0.294 0.301 0.176 
WW index     
Cash Flow  4543 1480 255.9 5963 
Cash Dividends Dummy 4543 1 1 0 
Leverage 4543 0.294 0.301 0.177 
Total Assets 4543 5.732 5.609 1.709 
Industry Sales Growth 4543 1.006 0.111 6.120 
Firms Sales Growth 4543 0.169 0.088 0.704 
 
 
Appendix B.2 provides statistical insights into the data used for computing the KZ and 
WW indices. In Panel A, the KZ index shows that the cash flow has a mean of 1086 with a 
standard deviation of 5333, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of 
companies with regards to cash flow. Additionally, almost the same statistical results are 
shown in Panel B. Meanwhile, the firms’ total assets in Panel A have a mean of 5.294; a 
median of 5.187 is almost the same for both panels. The cash dividends in Panel A are highly 
different among firms, with a mean of 16.39 and standard deviation of 91.50; almost the same 
result was found for Panel B. The cash mean in Panel A is 79.01, and it has high variation 
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across the sample; the same results were found in Panel B. The Q in Panel A has a high 
standard deviation, but Panel B has a lower standard deviation; this indicates that the firms in 
Panel B have less difference regarding Q. In Panel A, the leverage has a mean of 0.294 and a 
median of 0.297, and similar results apply to Panel B.  
However, in Panel A, the WW index shows that the cash flow has a mean of 1087 with 
a standard deviation of 5336, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of 
companies regarding cash flow. It also shows almost the same statistical results in Panel B. 
The firms’ cash dividends dummy in Panel A has a mean of 1 with a median of 1, which is 
almost the same for both panels. The leverage in Panel A is the same among firms, with a 
mean of 0.294 and standard deviation of 0.177, with almost the same results found for Panel 
B. The total mean assets in Panel A is 5.297, and there is low variation across the sample; the 
same results are found in Panel B. The industry sales growth in Panel A has a mean of 1.151 
and a high standard deviation, which is similar to the results found in Panel B. In Panel A, the 
firms’ sales growth has a mean of 0.219 and a median of 0.113, which is similar to the results 






Chapter Six: Boards’ gender diversity and firms’ access to 
finance 
In this chapter, I will examine the association between boards’ gender diversity and 
firms’ access to finance for Indian listed firms. In the first section, I will present the literature 
on female directors on firms’ boards and access to finance. Then, I will build two hypotheses 
to be tested in this chapter. The first will concern the relationship between female directors on 
firms’ boards and access to finance. The second will deal with the relationship between 
female directors’ participation in firms’ board committees and firms’ access to finance. Next 
I will present the investigation’s design, including details of the sample selection process, the 
measurement of the variables and the model specification. Then, the empirical results will be 
explained in detail, starting with the descriptive statistics, followed by the regression analysis 
and additional analysis. Finally a discussion of the findings and an explanation of them under 
the scope of limited attention theory will be given. 
6.1 Literature Review 
Gender diversity is a topic that has attracted a great amount of attention among 
academics, industry leaders and politicians alike and, consequently, it is central to many 
debates about corporate governance (Aribi et al., 2018). Appointing women to a firm’s board 
signals an improvement in the firm’s effectiveness and its board’s legitimacy (Hillman et al., 
2007) and it is believed that female directors are significant in the delivery of good corporate 
governance (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). There are a variety of ways in which greater gender 
diversity in the boardroom is believed to benefit firms; for instance, Arun et al. (2015) claim 
that female directors are more inclined to make voluntary disclosures. Meanwhile, Gul et al. 
(2009) suggest that female directors are more inclined to seek out voluntary information, 
thereby helping to address problems with information asymmetry. Li and Zhang (2019) 
believe that both creativity and the quality of decisions taken in the boardroom improve when 
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there is greater female representation on the board, because women will adopt different 
viewpoints, work in different ways and have different experiences that all-male boards cannot 
replicate.  
Indeed, there is a variety of ways in which greater gender diversity in the boardroom is 
believed to benefit firms. For instance, Cox (1991) asserts that appointing female directors 
confers a competitive advantage and Rose (2007) attributes this to the ability of female 
directors to help with problem solving. Meanwhile, Carter et al. (2003) establish a 
relationship between female directors and heightened levels of innovation and creativity. It 
has also been claimed that female directors are more inclined to discuss matters (Luoma, 
1999), ask probing questions, engage in participatory leadership (Bilimoria et al., 2006) and 
help their company to adhere to ethical best practice (Williams, 2003). An investigation into 
the composition of boards among the Fortune 500 companies revealed that the proportion of 
female directors had consistently increased over time and there were signs that the skills and 
resources of female directors were being appreciated and valued and they were “able to break 
the glass ceiling” (Daily et al., 1999). 
There is now a growing body of research indicating that the inclusion of female 
directors on the board results in improved oversight and monitoring of management actions. 
Carter et al. (2003) delve deeper into the diversity debate, noting that directors from any 
minority group (gender, culture, ethnicity) are more inclined to ask probing questions that 
others may overlook. There is growing consensus that female directors are more effective at 
monitoring management teams and appraising their efforts (Bennedsen & Meisner Nielsen, 
2010). The relatively high attendance rate of female directors also infers their willingness to 
monitor activities (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and is known to influence board inputs. Women 
are significantly more likely than men to attend board meetings but an interesting observation 
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is that, as the percentage of women on the board increases, the attendance of the male 
directors also improves. Moreover, female directors are significantly more likely to sit on 
committees charged with monitoring duties and are more likely to be assigned to corporate 
governance, audit or nominating committees. One exception, however, is compensation 
committees, to which women are significantly less likely to be assigned. 
Moreover, studying the diversity of the boards of Turkish firms, Ararat et al. (2015) 
consider the extent to which the monitoring function of the board contributes to the 
performance of the underlying company. They argue that board diversity will enhance 
monitoring by helping to avoid groupthink and encouraging critical investigations. As such, 
they establish a link between board diversity and critical inquiries. The performance of the 
firms is measured using return on equity and the market-to-book equity ratio. Furthermore, a 
composite board diversity index is developed, comprising gender, age, nationality and level 
of education. Monitoring intensity is measured by a composite variable that takes into 
account a variety of proxies, such as the number of board committees, the level of public 
disclosure, the frequency with which meetings are held and the quality of the auditor. Thus, 
they are able to conclude that board diversity is positively related to the intensity of 
monitoring activities and firm performance. Crucially, monitoring activities are found to be 
especially important at companies with concentrated ownership.  
Importantly, however, it is possible for excessive monitoring to adversely affect 
shareholder value (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) because of the associated cost of that 
monitoring, and the fact that more monitoring could be inefficient and redundant (Rediker & 
Seth, 1995). It is also possible that monitoring undertaken by women will be inferior in 
quality if they do not have the necessary expertise and knowledge (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012) 
or are less motivated to monitor the actions of others (Westphal, 2007). Previous research 
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examining companies operating in Sweden and Norway has arrived at similar conclusions, 
suggesting that a greater proportion of female directors is associated with companies 
underperforming (Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000). Furthermore, Bohren and Strom (2010) 
study a sample of companies operating in Norway and find that those with a higher 
proportion of female directors underperform. Meanwhile, Anderson et al. (2011) conclude 
that board gender diversity benefits the performance of highly complex companies but the 
opposite is true at less complex companies. 
The empirical literature has established that financial development has a significant 
positive effect on firms’ growth, especially among companies considered to be the most 
deserving of funding (Beck et al., 2006). Indeed, there is an inverse association between the 
range of investment in strategic operations and the financial constraints on companies 
(Campello et al., 2010), such investment including that in research and development (Hall & 
Lerner, 2010), the acquiring of additional inventory (Carpenter et al., 1998), or engaging in 
market share pricing (Chevalier, 1995). Access to finance is associated with capital 
constraints (Cheng et al., 2014), which refer to restrictions on a firm’s capital in relation to 
expansion (Lamont et al., 2001). A reduction in capital constraints positively affects a 
company's ability to expand and stay in business when it otherwise might not do so, by 
increasing its financing options. 
The inclusion of female directors might affect capital constraints. Given the perception 
that female directors are significant in the delivery of good corporate governance (Campbell 
& Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Gordini & Rancati, 2017), it can be assumed that capital providers 
will look more favourably upon firms with gender-diverse boards. It is known that companies 
demonstrating good corporate governance practices attract investors who demand lower rates 
of return, because they appreciate the value of good quality financial reporting and lower 
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monitoring costs. Zhu (2014) asserts that good corporate governance lowers the risks facing 
creditors; consequently, they are willing to provide capital at a lower cost. This highlights the 
need for female directors to monitor firms' investment and management decisions actively, 
avoiding the negative attention of capital providers. A greater number of female directors 
could conceivably help to lower a firm’s capital constraints and, thereby, affect its access to 
finance. This research applies the previous theoretical and empirical literature to develop 
specific hypotheses. The next subsection investigates gender representation on firms’ boards 
from two angles: female directors’ presence on boards, and female directors’ participation in 
board committees, and their influence on a company’s access to finance.  
6.1.1 Hypotheses’ development 
The relationship between female directors on firms’ boards and access to finance 
It is in the interests of creditors that borrowers make all of their repayments when they 
are due (Akudugu et al., 2009). Capital providers consider female directors to be a vital 
component of firms’ board composition and may pay attention to how effectively female 
directors perform their vital roles. It has also been observed that those firms with a higher 
proportion of female directors are monitored more effectively and generate significantly 
higher returns over the long term (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Indeed, there is growing 
consensus that female directors are more effective at monitoring management teams and 
appraising their efforts, as well as being more transparent when disclosing information (Alves 
et al., 2015). This suggests that more female directors on firms’ boards results in a lower 
likelihood that management manipulation will occur. In this sense, a greater number of 
female directors could indicate more reliable financial reporting, reduced earnings 
management, decreased cost of verifying a firm’s financial information, increased trust from 
capital providers in these firms’ financial positions, and thus greater capability to obtain 
financing. As a result, female directors can effectively reduce the risks to which creditors are 
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exposed (Adams & Funk, 2012; Levi et al., 2014). Actions of involve women in firms’ board 
help attract additional investors and enable firms to access external funding (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009), particularly in India due to its weak and insufficient investor protection and 
corporate governance (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012). Assuming that the gender representation 
on firms’ boards is an element of corporate governance, it is rational to suppose that the 
appointment of female directors to boards will enhance corporate governance. 
Based on the preceding arguments, the Indian context is characterized by weak 
corporate governance, having female directors on firms board might improve the corporate 
governance mechanisms and increase the effective at monitoring management teams. 
Therefore, I presume capital providers to react to firms with female directors on their boards 
decreasing capital constraints by increasing access to finance which decrease capital 
constraint, because of the vital roles female directors play on boards. Consequently, a 
significant positive relationship between female directors on firms’ boards and the firms’ 
access to finance is expected among the listed Indian firms. I, therefore, propose the 
following, first hypothesis of this chapter: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of female directors on a firm’s board 
and access to finance for listed firms in India. 
The relationship between female directors’ participation in firms’ board committees 
and firms’ access to finance 
Female directors are significantly more likely to sit on committees charged with 
monitoring duties and are more likely to be assigned to corporate governance, audit, 
nominating and compensation committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Directors who work on 
these kinds of committees are in a position to influence strategic decisions and shape a firm’s 
board policies (Reeb & Upadhyay, 2010). Zalata et al. (2019) state that female directors who 
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serve on monitoring committees mitigate managerial manipulation through discretionary 
accruals measurement. Female directors' more effective monitoring helps to enhance 
disclosure (Gul et al., 2011). Additionally, increasing firms’ boards’ gender diversity results 
in managers being more closely controlled, which in turn brings about an improvement in 
transparency, encourages increased communication with investors and improves disclosure. 
Previous research has also established that there is a positive relationship between board 
gender diversity, earnings quality and audit effort (Srinidhi et al., 2011). These researchers 
also confirm that including women on boards and audit committees increases the integrity of 
company reports, thereby giving investors greater assurance in the accuracy of financial data. 
Studying the diversity of the boards of Turkish firms, Ararat et al. (2015) consider the extent 
to which the monitoring function of boards contributes to the performance of the associated 
companies and to critical inquiry, concluding that capital providers appreciate female 
involvement in firms’ board committees. Although India has shown less involvement of 
female directors (Balasubramanian & Mohanty, 2015), the Company Act 2013 forces listed 
Indian firms to include at least one female director on their board.  
Based on the pervious arguments, in Indian listed firms show less participations of 
females directors, however inclusion female director on boards committees increases the 
integrity of company reports. The capital providers might appreciate female involvement in 
firms’ board committees owing the fact that might increase the credibility of firm financial 
statements. Thus, I presume capital providers to react to firms with female directors’ 
participation in firms’ board committees by granting more finance which decreasing capital 
constraints. Consequently, a significant positive relationship between female directors’ 
participation in firms’ board committees and the firms’ access to finance is expected among 
the listed Indian firms. I, therefore, propose the following, second hypothesis of this chapter: 
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H2: There is a positive relationship between female directors’ participation in firms’ board 
committees and access to finance for listed firms in India.  
6.2 Research Design 
6.2.1 Sample selection and data sources  
I obtained data from the Prowessdx database of the CMIE, which has data for companies 
with stocks listed on the two stock exchanges mentioned above. The database provides 
necessary financial data for individual companies and supplementary background information 
on their operations. It has been extensively employed in the empirical literature (Aswani, 
Chidambaran, & Hasan, 2021; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007; Mal & Gupta, 2020; Pinto & 
Rastogi, 2019). The initial sample comprises 6,729 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, belonging to 18 industrial categories, 
for the period from 2008 to 2017. After taking a closer look, 2,214 firms in the financial 
industry were excluded because they have different operations, regulations and governance 
arrangements (Iatridis, 2018). In addition, companies were eliminated that did not disclose 
any information about any of the variables (Mallin et al., 2015); consequently, 3,502 firms 
with missing data were excluded. Therefore, the final sample comprises 1,013 companies 
listed on the Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange. Table 17 








Table 17 Sample selection process for female directors on boards and their participation 
in board committees 
 Firms Observations 
Initial number of listed firms in NSE and BSE, data found in 
Prowessdx database, for the period from 2008-2017. 6,729 72,398 
   
Less financial firms. -2,214 -37,328 
Less firms with missing values  -3,502 -30,151 
Final sample  1,013 4,919 
NSE is the National Stock Exchange; BSE is the Bombay Stock Exchange; Prowessdx is the database provided 
by CMIE. 
6.2.2 Measurement of variables  
Access to finance refers to the ability of a company to obtain financing. The inability to 
access finance might be “due to credit constraints or inability to borrow, inability to issue 
equity, dependence on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets” (Lamont et al., 2001: 529); hence, 
reduced capital constraints render a firm more capable of attracting financing (Cheng et al., 
2014). If firms can access a finance source, this will represent a reduction in their capital 
constraints; therefore, the dependent variable used here is the KZ-index, a measurement of 
capital constraints (Baker et al., 2003; Bakke & Whited, 2010; Cheng et al., 2014). The KZ-
index was developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to serve as an indicator for the extent of 
financial constraints facing a given company. They related classifications to accounting 
variables using an ordered logit specification. In accordance with the approaches adopted in 
the empirical literature, regression coefficients are used to compose a KZ-index for each 
firm-year, based on a linear combination of five accounting ratios: cash holdings to capital, 
dividends to total capital, debt to total capital, the market-to-book ratio and cash flow to total 
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capital. The value of the index rises with financial constraints (Cheng et al., 2014). I follow 
Baker et al. (2003) by applying the same coefficients
12
.  
The first independent variable indicates the presence of female directors on the board, 
measured as the number of female directors (F) similarly to Arun et al. (2015), Aribi et al. 
(2018) and Srivastava et al. (2018). Second, for female participation in firm’s board 
committees, a dummy variable equal to 1 is created if female directors are involved in any of 
the firm’s board committees, and otherwise 0 (F_INV), similarly to Srivastava et al. (2018). 
The control variables are based on findings from prior research. Firm size shows the 
complexity of a company’s operations, with larger companies being expected to have more 
complex operations with greater stakes involved (Andreas et al., 2012). Also, Company size 
has been recognised in the literature as a vital key to the financing mix (Frank & Goyal, 
2009). Firm size is measured as a firm’s total assets at the end of the year (Mallin et al., 
2015). I incorporate both industry and year effects (Goh & Gupta, 2016). The National 
Industry Classification code is used to assign each company to the appropriate industry group 
(Industry). Appendix A presents the definitions of the variables. 
6.2.3 Model specification 
To test the hypotheses, the dependent variable is the KZ-index for the current year. The 
independent variables are the number of female directors on a firm’s board and their 
participation in the firm’s board committees in the previous year. An additional control 
variable, firm size is lagged by one year. The method adopted is similar to that of Caramanis 
and Lennox (2008), with independent variables lagged by one year to predict the dependent 
variables in the following year. An ordinary least squares approach is adopted to estimate 
Equations 1 and 2 below. To control heteroscedasticity and to address any potential cross-
                                                 
12
 See Appendix B for a more detailed construction of the main and alternative capital constraint indices (KZ, 
WW, KZE and KZ4).  
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sectional dependence issues, the approach adopted by Petersen (2009) is followed, whereby 
standard errors are clustered. Both equations employ clustering at the firm and year level 





 percentiles (Chang et al., 2007).  
To test the main hypotheses regarding the lagged effects of female board participation 
on a firm’s access to finance, the following equations are used: 
KZit = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                       (1)  
KZit = α0 + α1F_INVit−1 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                (2)  
where the dependent variable is the KZ-index for the current year, the independent variables 
are F and F_INV for the previous year, and the Firm size are lagged by one year. 
6.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 18. This provides statistical insight into 
the measure used to capture the degree to which the companies experience capital constraints. 
The KZ-index has a mean of -0.33 with a standard deviation of 1.33, showing variation 
across the sample regarding capital constraints. Meanwhile, the mean value of F is 0.53, 
whilst that of F_INV is 0.17 and their standard deviations are 0.68 and 0.38 respectively. The 
mean of firm size is 5.511. This implies that listed firms in India face different status 
regarding capital constraints, due to high levels of difference across the sample of firms’ 
capital constraints. Additionally, the mean and median of F is around 0.53, which implies that 
fewer than 1% of Indian-listed firms’ boards include a female director. In addition, the 
average of female directors’ involvement on board committees is around .017, which might 
indicate a low level of participation of female directors on firms’ boards. Regarding 
correlations, the firms’ capital constraints correlate to F by 0.004 and F_INV by -0.03. 
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However, the correlation between F and F_INV is high. Table 19 shows the correlation 
among the variables. Table 18 presents the correlations among the variables. 
Table 18 Descriptive statistics for the final sample of female directors on boards and 
their participation in board committees 
 N Mean Median SD 
KZ 4919 -0.337 -0.132 1.333 
F 4919 0.535 0.000 0.687 
F_INV 4919 0.175 0.000 0.380 
Firm size 4919 5.511 5.390 1.714 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; F is the number of female directors on the board; F_INV is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0. Firm size is the log 
of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
 
Table 19 Correlation matrix for female directors on boards and their participation in 
board committees 
 KZ F F_INV Firm size 
KZ 1    
F 0.004 1   
F_INV -0.030 0.531 1  
Firm size 0.168 0.127 0.185 1 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; F is the number of female directors on the board; F_INV is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0. Firm size is the log 
of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
 
6.3.2 Regression analysis 
This section explains the relationship between access to finance, measured by the KZ-
index, and the number of female directors on a firm’s board and their participation in board 
committees in the previous year. I control for industry and year fixed effects. Table 20 
column 1 shows the application of Equation 1 and the testing of the effect of F on KZ. The 
coefficient of F is negative but not statically significant, suggesting that firms with more 
female directors on their boards not statically associate with fewer capital constraints. 
The results are not support the argument that female directors on a firm’s board can 
influence the attitudes of capital providers, thereby positively affecting access to finance, and 
that female directors on a firm’s board signal more transparent disclosure of information, 
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supporting the argument of Alves et al. (2015). This suggest the appointing more female 
directors to a firm’s board might not reduce the likelihood that management will have the 
opportunity to participate in earnings management, thus not increasing the credibility of 
financial reporting; therefore, greater numbers of female directors on boards could not 
encourage capital providers to have positive attitudes towards these companies. Based on 
these results, I cannot expect capital providers to react to an increase in female directors on a 
firm’s board by granting more loans; hence, the results are not support H1. 
Table 20 Regressions results for lagged number of female directors on boards and their 
participation in board committees, against a firm’s access to finance 
Variables H1 H2 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
F -0.052  
 (0.056)  
F_INV  -0.207** 
  (0.095) 
Firm size 0.103*** 0.109*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant -0.602*** -0.637*** 
 (0.226) (0.224) 
   
Observations 4,919 4,919 
Adj. R-sq. 0.132 0.135 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; F is the number of female directors on the board; F_INV is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0; Firm size is the log 
of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
I illustrate the application of Equation 2 in Table 20 column 2, testing the effect of 
F_INV on KZ, that is whether female directors' participation in firms’ board committees 
affects the firms’ access to finance. The coefficient of F_INV is negative and highly 
significant (-0.207, p<0.05), suggesting that firms with greater participation of female 
directors in their board committees encounter fewer capital constraints.  
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These results support the argument that female directors' participation in firms’ board 
committees can influence capital providers' attitudes, positively affecting access to finance, 
since capital providers perceive female directors' participation as a sign of low earnings 
management (Zalata et al., 2019). Based on these results, I expect capital providers to react to 
an increase in female directors' participation by increasing the granting of loans to those 
firms; hence, the results support H2. 
6.3.3 Additional analysis 
For robustness, the KZ-index is replaced by the WW-index in Equations 1 and 2. 
Initially devised by Whited and Wu (2006), the WW-index offers an alternative means of 
gauging capital constraints
13
 (Chen et al., 2017b). Column 1 in Table 21 shows that the 
coefficient of F is negative and significant (-0.015, p<0.1), suggesting that firms with more 
female directors on their boards encounter fewer capital constraints. Moreover, column 2 of 
Table 21 shows that F_INV has a coefficient that is negative and highly significant (-0.04, 
p<0.01), indicating that firms with more female directors’ participation in their board 








                                                 
13
 For further robustness, I also use two modified KZ-indices. The first is an equally weighted KZ-index (KZE) 
that assigns equal weight to each of the five accounting ratios. This is necessary to ensure that the weights are 
not the significant factor (Chang et al., 2007). In the second modified KZ-index (KZ4), Tobin’s Q is dropped 
whilst the same coefficients are kept for the remaining four ratios (Baker et al., 2003). See Appendices C1 and 
C2 for the regression results. 
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Table 21 Regressions results for lagged number of female directors on boards and their 
participation in board committees, against a firm’s access to finance 
Variables Model Model 
(WW) (WW) 
   
F -0.015*  
 (0.008)  
F_INV  -0.041*** 
  (0.013) 
Constant -0.316*** -0.320*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
   
Observations 4,911 4,911 
R-squared 0.210 0.211 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
WW is the WW-index; F is the number of female directors on the board; F_INV is dummy variable equal 
to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
To address the equations' endogeneity issues, I use 2SLS regression, which is a typical 
remedy for endogeneity problems. 2SLS regression employs instrumental variables that are 
likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction (i.e., in this case being associated with female 
directors on firms’ boards, and their participation in board committees, but not associated 
with the KZ-index). I follow Usman et al. (2018a, 2018b) in using the instrumental variables. 
I use the main independent variable lagged by one year and the industry average of the main 
independent variable. Columns 1 and 2, in Table 22, show that the coefficient of F is negative 






Table 22 Additional analysis: 2SLS regressions results for lagged number of female 
directors on the board and their participation in board committees, against a firm’s 
access to finance 
Variables First stage  Second stage First stage  Second stage 
    
     
F   -0.028   
  (0.074)   
L.F 0.863***    
 (0.070)    
F.M 0.278***    
 (0.098)    
F_INV    -0.275* 
    (0.151) 
L. F_INV   0.742***  
   (0.048)  
F.M   0.704***  
   (0.118)  
Firm size 0.008* 0.090*** 0.015*** 0.100*** 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.003) (0.031) 
Constant -0.248 -0.493** -0.157 -0.529** 
 (0.167) (0.246) (0.114) (0.245) 
     
Observations 4,050 4,050 4,050 4,050 
R-squared 0.802 0.141 0.554 0.143 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
F is the number of female directors on the board; L.F is the one-year-lagged F; F.M is the industry average 
of the female directors in the last year; F_INV is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any 
board committee, otherwise 0; L. F_INV is the one-year-lagged F_INV; F_INV.M is the industry average 
of the dummy for female involvement in board committees in the last year. Firm size is the log of total 
assets of the firm for the previous year. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
Secondly, it is possible that the independent variable is not responsible for the KZ-
index being high or low. Instead, this could be due to the characteristics of the firms. Thus, 
the propensity score matching (PSM) method is used to overcome this issue. I apply this 
method to a set of control companies, matched to the original treatment companies, where 
each control company has a low value for the independent variable but no other apparent 
differences in its characteristics (e.g. its financial condition) from the matched treatment firm 
that has a high value for the independent variable. Thus, firms in each pair are closely similar 
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to each other except for one variable (the main independent variable). The matched sample in 
Table 23 shows that the coefficients on both F and F_INV are not statically significantly 
negative.  
Table 23 Additional analysis: Propensity score matching results for lagged number of 
female directors on the board and their participation in board committees, against a 
firm’s access to finance 
Panel A. Estimation of propensity score functions 
Variables F_D F_INV_D 
Firm size 0.181*** 0.104*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
CA/CL -0.148*** 0.007 
 (0.052) (0.044) 
LEV -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.020) (0.018) 
ROA 0.124*** 0.136*** 
 (0.041) (0.036) 
Constant -1.059*** 1.818*** 
 (0.182) (0.204) 
   
Observations 4,729 4,738 
Pseudo. R2 0.13 0.23 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 









F -0.052 -0.043   
 (0.056) (0.057)   
F_INV   -0.207** -0.136 
   (0.095) (0.101) 
Firm size 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.109*** 0.078** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.039) 
Constant -0.602*** -0.608** -0.637*** -0.799** 
 (0.226) (0.238) (0.224) (0.386) 
     
Observations 4,919 4,144 4,919 1,658 
R-squared 0.132 0.138 0.135 0.129 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Panel A, Probit Model: F_D is a binary variable which equals one if the firm has larger number of 
female board members than the sample median for the previous year; F_INV_D is a binary variable which 
equals one if the firm has a larger participation of its female board members than the sample median for 
the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year. LEV is the leverage 
ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by equity for the previous year; CA/CL is the current assets over 
current liabilities for the previous year; ROA is the return on assets for the previous year. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  
Panel B, Valuation Model: KZ is the KZ-index for the current year; F is the number of female directors 
on the board for the previous year; F_INV is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any 
board committee, otherwise 0 for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the 
previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 




The findings presenting week evidence that capital provider react positively to news of 
Indian companies appointing more female directors to their boards and female directors 
participating in board committees; hence, access to finance increases. This not supports the 
idea that female board members can influence creditors' attitudes, affecting companies' ability 
to access finance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Owing to women in the Indian context have 
suffered in the past from less educational involvement (Banerji et al., 2010), potentially 
leading to a lack of essential knowledge and expertise, that might appear to not impact capital 
providers’ attitudes towards women’s inclusion on firms’ boards. In addition, this might due 
to female directors engage in over-monitoring, which could negativity impact the good 
governance of firms (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011), also the Indian context 
is characterised by inadequate corporate governance practices (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012); 
For example, female directors may not perform their duties as expected if they are selected by 
the promoters or owner, and most new female directors are associated with promoters 
(Duggal, 2016). Consequently, capital providers in India may not appreciate female directors 
on board and involvement in firms’ board committees due to their vital role in mentoring and, 
therefore, grant such firms greater access to finance. 
In line with the limited attention theory, female directors on firms’ boards, and their 
participation in board committees, might not grab capital providers’ positive attention and 
lead to greater access to finance; capital providers are not consider greater numbers and 
participation of female directors as a ‘green flag’ or ‘red flag’. They also might not recognise 
this as a sign of a board’s good performance, leading to reduced management manipulation 
and increased credibility of financial reporting. In other words, more female directors on 
boards, and their participation in board committees, are not likely to send a positive signal to 
loan officers that influences their cognitive processes through the perceived accuracy of 
information (Stein, 2002). Based on the limited attention perspective, it is distinctly possible 
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that more female directors on firms’ boards, and their participation in the board committees 
of listed Indian firms, have not a statically significantly positive influence on lenders who are 
constrained by limited attention capacity, encouraging them to provide easier to access 
funding. For an institutional setting such as India, which provides low investor protection and 
weak supervision by accounting organisations, the presence of female directors on firms’ 
boards, and their participation in board committees, could not play a vital role in increasing 
capital providers’ trust, thereby increasing listed companies’ access to finance in India.  
In summary, according to the perspective of the limited attention theory, capital 
providers are not recognising that female directors are sufficiently knowledgeable to make a 
positive contribution e.g. (financial statements produced by firms with a larger proportion of 
female directors responsible for monitoring activities are likely to be more trustworthy (Arun 
et al., 2015), appointing female directors provides legitimacy to the board and signals greater 
effectiveness (Hillman et al., 2007) and enhanced corporate governance (Nielsen & Huse, 
2010)). In turn, capital providers’ perceptions will not lead to more access to finance for 
Indian listed firms with female directors. 
6.3.4 Sub-sample 
Because Chapters 4 and 5 indicate that certain variables, namely audit, non-audit fees, 
percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board and their remunerations, significantly 
affect firms’ capital constraints, it is important to control for these in Chapter 6. 
Consequently, I have added a sub-section where I keep only the sub-sample of firms for 
which I have data for the tests conducted in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. With this data, I repeat the 
analysis in Chapter 6 by including the key variables of interest used in Chapter 4 (e.g., ln AF, 
ln NAF, IND and IND_R). Therefore, the following equations are used: 
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𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼3 ln 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +  +𝛼4 𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅 𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛼6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                 (3)  
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ln 𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛼3 ln 𝑁𝐴𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 +  +𝛼4 𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝑖𝑡−1  +
𝛼5𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅  𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼6 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4)  
where the dependent variable is the KZ-index (KZ) for the current year, and the independent 
variables, F and F_INV, are lagged by one year, as are the control variables. 
The results of Table 24 show weak evidence to approve and support both hypotheses: a 
positive relationship between female directors on firms’ boards and access to finance for 
listed Indian firms, and a positive relationship between female directors’ participation in 
firms’ board committees and the firms’ access to finance. This is consistent with the previous 




























Table 24 Results of regressing lagged percentage of independent directors on the board 
and their remuneration on a firm’s access to finance  
Variables Model Model 
(KZ) (KZ) 
   
F 0.042  
 (0.074)  
F_INV  -0.062 
  (0.108) 
IND  0.633 0.619 
 (0.394) (0.393) 
IND_R -0.175*** -0.172*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) 
ln AF -0.030 -0.030 
 (0.069) (0.069) 
ln NAF -0.104** -0.103** 
 (0.044) (0.044) 
Firm size 0.264*** 0.267*** 
 (0.063) (0.063) 
Constant 0.147 0.136 
 (0.422) (0.418) 
   
Observations 2,158 2,158 
R-squared 0.194 0.194 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
KZ is the KZ-index for current year; F is the number of female directors on the board; F_INV is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0; IND is the percentage of 
independent directors on the board for the previous year; IND_R is the log of remuneration received by an 
independent member for the previous year; ln AF is the log of the audit fees for the previous year; ln NAF 
is the log of the non-audit fees for the previous year; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the 
previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered 
(by firm and year) standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
This study investigates capital providers’ attitudes toward boards’ gender diversity 
(female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees) in India's 
listed companies, providing significant insights. While gender diversity can be costly in terms 
of over monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), it can also influence capital providers' 
decisions, leading to greater access to finance. 
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Data were drawn from the Prowessdx database, consisting of an unbalanced panel 
dataset of 1,013 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National 
Stock Exchange, across 18 industry categories, totalling 4,919 observations between 2008 
and 2017. Based on the KZ-index as a measure of capital constraints, the investigation 
indicates a significant and negative relationship between the number of female directors on 
firms’ boards and their participation in firms’ board committees, and capital constraints, or a 
positive relationship with access to finance. The results are not statically significant and not 
support both hypotheses: a positive relationship between female directors on firms’ boards 
and access to finance for listed Indian firms, and a positive relationship between female 
directors’ participation in firms’ board committees and the firms’ access to finance.  
Female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees might not 
serve as ‘attention grabbers’ for capital providers in India. The providers may not perceive 
greater numbers of female directors on boards, and their participation in board committees, as 
a ‘green flag’ in the Indian context, which is characterised by weak protection for investors 
and many questions regarding the duties of board directors and the impact of female directors 
on boards. This study shows a weak evidence that female directors on boards, and their 
participation in board committees, can be used by companies to attract the positive attention 
of capital providers; therefore, by employing the limited attention perspective, the study has 
could not confirmed that more female directors on firms’ boards, and their participation in 
board committees, have a significant, positive influence on capital providers who are 
constrained by limited attention capacity. In turn, female directors on firms’ boards, and their 
participation in board committees may not lead to better access to finance for listed 

































Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variables  Description  
KZ KZ-index for the current year. 
F The number of female directors on the board. 
F_INV Dummy variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Firm size Log of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
Industry Multiple dummy variable based on 18 industries, according to National Industry 
Classification (NIC) codes. 
   
Year Multiple dummy variable based on the 10 years under investigation, 2008-2017.  
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Appendix B.1 Indices’ construction 
KZ, following Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
KZit (five-variable) = -1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) -39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) - 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 3.139LEVi(t) + 
0.283Qi(t), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1)  is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 
assets;  Cit/A(it_1) is cash balances over lagged assets;  LEVi(t)  is leverage; and Q is the market 
value of equity (price times shares outstanding) plus assets minus the book value of equity all 
over assets. 
WW, based on Whited and Wu (2006), derived as: 
WW = (−0.091 ∗ CF) − (0.062 ∗ DIVPOS) + (0.021 ∗ TLTD) − (0.044 ∗ LNTA) + 
(0.102 ∗ ISG) − (0.035 ∗ SG), 
 
where CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm pays cash dividends; TLTD is the ratio of the long-term debt to total assets; 
LNTA is the natural log of total assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digit industry sales growth; 
and SG is firm sales growth. 
KZE, based on Cheng et al. (2014), derived as: 
KZEit = {(1/5)*(-1.002CFit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(39.368DIVit/Ai(t_1))} – {(1/5)*(1.315Cit/A(it_1))} 
+ {(1/5)*3.139LEVi(t)} + {(1/5)*0.283Qi(t)}, 
 
I adjust the weights so that each ratio of the KZit index accounts for 1/5 of the variation in the 
index, with unchanging sign of the variable, in the same way that Chang et al. (2007) adjust 
the weights of the KZ (4 variables) index, so that each variable accounts for (1/4) of the 
variation in the index, with unchanging sign of the variable (Cheng et al., 2014). 
KZ4, based on Baker et al. (2003), derived as: 
      KZit (four-variable) = – 1.002 CFit/Ai(t_1) – 39.368 DIVit/Ai(t_1) – 1.315 Cit/A(it_1) + 
3.139LEVi(t)), 
 
where CFit/Ai(t_1) is cash flow over lagged assets; DIVit/Ai(t_1) is cash dividends over lagged 



















Appendix B. 2 Descriptive statistics for the data used for computing the KZ and WW Indices  
Panel A, for H1  
KZ index N Mean Median S.D 
Cash Flow  4919 1341 226.7 5635 
Total Assets 4919 5.627 5.523 1.732 
Cash Dividends  4919 22.12 1.569 110.15 
Cash 4919 123.03 4.499 642.8 
Q 4919 1.952 1.560 1.284 
Leverage 4919 0.297 0.303 0.179 
WW index     
Cash Flow  4911 1343 227.2 5639 
Cash Dividends Dummy 4911 1 1 0 
Leverage 4911 0.297 0.303 0.178 
Total Assets 4911 5.628 5.525 1.730 
Industry Sales Growth 4911 1.089 0.096 6.119 
Firms Sales Growth 4911 0.189 0.079 1.471 
 
Appendix B.2 provides statistical insights into the data used for computing the KZ and 
WW indices. The KZ index shows that cash flow has a mean of 1341 with a standard 
deviation of 5635, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of companies in 
regards to cash flow. Meanwhile, the firms’ total assets have a mean of 5.627 with a median 
of 5.523. The cash dividends are highly different among firms, with a mean of 22.12 and 
standard deviation of 110.15. The cash mean is 123.03, and it has a high level of variation 
across the sample. The Q has a mean of 1.952 and leverage has a mean of 0.297 and a median 
of 0.303. However, the WW index shows that cash flow has a mean of 1343 with a standard 
deviation of 5639, indicating a high level of variation across the sample of companies 
regarding cash flow. The firms’ cash dividends dummy in Panel A has a mean of 1 with a 
median of 1. The leverage of firms has a mean of 0.297 and a standard deviation of 0.303. 
The total assets mean is 5.628. The industry sales growth has a mean of 1.089 and a high 



































Appendix C1. Additional analysis: F and different capital constraints indices 
                                                              
 
VARIABLES KZE KZ4 
    
F  -0.010 -0.079  
 (0.011) (0.065)  
Firm size  0.021*** 0.119***  
 (0.006) (0.031)  
Constant -0.120*** -1.112***  
 (0.045) (0.245)  
    
Observations 4,919 4,919  
R-squared 0.132 0.137  
Year FE YES YES  
Industry FE YES YES  
KZE is the equal-weighted KZ-index; KZ4 is the KZ-index using four ratios for the current year; F is the 
number of female directors on the board; Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm for the previous year. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered (by 











Appendix C2. Additional analysis: F_INV and different capital constraints indices 
 
 
VARIABLES KZE KZ4 
   
F_INV  -0.041** -0.274** 
 (0.019) (0.109) 
Firm size  0.022*** 0.126*** 
 (0.006) (0.031) 
Constant -0.127*** -1.161*** 
 (0.045) (0.242) 
   
Observations 4,919 4,919 
R-squared 0.135 0.141 
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
KZE is the equal-weighted KZ-index; KZ4 is the KZ-index with four ratios for current year; F_INV is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a female is involved in any board committee, otherwise 0. Firm size is the log of total 
assets of the firm for the previous year.  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Two-way-clustered (by 




Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
Without financing, many firms will struggle to survive and grow. Therefore, having 
access to financing is a vital factor for a firm’s success. As such, firms try to grab the positive 
attention of capital providers in order to maintain better access to finance. On the other hand, 
capital providers evaluate firms’ characteristics, financial statements and corporate 
governance when firms request financing. This is because the capital providers want to 
ensure the firms will pay their debts. As such, many researchers try to understand and explore 
the factors that influence the decisions of capital providers. The prior literature finds some 
factors that may play a role in access to finance; audit quality, independent directors on firms’ 
boards and gender diversity among the board members are important factors that may impact 
creditors' financing decisions. This thesis aims to explore these factors in the Indian context.  
I chose India as the context of this study for several reasons. India’s widespread 
economic growth/development has rendered it an increasingly important actor on the world 
stage. India is the world’s second-most-populous country (CIA, 2020), one of the world’s 
five largest economies (International Monetary Fund, 2018), a member of the Group of 
Twenty (G20) countries, and one of the world’s fastest-developing and -growing economies 
(Banerjee et al., 2004). Moreover, India’s stock market was founded in 1875, making it one 
of the oldest in the world (Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013). Yet, India suffers from low 
protection for investors, high corruption and a weak judicial system. These contradictions in 
the institutional setting of India make it unique and worth examining. It is also important to 
understand the main factors that influence the decisions of capital providers over whether or 
not to provide finance. As such, this study seeks to understand how audit quality, the 
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presence of independent directors on firms’ boards and gender diversity among the board 
members impact creditors’ financing decisions in India. 
In order to understand the influence of these factors, quantitative data were collected. I 
obtained data from the Prowessdx database of the Centre for Monitoring of Indian Economy 
(CMIE), which contains data for companies with stocks listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange of India. The firms whose data I 
collected belong to 18 industrial categories. The database provides the necessary financial 
data for individual companies and supplementary background information on their 
operations. Prowessdx is an extensive database that provides statistics for companies operating 
in India and has been extensively employed in the empirical literature (Elango & Pattnaik, 
2007). It is important to mention that firms in financial industries were excluded because they 
have different operations, regulations and governance arrangements (Iatridis, 2018). It is also 
worth noting that each empirical chapter is based on a different sample due to the availability 
in Prowessdx of the information needed to perform the empirical tests. This will be explained 
further in the following sections. 
The remaining of this chapter presents the key findings, discussions and contributions 
of our thesis. Section 7.2 presents and summarises the key findings of Chapter 4, section 7.3 
those of Chapter 5 and section 7.4 those of Chapter 6. Following that, the contributions and 
implications of this thesis will be provided and the limitations discussed. Finally, future 




7.2  Audit Quality and Access to Finance 
Chapter 4 aims to explore how capital providers price audit elements when evaluating 
firms. Since audits serve to approve the credibility of firms’ financial reporting (Alzoubi, 
2018), capital providers might pay much attention to audit quality. Thus, I aim to find the 
relationship between access to finance and audit quality in listed Indian firms. I measure audit 
quality by audit fees and non-audit fees. Thus, in this chapter, I explore two relationships: 
that between audit fees and access to finance for listed Indian firms; and that between non-
audit fees and access to finance by reducing their capital constraints. I measure access to 
finance by firms’ capital constraints and I propose the following two hypotheses: 
 H1: A positive relationship exists between audit fees and access to finance for listed Indian 
firms. 
H2: A positive relationship exists between non-audit fees and access to finance for listed 
Indian firms. 
The sample used to test H1 comprised 971 companies listed on the Mumbai Stock 
Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, belonging to 18 industrial categories 
(Panel A). Panel B, used to test H2, consisted of 649 companies. Both panels included data 
for non-financial companies for the period from 2002 to 2017. 
The results show that the two factors play a significant role in firms’ access to finance. 
There is a significant positive relationship between audit fees and access to finance, and 
between non-audit fees and access to finance. This means that audit and non-audit fees paid 
by listed Indian firms grab a lot of attention from capital providers, and that the capital 
providers in India see high audit and non-audit fees as a green flag providing confidence 
about the credibility of the information provided in the firms’ financial statements. The 
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reason behind this might be that there are some concerns about accounting organisations' 
reliability in fulfilling their obligations toward audit frim errors (Chakrabarti, 2005) and weak 
protection for investors (Narayanaswamy et al., 2012).  
Following the limited attention perspective, high audit and non-audit fees have a 
significantly positive effect on capital providers who are constrained by limited attention 
capacity. Thus, high fees of this kind lead to more access to finance for listed companies in 
India. The findings show that the KZ-index for capital constraints shows a significant 
negative relationship with audit and non-audit fees, implying increased access to finance for 
those firms paying higher fees. The results support both hypotheses: there exists a positive 
relationship between audit fees and access to finance for listed Indian firms and a positive 
relationship between non-audit fees and access to finance. 
7.3  Independent Directors on Boards and Access to Finance 
Chapter 5 explores how capital providers in India value the independence of the board 
when assessing firms. A firm’s board of directors is responsible for overseeing the executive 
management. Managers have an incentive to manipulate financial information, either to avoid 
breaching loan covenants, or for personal gain if it triggers the payment of bonuses (Dechow 
et al., 1996). A higher presence of independent members on boards indicates better corporate 
governance, more oversight of management and financial information, and higher 
independence of auditors. However, there are concerns surrounding the ineffective role of 
independent directors in India due to the characteristics of the Indian context (e.g., the hiring 
of independent directors by firms’ management and thus potentially friendly relationships 
between the two). Therefore, I aim to explore the relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors on the board and access to finance. I propose the following hypothesis: 
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H1: There is a negative relationship between the percentage of independent members on a 
firm’s board and access to finance for listed firms in India.  
The second relationship that I look at is that between the remuneration of independent 
directors and access to finance. Capital providers may interpret the remuneration paid to 
independent directors in one of two ways: either that exaggerated remuneration packages may 
hinder the independence of directors (e.g. Goh & Gupta, 2016), or that the high remuneration 
reflects their efforts and time spent on the firms’ boards (Adams & Ferreira, 2008). 
Therefore, this study aims to grasp how the capital providers in India perceive the 
remuneration of independent directors. To examine this relationship, I hypothesise as 
follows: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the remuneration of independent directors and 
access to finance for listed firms in India. 
The sample for this chapter consisted of companies from 18 industrial categories listed 
on the Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, covering the 
period from 2006 to 2017. The sample used to test H1 comprised 1,054 Indian listed firms 
and that used to test H2 consisted of 894 firms. 
Regarding the first hypothesis, I find a substantial positive relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors and capital constraints, and thus a negative relationship 
between the percentage of independent directors and access to finance. In other words, capital 
providers in India perceive a high percentage of independent directors as a ‘red flag’ in the 
Indian context. The reason behind that might be that the independent directors' independence 
exists only on paper. This is supported by the findings of a prior study conducted by Bhatt 
and Bhattacharya (2015), who argue that managers nominate independent directors to 
maintain control over the firm. This may be attributed to the reality that appointing 
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independent board members is a novel practice in the Indian context (Arora & Sharma, 
2016).  
Interestingly, with respect to the second hypothesis, I find there is a significant negative 
relationship between the remuneration of independent directors and capital constraints, 
implying a positive relationship with access to finance. This means that capital providers 
perceive high remuneration of independent directors in the Indian context as a good sign. 
There are some explanations behind this relationship, even though capital providers might not 
consider independent director remuneration as a characteristic of independent directors. The 
remuneration of independent directors is connected to the firm’s profitability and sitting fees 
(the effort of the directors) (Naaraayanan & Nielsen, 2016). Therefore, the independent 
directors’ remuneration might be perceived by capital providers as demonstrating firms’ 
prospective profitability and enhanced activity of the board, which would affect firms’ 
likelihood of producing profits and continuing to exist in the market. Following the limited 
attention theory, a high percentage of independent directors on a firm’s board has a 
significant negative influence on capital providers who are constrained by a limited attention 
capacity, but their remuneration has a significant positive impact. 
7.4  Boards’ Gender Diversity and Access to Finance 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to examine how capital providers evaluate gender diversity 
when assessing whether to provide financing to a firm. A higher presence of women on the 
board of directors is assumed to improve the governance of a firm (Campbell & Mínguez-
Vera, 2008; Gordini & Rancati, 2017). This is because women are thought to improve the 
oversight and monitoring of management actions (Carter et al., 2003) and encourage firms to 
follow ethical best practice (Williams, 2003). It is also suggested that female board members 
improve voluntary disclosure (see, for example, Gul et al., 2009; Alves et al., 2015; Arun et 
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al., 2015), and put in more effort and have higher attendance rates (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
This implies their willingness to engage in monitoring activities, and suggests they are better 
at organising board meetings than men (Huse & Solberg, 2006). Additionally, having a more 
heterogeneous board makes it more likely that it will provide more diverse solutions and 
opinions on issues. Therefore, I expected that capital providers would perceive the presence 
of women on the board as a sign of better governance, and I hypothesised a positive 
relationship between access to finance and the number of female directors on the board.  
The board of directors is comprised of committees considered to be a significant aspect 
of the governance process. Therefore, it is important that these committees are created 
properly since the board regularly allocates duties to them to more effectively manage 
specialised or complex matters. The main task of the committees is to provide 
recommendations to the board, and the appointment of the right committee members will 
allow the board to accomplish its duties efficiently. Researchers in governance find that, 
when female directors participate in a board’s committees, particularly monitoring 
committees (e.g. the audit committee), it reduces managerial manipulation (Zalata et al., 
2019) and increases the integrity of company reports (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Therefore, I 
believe that the presence of women on a board’s committees will be appreciated by capital 
providers, and I hypothesise a positive relationship between female directors’ participation in 
firms’ board committees and access to finance for listed firms in India.  
In order to test my hypotheses in this chapter, I again collected data from the Prowessdx 
database. This consisted of an unbalanced panel dataset of 1,013 companies listed on the 
Mumbai Stock Exchange of India and the National Stock Exchange, across 18 industry 
categories, totalling 4,919 observations between 2008 and 2017. 
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The results show a weak evidence of the negative relationship between both the number 
of female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees, and capital 
constraints, suggesting that greater female participation implies better access to finance by 
reducing their capital constraints. The results are not consistence and weak to support both 
hypotheses: a positive relationship between the presence of female directors on firms’ boards 
and access to finance for listed firms in India, and a positive relationship between female 
directors’ participation in board committees and firms’ access to finance. Under the limited 
attention theory, this study not supports that more female director on firms’ boards and their 
participations in board committees have a significant, positive influence on capital providers 
who are constrained by limited attention capacity. This could not lead to better access to 
finance for listed companies in India that appoint women to such positions. The presence of 
female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board committees in India not 
grabbing the capital providers’ attention positively. Capital providers are not perceive greater 
female representation on the board of directors and participation in board committees as 
positive signs of a firm’s board performance, this might due to that India experiences 
widespread gender inequality (Raju, 2014), which impacts the capital providers perception 
toward female representation in such positions.  
7.5  Contributions 
This research makes numerous contributions to the current literature and has significant 
theoretical implications. Although most previous literature focuses on advanced economies 
when investigating access to finance (Aryeetey, 1998; Beck et al., 2006), little research has 
been conducted in emerging economies. Developing economies have many different features 
to advanced economies (e.g. infrastructure, political systems and financial systems). For 
instance, developing economies have low protection for shareholders and investors (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010) and weak capital markets (Claessens 
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& Yurtoglu, 2013). India provides a unique example of an emerging market economy. For 
instance, India has unusually high family control (Houqe et al., 2017) and corruption (World 
Justice Project, 2016), while ranking as one of the largest economies in the world. Therefore, 
this research closes existing gaps by presenting evidence of capital providers’ perceptions in 
the unique context of India’s emerging market.  
Although many investigations have been conducted in developed economies (mainly 
the US) on auditing and finance (Larcker & Richardson, 2004; Srinidhi & Gul, 2007; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2008; Nam & Ronen, 2012), the research conducted in India raises many 
doubts about the quality of audit services, even those provided by big accounting firms 
(Joshy et al., 2015). India also experiences weak actions taken by professional accounting 
organisations against poor or faulty auditing (Chakrabarti, 2005). Therefore, the first 
contribution of this thesis is exploring capital providers’ attitudes towards audit quality in 
listed Indian firms (Chapter 5).   
Most of the previous research analysing the relationship between independent directors 
and finance has also been conducted in the US economy (e.g. Sengupta & Bhojraj, 2003; 
Anderson et al., 2004a; Ertugrul & Hegde, 2008). Yet, this relationship might be different in 
other contexts (Lorca et al., 2011). In addition, there are some concerns about the 
independence of independent directors in India (Bhatt & Bhattacharya, 2015). Thus, the 
current investigation’s purpose is to fill this gap by offering evidence from the Indian context 
to reveal the perspective of capital providers on the percentage of independent directors and 
their remuneration in Indian listed firms. Consequently, the second contribution of this 
research is its investigation of the impact of independent directors and their remuneration on 
a company’s ability to access finance in India (Chapter 6).  
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Little attention has been paid to understanding the role of gender diversity in firms’ 
boards (Arun et al., 2015). The existing literature on the association between gender and 
finance has predominantly been conducted in developed economies, for instance, Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and Li and Zhang (2019) in the US and Arun et al. (2015) in the UK. 
However, in developing economies, this relationship might be different because corporate 
governance often falls short in emerging markets (Liedong & Rajwani, 2018). Also, Indian 
women often suffer from gender discrimination (Jadiyappa et al., 2019). Therefore, the 
current research helps to seal this gender gap by showing the attitude of capital providers 
towards the number of female directors on firms’ boards and their participation in board 
committees in India. This will hopefully encourage firms to enhance female director’s role on 
boards, thereby increasing firms’ access to finance. Thus, the third contribution of this thesis 
is the finding that the presence of female directors on companies’ boards affects those 
companies’ ability to access finance in India (Chapter 7). 
The final contribution of this thesis is its theoretical contribution. Previous research on 
access to finance has applied the agency theory to explain the findings (see, e.g., Sengupta & 
Bhojraj, 2003; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011; Barroso et al., 2018). Pecking order theory has 
also been used in previous investigations to explain access to finance (see, e.g. Hernandez-
Nicolas et al., 2015; Benkraiem et al., 2018). However, due to the use of the unique context 
of India in this investigation, I believed that using a new theoretical framework would 
provide new findings. Consequently, this research aimed to extend our understanding of the 
phenomenon of access to finance by employing limited attention theory. Therefore, it has 
attempted to offer an alternative interpretation of the associations between a firm’s financial 
constraints and audit and non-audit fees (Chapter 5), the percentage of independent directors 
on a firm’s board and their remuneration (Chapter 6), and female directors on a firm’s board 
and their participation in board committees (Chapter 7). To the best of my knowledge, no 
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other investigations have previously employed limited attention theory in this context. 
Previous studies have used this theory to explain investors’ attention (Hirshleifer & Teoh, 
2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2004; Barber & Odean, 2008) or debtors’ attention towards 
advertising expenses (Ding et al., 2017). Consequently, this research expands the application 
of limited attention theory to understand capital providers’ attention paid towards audits, 
independent directors on firms’ boards and gender diversity on firms’ boards in India. 
7.6  Implications 
My empirical results have several implications for regulators, policymakers, 
companies, investors and practitioners. For regulators and policymakers, the results about 
independent board members and access to finance reveal that capital providers do not value 
the presence of independent directors on firms’ boards. This may imply that capital providers 
in India believe that independent directors are not truly independent. In other words, the 
companies may only be symbolically complying with the regulations on independent board 
members without actually implementing the regulations effectively. In this case, the 
companies may be deceiving the shareholders and stakeholders, who may not have a strong 
knowledge of corporate governance. Examining the history of several financial frauds and 
crises, there is one main common factor, which is that the independent board members have 
not really been independent. Therefore, I highly advise regulatory bodies and policymakers in 
India and other emerging countries to work proactively to strengthen the requirements on 
firms’ independent board members and ensure they are truly independent. I also recommend 
that investors pay considerable attention when evaluating firms, particularly in regard to 
corporate governance practice and independent board members. I recommend that firms 
appoint members of the board who are independent in reality and not just in appearance. This 
is because these members will eventually work for the benefit of the firms by providing more 
oversight of the management. More importantly, it is highly recommended that Indian firms 
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try to apply the best corporate governance practices in order to grab international investors’ 
attention. This is because international investors take corporate governance very seriously 
(Hassan et al., 2018) and could pay a premium of 12–14% to companies that apply best 
governance practices. For individual investors and shareholders, I highly recommend that 
they play an active role by participating in the general assembly, electing and voting for the 
right, truly independent board members.  
In addition, the results from the examination of the remuneration of independent board 
members and access to finance imply that capital providers appreciate higher payment of 
independent members of firms’ boards. This suggests that the capital providers in India do 
not see independent board members’ remuneration as a threat to their independence. Indeed, 
the remuneration of independent directors might be a signal of a firm’s profitability and the 
activity of the board members, since this remuneration contains a percentage of the annual 
profit and the sitting fees. In this sense, regulators in India should issue and apply regulations 
to reduce any potential doubt in regards to the economic bond between the board of directors 
and firms’ management. The major growth of the Indian economy is enticing many 
international investors, and it is important that these investors’ investments are protected. 
Regarding the audit quality results, I find that capital providers price audit quality based 
on audit and non-audit fees. This may indicate that capital providers aim to ensure the 
integrity of financial information and that good controls are in place in firms, as this increases 
the likelihood that they will repay their debts. Therefore, I recommend that firms do not 
hesitate to pay for auditors and non-auditing services, as this will convey a positive signal to 
capital providers and other stakeholders. I advise regulators to encourage firms to invest and 
pay to get better auditing, as this will improve their access to finance, the integrity and 
credibility of their financial reporting, and eventually their image among their competitors. I 
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also recommend that the regulators take steps to improve the auditing profession since the 
capital providers, the most knowledgeable stakeholders, pay attention to audit quality. For the 
investors, I would advise them to invest in firms with high-quality auditing and in firms that 
pay to improve their financial statements.  
In terms of gender diversity, our results indicate that the government need to take more 
steps to promote equality between men and women. This is especially important in Indian 
society, which is largely male-dominated and characterised by gender discrimination. As 
such, the Indian government should take further steps and issue more regulations to promote 
the advantages of the presence of female directors on boards. For instance, instead of forcing 
listed firms to have at least one female director on the board, women should comprise at least 
a third of the board. India should follow the examples of other countries that have taken 
similar measures. For instance, in Norway, firms are required to have at least 40% female 
board members (Bohren & Strom, 2010). In addition, investors might need to investigate 
more when before investing in firms whose boards contain female members. Another 
implication is that other countries in emerging market contexts might apply the same tactic, 
thereby encouraging greater gender equality in their own contexts to obtain the real benefits 
of gender diversity on firms’ board. Therefore, I highly recommend that firms in India and 
other countries appoint more female directors to serve on their boards.  
7.7 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Like all studies, our research contains limitations that could provide useful avenues for 
future research. Although India provides a strong example of an emerging market context, 
this study’s hypotheses and the results of the tests might not be generalizable to other 
emerging countries, such as China, due to their different financial systems. Therefore, I invite 
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researchers and practitioners to replicate this study in different contexts and compare the 
results.  
One main limitation of this research is that data availability prevented me from 
controlling for important elements, such as family ownership; I believe this variable might 
enhance the research results by highlighting the impact of family ownership on access to 
finance, particularly in environments suffering from the unique control of family groups 
compared to other developing contexts (Houqe et al., 2017). This variable may also affect the 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms in listed Indian firms. For example, the 
controlling privileges of family groups afford them influence over the selection of the 
independent members of the board (Kumar & Singh, 2012). Therefore, the research does not 
show how the capital providers perceive the family groups. Additionally, it might enhance 
the results of this research if we had access to other corporate governance variables, which 
would show the degree of governance effective in Indian-listed firms, such as CEO-Chair 
duality and characteristics of the board committees. This may capture better insights into the 
capital providers’ attitude toward Indian corporate governance, especially if the standard of 
corporate governance in India lags behind (Bhatt and Bhattacharya, 2015). In addition, in this 
research, I follow Cheng et al. (2014) by employing tests that do not use any control variables 
beyond size for the KZ index and no control variable for the WW index; however, recent 
related literature does consider control variables (Sun et al., 2020; Tsai et al., 2021), which 
might enhance the results of this research and capture more insights relating to access to 
finance. Moreover, this research focuses on the key dependent variable (KZ index) for the 
late 1990s, and the WW index is employed for the mid-2000s. However, the latest index, e.g., 
the SA index, from 2010 has not been used due to data availability; this might give more 
strength to research results. Finally, this research does not use other capital constraints 
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indicators, such as cost of loan (Beladi et al., 2018), which would provide a different angle to 
support the findings of this research.  
As avenues for future research; this study is that it only covers the listed firms in India. 
This highlights an opportunity for researchers to extend this investigation to unlisted firms in 
India, with the same hypotheses, to develop a better understanding of the three factors 
discussed in this study. Also, this study only explores the impact of independent board 
members, board diversity and audit quality on access to finance. Hence, further research is 
urgently needed to explore other important factors which may influence access to finance. 
These factors include auditor specialisation, audit tenure, other characteristics of the members 
of the board of directors (e.g., directors’ educational qualifications, tenure and age) and of the 
board committees. I highly recommend that researchers explore the impact of audit 
committee characteristics (size, meetings, independence, gender, etc.) on access to finance. 
This is because the audit committee is considered one of the most important elements of 
corporate governance since it is responsible for financial reporting, external auditors and 
internal auditors. A similar argument could be made for the risk committee. It would also be 
interesting to conduct a qualitative study, including interviews or surveys of capital providers 
to investigate their perceptions of the major factors that influence their decisions about 
providing finance. More importantly, future research should aim to understand capital 
providers’ points of view regarding independent board members to try to understand the 
results of our study in this area. This kind of study could substantially help us to understand 
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